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Games, . . .
Game theory deals with situations in which several persons with (possibly) diverging
interests are involved. These persons (players) have to make choices, which then to-
gether determine the outcome. All players have some knowledge of the choices available
to each player and of the preferences of each player regarding the outcomes. In their
monumental book Theory of games and economic behavior, John von Neumann and
Oskar Morgenstern (1944) argued that economic problems may be analyzed as games.
Once all irrelevant details are stripped away from an economic problem, one is left with
an abstract decision problem: a game.
Traditionally, game theory has been divided into a cooperative and a non-cooperative
branch. In a cooperative game players are assumed to be able to make binding agree-
ments and to form coalitions, although this is not explicitly shown by the rules of the
game. Such a game is namely described by what each coalition can achieve when its
members cooperate. The main questions addressed in cooperative game theory are which
coalition will form and how the gains should be divided among its members. In this thesis
only non-cooperative games will be studied. The rules of a non-cooperative game de-
scribe precisely which choices are available to each player. Players are only able to make
binding agreements whenever the rules of the game permit them to do so. Each player
has to decide which plan of action to follow in such a game, independently of the other
players. Since the outcome of the game will depend on the actions of all players, which
action is optimal for a player depends on the actions the other players choose. The ac-
tion that a plaver chooses, therefore, depends on what he expects the other players to do.
I
2 Introduction
Rules, . . .
In order to model an economic situation as a game one needs to answer the follow-
ing questions. Who are the players? Which actions are available to them? What is the
information of the players? What are the preferences of the players over the possible
outcomes of play? Hence, one is forced to think in detail about the economic institutions
and instruments that could play a role in a certain context, a particular phenomenon
one wants to explain.
When transforming an economic situation into a garne, one faces the trade-off between
simplicity and abstraction on the one hand, and reality on the other. A game should
be reasonably simple in order to be analyzed and to provide insights, but it should
also not be too far from reality. One needs to take care in defining the rules of the
game. Sometimes a small change of the rules of the game is sufficient to lead to totally
different results. Consider, for example, a very simple linear duopoly model with two
identical firms. When the firms compete in prices profits will be zero in equilibrium
(Bertrand (1883)). Equilibrium profits are positive and identical (Cournot (1838)) if
they compete in quantities. If one firm can move before the other, the leader will have
higher profits than the follower (Von Stackelberg (1934)). This example shows that the
exact specification of the rules may have an enormous impact on the outcome. Somet.imes
it is difFicult to determine which details of a real life problem are truly irrelevant for the
decision problem, and which only appear to be so at first sight.
It is therefore important to examine the consequences when players can make, what
Thomas Schelling (1960) calls, strategic moves. Examples of such moves are: making
promises, uttering threats or committing oneself to a certain course of action. The notion
of commitment should be interpreted in a broad sense. One way of committing oneself
is to take an irrevocable action. For instance, an army unit may burn the bridges behind
itself, thereby making a withdrawal physically impossible. Another way of committing is
to delegate responsibility of the final decision to another person whose incentive structure
provides an ex post motive for fulfillment. For example, a government may give authority
to punish lawbreakers to sadists. Yet another way to commit is to worsen one's own
payoff in case of non-fulfillment. For example, one may accept a wager not to break a
diet. These and many other examples of strategic moves are given by Schelling (1960) in
his classic The strategy of confiict. He shows (wit.hout having to go into deep technical
detail) that such moves may affect the outcome. He also points out that, in order to
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make commitments or promises, it is necessary that they can be communicated to the
other players.
A major part of this thesis is devoted to the analysis of games in which strategic
moves are possible. These strategic moves should and will be formally incorporated in
the description of the rules of the game.
In Chapters 4 and 5 we consider a strategic move that appears to be completely
irrelevant. Namely, we consider a situation in which one of two players involved in a
particular game may choose to burn some money (or, tnore general, some utility) before
this game is played. At first sight it seems obvious that this player will never choose to
burn money, and that the possibility to do so will have no effect on the outcome of the
game. This intuition, however, is misleading.l The reason is that once the possibility of
burning money is incorporated in the rules of the game, the second player must make
his choice of action dependent on whether or not some money was burnt. The model
with burning money is therefore mathematically equivalent to a model in which the first
player has access to a costly communication technology. The outcome of the game will
depend on how a signal of burning money (or, for that matter, a signal of not burning
money) is interpreted by the second player. In Chapter 4 a signal may reveal intended
play in the future, while in Chapter 5 a signal may reveal some private information.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of this thesis deal with the order in which decisions are made.
Usually it is assumed either that all players choose simultaneously (nobody can make
commitments), or that they choose in a particular given order (the first player can (or
must) make a commitment). Anyway, the order of moves is exogenous and this may
be a bad reflection of reality. Some authors addressed this issue by determining the
outcome for every possible order of moves and then compare the different outcomes.
This approach is, however, unsatisfactory. Usually it will not be the case that all players
prefer the outcome that results from one particular order and it will be difficult to say
something sensible about which order will occur. It does not necessarily make sense to
assume that, if no agreement of the above type can be reached, then the model in which
all players play simultaneously will result. It might be the case, like in a price-setting
duopoly with differentiated products, that a leader-follower configuration is preferred,
by leader and follower, to the configuration with simultaneous moves. And even in case
there is one particular order of moves t,hat is preferred by all players, it is not at all
obvious that this order will result.
1See also Van Damme (1989) and Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992).
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In order to be able to predict whether there will be sequential or simultaneous decision
making, one needs a model in which the order of the moves is determined endogenously.
In Chapters 6 and 7 we use a two period model. In this model players decide whether
to move early (period 1) or late (period 2). However, they do not have the ability
to move before the other. Chapter 6 deals with games in which players have finitely
many strategies. The main result concerns games that have an equilibrium at which no
player has an incentive to move first. Chapter 7 is concerned with games like Cournot
competition, in which players have infinitely many strategies and do have an incentive
to move first. In Chapter 8 we investigate the robustness of the power to commit with
respect to the communication of the commitment. Schelling (1960) already pointed
out that the communication of a commitment is crucial. Moreover, Bagwell (1992)
claimed that the power to commit is completely lost whenever there is the slightest
imperfection in the observability of the commitment. In the case of quantity competition
this would imply that, if there is some small probability that the follower observes a
quantity different from the actual commitment quantity, the leader will not commit
himself to his Stackelberg quantity. Instead; he will commit himself to his Cournot
quantity. We show, however, that Bagwell's claim crucially depends on the restriction
to pure strategy equilibria, and that, when mixed strategy equilibria are taken into
account, there is no need to reconsider the literature that applies the idea of a first-
mover advantage.
and Solutions
Once the rules of a game are established, mathematical and game theoretical tools can
be fruitfully applied to "solve" the game analytically and rigorously. A solution of a
game should either predict how this game will be played or recommend a particular
way of playing the game. Usually a game is solved by determining the Nash equilibria,
that is, by finding those strategy profiles from which no player wants to deviate uni-
laterally. 5ometimes refinements or "coarsenings" of the Nash equilibrium concept are
considered. In the last two decades the game theoretical tool-box has been extended by
many authors. The main contributions, however, were by John Nash, John Harsanyi
and Reinhard Selten.2 Nash (1950) introduced the concept of a(Nash) equilibrium.
Selten (1965) introduced the notion of subgame perfection in dynamic games to exclude
2For their contributions they were awarded the 1994 Nobel memorial pri2e in economics by the Royal
Swedish Academy of Sciences.
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Nash equilibria that are based on empty threats. Harsanyi (1967-68) showed how sit-
uations with incomplete information can be modeled. Moreover, Harsanyi and Selten
(1988) addressed the problem that a game may possess multiple equilibria. Together
they developed a theory that always selects a unique solution.
By now there are many different solution concepts, many of which are refinements of
the Nash equilibrium. (See Van Damme (1987).) The solution of a game depends cru-
cially on the solution concept that is employed. This is particularly (but not exclusively)
true if the game has more than one Nash equilibrium. Should all equilibria be consid-
ered as solutions of the game? Or should perhaps attention be restricted to a certain
refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept? And if so, to which one? Should we invoke
the selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) which gives a unique solution, or is
it more reasonable not to restrict to Nash equilibria but to consider all rationalizable
strategies (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984))? There seems to be no definitive answer
to these questions, and this thesis certainly will not give one. In this thesis we do not
introduce new solut,ion concepts. Instead, we discuss and apply several solution concepts
that have been introduced only recently and which may therefore be unfamiliar to most
readers. We also consider some variatiotis of existing solution concepts.
Main emphasis will be on curb sets. A curb set is a product set of strategies that is
closed under best replies. If a player is sure that all other players will play a strategy
from a particular curb set, then it is in this player's interest to do so as well. Curb sets
were introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991). In Chapter 2 we formally introduce curb
sets and other related set-valued concepts. In Chapter 3 we show how players may learn
to play strategies from a minimal curb set. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6(and, in a sense, also
in Chapters 7 and 8) we employ minimal curb sets as the solution concept.
In Chapters 7 and 8 we will use an equilibrium selection theory that selects a unique
strategy profile as the solution of the game. This theory is mainly based on the selection
theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), and in particular on the tracing procedure of
Harsanyi (1975). In some respects, however, our theory will differ from the existing
theories. Most applications of the selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) have
been restricted to the class of 2 x 2 games. Probably this is due to the complexities of
the computations involved in their theory. Chapters 7 and 8 may therefore also be seen
as exercises in applying the tracing procedure.
6 Introduction
1.1 Summary
Games, Rules, and Solutions is a thesis on non-cooperative game theory. It aims to
investigate the consequences of incorporating certain strategic moves (such as commit-
ments and communication) in the rules of a game. At the same time it explores the
workings of some recently introduced solution concepts.
Chapter 1 is introductory.
Chapter 2 starts with a brief discussion of (set-valued) solution concepts. Several set-
valued concepts are formally defined in this chapter. Main focus will be on sets of strategy
profiles that are closed under (some kind of) best replies. In particular, curb, curb",
robust and persistent sets and primitive, primitive~, robust and persistent formations
are defined. Several properties of these concepts are listed. We will make use of these
properties in several other chapters. Examples are provided to illustrate the subtle
differences between the above mentioned solution concepts. Chapter 2 concludes by
discussing two other set-valued solution concepts, namely cyclically stable sets (Matsui
(1992)) and equilibrium evolutionarily stable sets (Swinkels (1992)).
It is important to know whether a solution concept is relevant in an eductive or
in an evolutionary context. Chapter 3 shows that curb and persistency are relevant
in an evolutionary context. It presents a dynamic learning process with the following
characteristic: Players have a bounded memory and play best replies against beliefs,
formed on the basis of strategies used in the recent past. It is shown that this learning
process leads the players to playing strategies from a minimal curb set, i.e. a minimal
set of strategies that is closed under best replies. This result continues to hold in the
presence of mimickers and sophisticated players. VVhen players are not certain about the
strategies chosen by the other players, the process does not converge to a minimal curb
set, but to a minimal curb~`, robust or persistent set, depending on how the uncertainty
is modeled.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the consequences of allowing some players to burn some
money before a game is played. At first sight it might seem that an opportunity to burn
money is completely irrelevant, since it seems unlikely that it will ever be used. It turns
out, however, that having this opportunity is (mathematically) equivalent with having
access to a costly pre-play communication technology and that it does affect. the outcome.
In Chapter 4 we consider a setting with an arbitrary (finite) number of players among
which there are some who have the possibility to burn money. We show that strategy
profiles in minimal curb (or curb~`) sets yield all players who have the possibility to
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burn, their preferred outcome. Moreover, in such profiles no money is actually burnt,
the possibility alone suffices. T'he results go through for persistent sets in the special case
of two person games, but not for games with more than two players. Chapter 5 considers
the possibility of burning money in a game with asymmetric information. There are two
players, a Sender and a Receiver. The Sender has private information on his type, which
affects the payoff of both players. The Receiver must choose an action, and this action
affects the payoff of both players. Before the Receiver takes an action the Sender sends
a costly message to the Receiver. It is shown that each type of the Sender gets his
preferred action in any curb (or curb~` or persistent) strategy profile.
It has been long recognized that the order in which players take their decisions is very
important. In most models the rules of the game prescribe a particular order in which
players make their decisions. Sometimes there is a"first-mover advantage". If that is
the case all players will try to obtain the first move. That is, each player will want to
commit himself to a particular action, thereby inducing the other players to behave in a
way that is favorable to himself.
Chapter 6 investigates which equilibria of a bi-matrix garne are still víable when both
players have the opportunity to commit themselves. To that end we study a model of
endogenous timing in which players face the trade-off between committing early and
forcing the opponent to best respond, and moving late so as to be able to play a best
response against the opponent. It is shown that when the sequencing of the moves is
endogenous, mixed strategy equilibria of the original game are only viable if they are
commitment robust, that is, if no player has an incentive to move first at this equilibrium.
In contrast, any pure strategy equilibrium is a perfect equilibrium outcome of the timing
game. The concepts of curb~ and persistent equilibria, however, allow the conclusion
that only commitment robust equilibria are viable.
Chapter 7 analyzes some economic games of timing, where the original game has a
unique Nash equilibrium which is not commitment robust. The endogenous timing game
has three pure subgame perfect equilibria. Either a leader-follower configuration occurs
in which the players play in different periods (two possibilities) or the equilibrium of
the original game is played in period one. In order to make a selection between these
equilibria elements from the equilibrium selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988)
are applied. In part.icular, the risk dominance relation between the three equilibria
is investigated. It turns out that playing the Nash equilibrium in period one is risk
dominated by both Stackelberg equilibria. In order to select between the Stackelberg
equilibria we restrict ourselves to three specific games: (1) Cournot quantity competition,
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(2) price competition with differentiated products and (3) the private provision of a public
good. We assume that players differ with respect to marginal cost. The result we obtain
in each of the three games under consideration, is that the equilibrium in which the low
cost firm is the leader is risk dominant.
In Chapters 6 and 7 it was assumed that players can commit to an irreversible action,
and communicate this action to the opponent. In Chapter 8 we analyze the situation
with an exogenously given leader. But the action of this leader is only imperfectly
observed by the follower. Bagwell (1992) made the claim that the power to commit
oneself to an action does not confer any strategic benefit if this commitment cannot be
perfectly observed by the opponent. It is shown in Chapter 8 that this claim crucially
depends on the restriction to pure strategy equilibria. Specifically, the game analyzed
by Bagwell always has a mixed equilibrium that is close to the Stackelberg equilibrium
of the game in which the commitment is observed perfectly. We introduce a new theory
of equilibrium selection that combines elements from the theory of Harsanyi and Selten
(1988) with elements from the theory of Harsanyi (1993). When the noise is sufficiently
small, this theory selects the Stackelberg equilibrium.
1.2 Organization of this thesis
Several chapters of this thesis are based on papers that have appeared elsewhere. Some
of these were co-authored by Eric van Damme. Chapter 3 is based on Hurkens (1994).
Chapter 4 is almost the same as Hurkens (1993). Chapter 6 is a(substantially) revised
version of Van Damme and Hurkens (1993). Chapter 7 is based on joint research with
Eric van Damme. Chapter 8 is almost identical to Van Damme and Hurkens (1994).
This thesis can be read in several ways. The first way is to start at the beginning and
read through till the end. Alternative ways may be followed by readers who are mainly
interested in a particular chapter or subject. All chapters are almost self-contained.
Readers interested in the theoretical aspects of set-valued solution concepts may read
Chapter 2(for definitions, properties and some examples) and Chapter 3(for a justi-
fication of such concepts in a dynamic learning framework). They are urged to read
Section 1.3 (that introduces some notation and basic concepts) first. Readers mainly
interested in applications of set-valued solution concepts should glance through Sec-
tions 1.3 and 2.2 and then go to Chapters 4, 5 or 6. Persons interested in equilibrium
selection theories may want to read Chapters 7 or 8. Readers interested in Chapter 7
may want to read 5ections 6.1 through 6.3 first, while Chapter 8 may be read without
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any preparatory reading.
By organiZing the thesis in such a way that each chapter is (almost) self-contained,
it was inevitable that some overlap between chapters occurred. So be it.
1.3 Preliminaries
This section introduces some basic notations and concepts that will be used throughout
most parts of the thesis.
Let g-(Ar, ..., An, ul, ..., un) be a finite n-person normal forrn game with player set
N-{ 1, ..., n}. A; denotes the finite set of pure strategies of player i. Let A- jI; r A;.
For any finite and non-empty set X we denote the set of probability distributions over
X by 0(X). Let S; - 0(A;) denote the set of mixed strategies of player i, and let
S- j~j; r S;. We will identify a pure action with the probability distribution that puts
all weight on this action. For a strategy profile s E S, s; denotes player i's strategy and
s-; denotes the profile of strategies of all players besides i. Similarly, for any product set
X - jj; r X; we denote X-; - jh~; X~. Usually we will interpret S; and S-; as beliefs
over the behavior of player i and the behavior of all players besides i, respectively.
Sometimes we will allow a player i to have a correlated belief over the behavior of all
other players, i.e. his belief will then be an element of 0(A-;). The uncorrelated strategy
sets S and S-; are embedded in a natural way in ~(A) and 0(A-;), respectively. Typical
elements of these correlated strategy sets are denoted by s` and s` ;, respectively. For a
distribution s` E 0(A) let s; E 0(A;) be the marginal on A;, and let, s`; E 0(A-;) be
the marginal on A-;, i.e.
S;(ai) - ~a-~EA-.Sc(aiiQ-i) lQi E Ai)
s-i(Q-i) - ~a~EA,sc(aiva-i) (a-i E A-i)
Because of the natural embedding of mixed strategies into the set of correlated strategies
it suffices to give definitions for the most general case, i.e. for the case of correlated
strategies. The payoff function of player i, u; : A-~ R, is extended to u; : S; x 0(A-;) -~
R in the following natural way.
~i(Sii S~ i) '- ~ Silai)Sc i(a-i)ui(Q)
nEA
For s`; E 0(A-;) let 13;(s`;) - argmax{u;(s;,s`;)~s; E S;} denote the set of best
replies for player i against s`;. For s E S let Ci(s) - j-j; r 13;(s-;). The pure best replies
are denoted by B;(s`,) - 13;(s`;) f1 A; and B(s) - Ci(s) fl A. For any set F C 0(A), let
10 Introduction
B;(F) - US~EFB;(s`;), and let B(F) -~;~ B;(F). A strategy combination s is called
a Nash equilibrium if s E Ci(s). It is called strict if {s} - Ci(s). As a kind of inverse of
the best reply correspondence we define the stability region. Now we need to distinguish
the correlated strategy case from the uncorrelated strategy case. For s; E S;, let
St;(s;) - {s-; E S-;~s; E ,r3;(s-;)},
St,`(s;) -{s`, E S`;~s; E I3;(s`;)}.
Strategies s; and s; are equivalent (s; ~ s;) if u;(s;, a-;) - u;(s,., a-;) for all a-; E A-;.
Strategy s; is weakly dominated by s; if u;(s;,a-;) C u;(s;.,a-;) for all a-; E A-; with
strict inequality for at least one a-;. For s; E S; we let C(s;) - {a; E A;~s;(a;) ~ 0}
denote the carrier or support of s;, and C(s) - j~j; ~ C(s;). Sometimes, we also write
supp(s) - C(s). Strategy s; is completely mixed if C(s;) - A;. Strat,egy combinat.ion s




Since the work of Nash ( 1950), the Nash equilibrium is probably the best known and
most applied solution concept in the literature on strategic interaction. Actually, it
was already present ( under different names) in the work of Cournot ( 1838) and Bertrand
(1883). A Nash equilibrium describes a situation of "stability". It is a profile of strategies
such that no player can improve his payoff by a unilateral deviation. Any theory that
would recommend players to play a strategy profile that is not a Nash equilibrium, is
necessarily self-defeating. There are, however, some problems with the Nash equilibrium
concept.
First, it is optimal to play an equilibrium strategy if the other players play their part
of the equilibrium. But, in general, a Bayesian player should try and guess what strate-
gies the other players are choosing and respond optimally against these strategies. It is,
a priori, not obvious that the other players choose equilibrium strategies.l The literature
has paid attention to the question of how players may reach a Nash equilibrium. In some
circumstances, players can deduce what the other players will do. When it is common
knowledge that players are rational ( i.e., maximize their expected payoff), iterated elim-
ination of strictly dominated strategies can be applied, and in some situations (when
the game is dominance solvable ( see Moulin ( 1979) and Milgrom and Roberts ( 1991)))
this is enough to ensure that a Nash equilibrium will be played. In other cases, a player
may have some idea of which strategies will be used by the other players, because the
1See Edgar Allen Poe's (1908) "The purloined letter" for a nice story in which a boy beats his
opponent in Matching Pennies by guessing his opponent's strategy and playing optimally against that
strategy.
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same game has been played repeatedly over time and he has some information about the
evolution of play. There is a growing literature on learning and evolution, which views
(some) Nash equilibria as the rest points of a dynamic system in which players adapt
their strategies gradually and myopically. (For a survey see Van Damme (1994a).)
A second problem with Nash equilibria is that they might not be that stable after
all. Although no player can improve his payoff by a unilateral deviation, it might be the
case that some deviations do not hurt the player. In other words, some players might
have multiple best replies. This is always the case in mixed strategy equilibria. This
problem does not arise for strict equilibria. The conclusion seems to be that strict Nash
equilibria are very appealing2 but, unfortunately, in many interesting games they do not
exist.
We remarked above that any single-valued solution concept, that is, any theory that
recommends to play a particular strategy profile, must recommend a Nash equilibrium
or be self-defeating. In this chapter we will consider set-valved solution concepts. Unlike
a Nash equilibrium, such solution concepts do not give a single strategy profile as the
solution of the game, but they yield a set of strategy profiles as the solution. Set-valued
solution concepts are not new: Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) proposed the notion of
rationalizable strategies, Kalai and Samet (1984) defined persistent retracts, Gilboa and
Matsui (1991) and Matsui (1992) introduced cyclically stable sets (CSS), Swinkels (1992)
introduced equilibrium evolutionarily stable sets (EES sets). More abstract notions of
set-valued solution concepts were proposed by Kalai and Schmeidler (1977) and Gilboa
and Samet (1991). Some of these set-valued concepts can be viewed as a generalization
of strict equilibria in the following sense. If a player deviates and plays a(sensible)
strategy outside the solution set, then he is not playing optimally. Moreover, many of
these set-valued solution concepts exist for all games.
One might wonder whether set-valued solution concepts are useful for prediction pur-
poses. Probably (and hopefully) it will be more often the case that observed behavior
(i.e., the strategy profile actually chosen) is an element of the solution set, than that it
happens to be a Nash equilibrium. But if the set is large the predictive power may be
very low. For example, the set may contain all strategy profiles. In Chapter 4 on pre-play
communication we will see that the solution set (in that case curb or persistent retracts)
is large, but all elements of this set correspond to the same outcome. In Chapter 6 on
endogenous timing, we will see that all equilibria in a persistent retract correspond to
zOne strict equilibrium may be more appealing than another because the former may be payoff
and~or risk dominant.
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the same outcome. Other applications of persistent and curb retracts can be found in
Kalai and Samet (1985), Blume (1993a,b, 1994) and Balkenborg (1993a). We conclude
that the assumption that players choose a strategy from the solution set is rather weak,
but in some applications it suffices to draw strong conclusions.
It could be the case that set-valued solution concepts suffer from the same problem
as Nash equilibria. Namely, it is only optimal to play in the set if the other players do
so. The literature has paid attention to this matter also. The solution concepts EES
and CSS are usually viewed as the resulting outcome of some (unspecified) evolutionary
dynamic. Ritzberger and Weibull (1991) provide a similar dynamic where the "rest
points" (or better, the "rest sets" ) are sets closely related to curb retracts. Chapter 3
presents an explicit learning model that leads players to play strategies from a curb (or
persistent) retract.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 several set-valued
solution concepts are defined and the main properties o[ and relations between these
concepts are stated. Many examples are given to illustrate the subtle differences between
these concepts. Section 2.3 contains the definitions of EES sets and CSS. We try to clarify
the relations between these concepts (and curb retracts). We also correct some mistakes
made in Swinkels (1992).
2.2 Defining properties
2.2.1 Independent beliefs
Let g-(A, u) be a normal form game. In this section we will consider solution concepts
that recommend to each player i a finite and non-empty subset C; C S;. The recommen-
dation will be public, i.e. it is commonly known by the players that the recommendation
is C- j-j; 1 C;. If player i is Bayesian he will form some beliefs about the behavior of the
other players. If we assume that a player believes that the other players will follow the
recommendation, and if we furthermore assume independence, then the belief of player
i is represent,ed by an element of the set jj~~; ~(C~).3 Following Kalai and Samet (1984)
we call R- jI; 1 0(C;) a retract. Hence, a retract is a product of convex hulls of finitely
many (mixed) strategies. We call R a selection retract if each element of C; is equivalent
with a pure strategy and no two strategies in C; are equivalent. We are interested in
self-enforcing solution concepts and therefore we will insist that these retracts are closed
3See Section 2.2.2 for the case where a player's belief is dependent, i.e. is an element of A(n~~~ C~).
14 Set-valued Solution Concepts
under best replies: If s-; E R-; and s; E L3;(s-;) `R; then player i might very well play a
strategy outside R;. If other players recognize this possibility, they may assign positive
probability to the event that s; is played, that is, they may believe that player i does
not follow the recommendation. Since not all best replies are equally compelling (some
may be weakly dominated, inadmissible or not semi-robust (these concepts are defined
below)), we will consider several different requirements.9 The whole set of strategies is
always closed under any kind of best. replies, but for prediction purposes (or as a recom-
mendation) it is not very useful. Therefore we will impose that the solution be minimal.
A better motivation for the minimality condition is provided by Chapter 3. Let us now
define the different kinds of best replies.
Definition 2.1 (i) s; is an undominated best reply to s-; (denoted by s; E UCi;(s-;)~ if
it is a best reply to s-;, and s; is not weakly dominated by any s; E S;.
(ii) s; is an admissible best reply to s-; (denoted by s; E AL3;(s-;)~ if there e~ists a
sequence {s~k;l}k 1 of completely mi~ed strategies in S-; that converges to s-;, such
that s; is a best reply to each element of this sequence.
(iii) s; is a semi-robvst best reply to s-; (denoted by s; E SRC3;(s-;)~ if there exists
a sequence {s~k;l}k 1 in the interior (in the topological space S-;~ of the stability
region of s; that converges to s-;.
We will use these notions of best replies to define several properties. Then we will
consider minimal sets with these properties.
Definition 2.2 Let R- j-j~ 1 R; be a retract.
(i) R is closed under best replies:
for all i E N and for all s-; E R-;, Li;(s-;) C R;
(ii) R is closed under nndominated best replies:
for all i E N and for all s-; E R-;, UCi;(s-;) C R;
(iii) R is closed under admissible best replies:
for all i E N and for all s-; E R-;, ACi;(s-;) C R;
4If one of these tequirements would be obviously more compelling than the others, we could testrict
attention to the most compelling requirement. This is however not the case.
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(iv) R is closed under semi-robust best replies:
for all i E N and for all s-; E R-;, SRL3;(s-;) C R;
(v) R i~s closed under semi-robust best replies up to equivalence:
for all i E N and for all s-; E R-; and s; E S7Z1i;(s-;),
th.ere exists s; E R; with s;. ~ s;
(vi) R is absorbing:
for all i E N there eaists an open neighborhood C7-; C S-; of R-;
such that for all s-; E C~-; there exists s; E R; with s; E 13;(s-;)
(vii) R satisfies the Nash requirement:
for all s-; E R-; there ezists s; E R; with s; E Ci;(s-;)
A retract is minimal with respect to some property (X~ if it satisfies (XJ and it does
not contain a smaller retract that satisfies (X). Retracts that are minímal with respect
to properties ( i), (ii), ( iii), (iv), (vi) and (vii) are called, respectively, curb, curó~,
admissible, robust, persistent and Nash retracts.
The name "curb" was introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991) and is mnenomic for
closed under rational behavior. Persistent retracts were first introduced by Kalai and
Samet (1984). The other termirrology is borrowed from Balkenborg (1992). It is easy
to see that a set is a Nash retract if and only if it is a singleton containing a Nash
equilibrium. Generic normal form games have no equivalent strategies and all best replies
are semi-robust. Hence, for such games curb retracts and robust retracts coincide.
Lemma 2.1 Let R 6e a retract. Then (i) ~ (ii) ~ (iii) ~ (iv) ~ (v) 4-i (vi) ~ (vií).
,Ltoreover, for a two person game we have (iii) ~(ii).
Proof. Most of the implications are trivial. The claim on two person games follows
from the fact that a strategy that is not weakly dominated must be an admissible best
reply to some strategy of the opponent. See e.g. Pearce (1984, Appendix B, Lemma 4).
We will only show (v) t~ (vi).
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First note that a mixed strategy is a semi-robust best reply only if it is the mixture of
pure semi-robust best replies that are equivalent. Furthermore, two equivalent strategies
have tlre same stability region.
Suppose that R is an absorbing retract and let s; E S7ZCi;(.s-;) for some s-; E R-;.
Every open neighborhood of R-; intersects the interior of St;(s;). Up to equivalence
player i has a unique best reply in the interior. Hence, there exists s; E R; with s; ~ s;.
This establishes (vi) ~ (v).
Now suppose that R is closed under semi-robust best replies up to equivalence. Let
U-; be the union of all stability regions of semi-robust best replies against R-;, i.e.
U-i - U{s,ES7ZD,(s-,)~s-,ER-,}Sti(Si).
It can easily be checked that the interior of U-; is an open neighborhood of R-; that
satisfies the requirement in (vi). This completes the proof. ~
We will now describe the structure of and the relation between the different retracts
defined above. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 we will make use of the properties listed in the
next theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (i) Every curb retract is the cartesian product of convex hulls of sets of
pure strategies. Two dífjerent curb retracts have an empty intersection. The same
assertions hold for curb~, admissible aazd robust retracts.
(ii) A persistent retract is a selection retract.
(iii) Every game has a curb retract. Every curb retract contains a curb~ retract. Every
curb~ retract contains an admissióle retract. Every admissible retract contains a
robust retract. Every robvst retract contains a persistent retract. Every persistent
retract contains a Nash equilibrium.
(iv) If R is a curb retract and s; E R; is an extreme point of R;, then there ezists
s-; E R-; such that s; E Ci;(s-;). Similar assertions hold for curb~, admissible,
robust and persistent retracts ~with the appropriate notion of best reply~.
Proof. (i) If a mixed strategy is an extreme point of a curb retract then it is not a
best reply to any strategy combination of the retract. (Otherwise all pure strategies
in its carrier would be in the retract which would contradict the mixed strategy being
an extreme point.) Hence, the retract that is obtained by deleting all strategies that
put positive weight on this mixed strategy is also closed under best replies. But this
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contradicts the fact that the retract is minimal. The other assertions are trivial: They
follow basically from the observation that the intersection of two retracts that are closed
under best replies, is closed under best replies.
(ii) This follows from Lemma 2.1. For a formal proof see Kalai and Samet (1984).
(iii) By (i) we know that curb retracts are spanned by pure strategies. Since there are
only firritely many pure strategies and since the set of all strategy profiles is closed under
best replies we have that there is at least one curb retract. The other assertions follow
from Lemma 2.1.
(iv) This follows from the minimality argument used in part (i). ~
Note that non-extreme points of a curb ( or other) retract need not be best replies.
Even stronger, a persistent retract may contain a mixed strategy that is strictly domi-
nated. Since retracts are actually described by the sets of extreme points, we will intro-
duce some terminology for these sets. Let us call a finite product set C-]-j2r G (C S)
a curb set if j-j; r 0(C,) is closed under best replies. It follows that a minimal curb
set is the set of extreme points of a curb retract. Similarly, we define ( minimal) curb~`,
admissible, robust, absorbing and persistent sets.
By Theorem 2.1(iii) we may use the set-valued solution concepts to refine the notion
of a Nash equilibrium. For example, call a Nash equilibrium a curb equilibrium if it is
contained in a curb retract. By the above theorem a curb equilibrium always exists. Note,
however, a persistent equilibrium is not always a curb equilibrium and a curb equilibrium
is not necessarily persistent. (We will see some examples later on.) This means that we
cannot say that a curb equilibrium is a stronger (or weaker) concept than a persistent
equilibrium. This is due to the minimality requirements for retracts. A retract that is
closed under best replies is necessarily absorbing. However, a retract that is minimal
with respect to closedness under best replies is not necessarily minimal with respect to
absorbingness. There is a way of refining the Nash equilibrium concept in a"nested" way.
Namely, it follows from Theorem 2.1 that every game has an equilibrium that is curb,
curb~`, admissible, (semi-)robusts and persistent. By Kalai and Samet's ( 1984) result that
every persistent retract contains a proper ( Myerson (1978)) equilibrium, we may even
insist that this equilibrium is proper as well. This is clearly the strongest refinement we
can get out of the set-valued solution concepts defined so far. Such a refinement, however,
sHete we use "semi-robust" to differentiate this equilibrium concept from Okada's (1983) concept of
a robust equilibrium (which need not exist).
18 Set-valued Solution Concepts
is not very appealing.s Why should an equilibrium that satisfies all these requirements be
more attractive than any other proper (and persistent) equilibrium? We close this part
with a remark. If a game has a unique persistent retract, and this retract is also closed
under best replies, then every persistent equilibrium is curb, and vice versa. However,
even in this case there may be persistent equilibria that are not proper and there may
be proper equilibria that are not persistent. Examples of such games can be found in
Van Damme (1987).
In the remainder of this section we give examples to illustrate the subtle differences
between the solution concepts defined up to now. In particular, these examples show
that a curb~` equilibrium need not be curb, that an admissible equilibrium need not be
curb~`, etcetera.
A curb~ retract is not necessarily contained in a curb retract.











Only {(B, R)} is a curb retract, but {(T, L)} is a curb~` retract.
An admissible retract is not necessarily contained in a curb~ retract.
Consider the three person game presented in Figure 2.2. Each player i chooses




















6Harsanyi (1993) defines an equilibrium to be eligible whenever it is both persistent and proper. He
uses this notion for his new theory of equilibrium selection.
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It is easy to check that. a3 is the unique admissible best reply (in uncorrelated
strategies) against ( a1ia2). It follows that {(al,azia3)} is an admissible retract.
But {(b~,b2,63)} is the only curb` (or curb) retract.
A robust retract is not necessarily contained in an admissible retract.








0,2 2,0 0,1 0,0
2,0 0,2 0,1 0,0
1,0 1,0 0,0 0,1
0,0 0,0 1,0 1,1
Figure 2.3.
This is a two person game without dominated st,rategies. Hence, the admissible re-
tracts coincide with the curb retracts. The only curb retract is {(dl, dz)}. However,
RI x RZ is a robust retract when R; - 0({a;,b;}).
A persistent retract is not necessarily contained in a robust retract.







The only robust retract is {(B, R)}. There are many persistent retracts. Let
s(a) -(1 - cr)L ~ cYC. For all a E [0, 2~3) we have that {(T, s(a))} is a persistent
retract. This example also shows that a Nash retract need not be contained in a
persistent retract, since {(T,s(2~3))} is such a retract.
2.2.2 Dependent beliefs
Thus far we assumed that if j-j; 1 G; is recommended, then player i's belief is represented
by an element of R-; - j-j~~; ~1(C~). That is, we assumed that beliefs are independent.
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However, it might be the case that player i believes that the actions of other players
are correlated. He might believe this, even in the case the other players do in fact not
correlate their actions. 5uch a belief is represented by an element of 0(]-j~~; C~). Of
course, R-; is in a natural way embedded in the latter set, hence a player may still
have independent beliefs. In this section we will examine the consequences of allowing
for dependent beliefs. Again, we will consider sets that are closed under best replies,
but now more beliefs are allowed and, as a consequence, more strategies will have to
be included in the recommendation. We will also consider undominated, admissible and
semi-robust best replies. Some of these concepts need to be adapted to the correlated
strategy case. Before we do that let us remark that it is obvious that for two person
games nothing wili change.
The notions of best replies and undominated best replies need not be adapted: Weakly
domination is checked against all pure strategy combinations.
We say that s; is an admissible best reply in correlated strategies against s` ; E ~(A-;)
(denoted by s; E .ACi;(s`;)) if there exists a sequence {s`'~k~}k 1 of completely mixed
correlated strategy combinations that converges to s` ;, such that s; is a best reply
to each element of this sequence. Note that if s` ; is in fact an uncorrelated strategy
combination, then AIi;(s`;) C AC3;(s`~). In general, the latter inclusion is strict.
We say that s; is a semi-robust best reply in correlated strategies against s` ;(denoted
by s; E SR13; (s`;)) if there exists a sequence {s`'~k~}k i in the interior (in the topological
space 0(A-;)) of the stability region St; (s;) that converges to s~ ;. Again, if s` t is in fact
an uncorrelated strategy combination , then SRl3;(s`;) C SRL3; (s`;), and this inclusion
is in general strict.
Again, we will consider minimal sets that are closed under different kinds of best
replies (against dependent beliefs). For convenience we will work directly with the set
of extreme points. Following Harsanyi and Selten (1988) we will use the terminology
"formation" instead of sets or retracts, to distinguish the correlated strategy case from
the uncorrelated strategy case.
Definition 2.3 Let C- jji 1 C;, where G, C S; is finite and non-e7rcpty.
(i) C is a prim,itive forrrcation if it is rreinimal w.r.t.
for all i E N and for all s`; E 0(C-;),Ci;(s`,) C 0(C;)
(ii) C is a prinzitive~ formation if it is rniniraal w.r.t.
for ald i E N and for all s`; E 0(C-;),Lf13;(s` ti) C ~1(C;)
2.2 Defining properties 21
(iii) C is an admissibde formation if it is minimal w.r.t.
for all i E .ti' and for all s`; E 0(C-;),,,4Ci;(s`;) C 0(C;)
(iv) C is a robust formation if it is minimal w.r.t.
for all i E N and for all s`; E 0(C-,),S7ZIi,`(s`;) C 0(C;)
(v) C is a persistent formation if it is minimal w.r.t.
for all i E N there eaists an open neighborhood C~`; C 0(A-;) of 0(C-;),
such that for all s`; E C)`; there eaists s; E~(C;) with s; E Ci;(s`;)
Analogies of Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 2.1 can be shown easily. There is, however, a
slight difference with the last part of Lemma 2.1. There we stated that, for games with
two players, curb~` retracts and admissible retracts coincide. In the world of correlated
strategies a player views his opponents as one. single player. It is easy to adjust the proof
in Pearce (1984, Appendix B) to prove that, for all s`; E 0(A-;), ACi; (s`;) - LfCi;(s` ;).
It follows that, for all games, admissible formations and primitive~` formations coincide.
It is easy to see that every persistent formation contains a persistent set: Let C be a
persistent formation and let C~`; be an open neighborhood of 0(C-;) with the required
property. Now let C)-; - C~` ;(1 S-; denote the set of uncorrelated strategies in this open
neighborhood. Then CJ-; is an open neighborhood of j-j~~; 0(C~) and it has the required
property.
The following example of a three person game shows that it matters whether one
allows dependent beliefs or not.
A minimal curb set is not necessarily contained in a primitive formation.
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The strategy (ci, c2, c3) is a strict equilibrium and defines the unique primitive
formation (and, for that matter, also the unique primitive~`, robust and persistent
formation). The product set {al,bl} x{a2ib2} x{cl,c2} is a minimal curb set.
Note, however, Lhat c3 is the best reply against the correlated strategy 1~2(al, a2) f
1~2(bl,b2). From this example it also follows that minimal curb~`, robust and
persistent sets are not necessarily contained in primitive~`, robust and persistent
formations, respectively.
In Figure 2.6 we summarize the relations between the different concepts encountered
in this chapter. Here X~ Y means that every X contains a Y, and that, in general, not
every Y is contained in an X. We already provided an example for each case "X ~ Y"
that shows that not every Y is contained in an X. Whenever the inclusion symbol is
accompanied by an asterisk (X ~' Y), then every Y is an X for the special case of two
person games.
prim. form. ~ prim.~` form. - adm. form. ~ robust form. ~ pers. form.
U. U, U. U, U,
min. curb set ~ min. curb~ set ~' min. adm. set ~ min. robust set ~ pers. set
Figure 2.6.
2.3 CSS and EES
The final section of this chapter is devoted to the discussion of two other set-valued
solution concepts, namely CSS and EES. In contrast to the earlier introduced solution
concepts, these concepts will not be important in the remainder of this thesis. Skipping
this section will therefore not lead to any difFiculties in any of the other chapters.
Swinkels (1992) introduced the notion of an equilibrium evolutionarily stable set (EES
set). An EES set is a closed and non-empty set of Nash equilibria that is stable under a
dynamic evolutionary process. The evolutionary process is not modeled explicitly. The
stability requirement is described by an entry condition for mutants. Roughly speaking..
this entry condition says that a small portion of mutants can enter (and `survive') if
the strategy they play is a best response to the strategy of the post-entry population.
We will refer to this entry condition as (S) (for Swinkels). Gilboa and Matsui (1991)
introduced the notion of a cyclically stable set (CSS). iVlatsui (1992) modified the notion
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of a CSS. This modified version of CSS (mCSS) is a set of strategy combinations that
is closed under any dynamic that always moves in the direction of a best reply. The
dynamic implicitly present in Matsui's concept is therefore a best reply dynamic, and
not an evolutionary dynamic.. Although the intuitive motivations for EES and mCSS are
quite different, the two concepts are, in a mathematical sense, closely related. Matsui
showed that an mCSS is a closed and non-empty set of strategy profiles that satisfies
a certain entry condition. We will refer to this entry condition as (M) (for Matsui).
The different entry conditions (S) and (M) look similar, and it is often stated informally
that the only difference between CSS and EES is the extra requirement for EES that
it should be a subset of the set of Nash equilibria.' In fact, Swinkels claims that any
set satisfying (S) also satisfies (M). What Swinkels in fact "shows" is that any set that
satisfies (S) also satisfies a condition (T) ((T) for "two"). However, his proof is only
correct for two person games. Moreover, condition (T) is only equivalent to (M) in the
case of t.wo person games.
In this section we will restore the mistakes made by Swinkels. We will show an
example of a game that admits a non-empty set of Nash equilibria that satisfies (M)
but not (S). Hence, this example illuminates the fact that the closedness condition is
more important than Swinkels admits. Then we show by example that in a three person
game, an EES set need not satisfy (T). Then we will give a correct proof for Swinkels'
claim that any closed set satisfying (S) also satisfies (M). We show that even generic
normal form games need not have EES sets. Then we state some results on the relations
between EES sets, CSS and curb retracts. We conclude this section by showing that
there is no link between EES sets and forward induction.
2.3.1 Defining CSS and EES
Throughout this section we will only speak about uncorrelated strategies. In particular,
we view s E S as an L-tuple, where L-~i 1 ~A;~, and not as a distribution from 0(A).
Hence, for any strategies s and s' and any number a E[0, 1], we will write as ~- (1 - a)s'
to denote the strategy combination in which each player i plays as; ~- (1 - a)sZ. We wil]
use the notation u;(s; s;.) to denote i's payoff when he plays s; while each player j~ i
plays s~.
We will only employ Matsui's modified version of CSS.
~Blume, Kim and Sobel ( 1993) define entry resístant sets as minimal closed and non-empty sets
satisfying (S). They state that they do not know whether these ER sets are the same as mCSS.
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Definition 2.4 (Matsui (1992)) Strategy profile s' E S is directly accessible jrom
s E S if there exist T 7 0, a continuous function p:[O,T] ~ S, differentiable from the
right, and a step function h:[O,T) -~ S, continuous from the right, such that
(i~ p(0) - s, p(T) - s',
(ii~ dát (t) - h(t) - p(t) (for all t E[O,T)) and
(iii) h(t) E 13(p(t)) (for all t E[O,T)).
Hence, strategy profile s' is directly accessible from s if there exists a well-behaved
function p:[0, T] -~ S such that the curve it describes starts at s, ends at s' and `moves'
at any point t E [O, T) in the direction of a best reply to p(t). Matsui calls this function
p(.) a best response dynamic path.
Now accessibility is defined recursively as follows: s' is accessible from s if either (i)
s' is directly accessible from s, or (ii) there exists a sequence {sk}k 1 converging to s'
such that sk is accessible from s for each k, or (iii) s' is accessible from some s, which in
turn is accessible from s.
Definition 2.5 A non-empty set O C S is called a modified cyclically stable set (mCSS~
if, for all s E O and all s' E S it h,olds that s' is accessible from s if and only if s' E O.
Matsui shows that an mCS5 always exists, using Zorn's Lemma. In order to apply Zorn's
Lemma, he needs that R(s) -{s' E S~s' is accessible from s} is closed. This follows of
course from ( ii) in the recursive definition. It, is, however, not clear whether the same
result could not be obtained from direct accessibility alone.
We need one more definition. For given O C S and s E O; a vector w E R.~'EV ~A'~ is
a feasible direction from s in O if there exists É 1 0 such that s~ ew E O for all E E[0, É].
Now we are ready to state iVlatsui's characterization.
Lemma 2.2 ( Matsui ( 1992)) A subset O C S is an mCSS íf and only if it is minimal
with respect to
(1) O is closed and nan-empty, and
(M) If s E O and w E R~'EN ~A'~ with s-} w E S, and E' 1 0 is such that for all
E E[O,e'); for all i E N and for all z; E C3;(s)
u;(s ~ ew; s; f w;) ~ u;(s -}- ew; z;),
then w is a feasible direction from s in O.
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Proof. See Matsui (1992). O
It will bc more convenient to work with another characterization of an mCSS.
Lemma 2.3 0 C S is an mCS.S if and only ij it is minirrtal with respect to
(1) n is closed and non-empty, a~ed
(M~`) Ij s E O and s' E.S and É 1 0 is such that jor all e E [0, ë),
s' E C3((1 - e)s ~- es'),
then (1 - E)s ~- es' E O jor all e E[0, ë).
Proof. We show that O satisfies (1) and (M) if and only if it satisfies (1) and (M~). It
is obvious that O satisfies (M) whenever it satisfies (M~). So, let O satisfy (1) and (M)
and let s E O, s' E S and ~~ 0 be such that
~i(() - E)S ~ ES'i S{) ~ ui((1 - E)S ~ ES'i ai)
for all e E[O,É), for all i E N and for all a; E A;. By (M) there exists e' ) 0 such that
(1 - E)s ~ es' E O for all e E[0, e']. Let ~ be the supremum over all e' with this property.
Since O is closed the supremum is in fact a maximum. We need to show that é~ é.
Suppose that ~ G Ë. We will derive a contradiction.
Consider the strategy profile s -( 1 - é)s ~- és' E 0. For all a E[O,É - é) we have
(i - a)s f as' -(i -((I - a)É t a))s f((i -~)É -~ a)s', while (i - a)É ~ a ~ É f a ~ É.
Hence,
n~((1 - a)s ~-.~s'; s,) ) u;((1 - .~)s ~ ~s'; at)
for all a; E A; and all i E N. Hence, s' - s is a feasible direction from s in O: There
exists e' ~ 0 such that (1 - E)s ~ es' E 0 for all e E[O,e']. However, this contradicts
the fact that ~ is the maximal e' such that (1 - e)s ~ es' E 0 for all e E[O,e'], since
(I - e')s -~ e's' - (1 - e')(1 - É)s -F ((1 - e')é -~ e')s', and (1 - e')é f e' ~ é. O
Now we recall the definition of an EES set from Swinkels ( 1992).
Definition 2.6 0 C S is an equilibrium evolutionarily staóle set (EES set~ if it is
minimal with respect to
(1) O is closed and non-empty,
(2) O C{s E S~s E Ci(s)}, and
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(S) there e:zists ó' ) 0 svch that for all ó E(O,b'), for all s E O and for all s' E S
s'EC3((1-b)sfós') ~ (i-ó)sfbs'E0.
The entry conditions (M~) and (S) are very similar. The difference between them is
that the ~ in condition (M~`) is chosen for each pair of strategy combinations (s, s') E O x S
separately, while the ó' in condition (S) has to be chosen uniformly. Often it is stated
that the difference between CSS and EES is the additional requirement for the latter to
be a set of Nash equilibria. The following example shows that the conditions (M~) and
(S) are different. It also shows that the closedness condition is important. Consider the













Let O- {(T,(1 - a)L ~ aC)~a E [0,2~3)}. This set contains only equilibria and
it satisfies (M~) (and (M)): For each s(a) :- (T, (1 - cr)L f crC) E O we may choose
É- 2~3 - a. O does, however, not satisfy (S): For each ó' E(0, 1] we can take ó- b'~2,
s' -(B, C) and s- s(cr) with a such that (1 -~)(1 - ó) - 1~3. Then we have that
s:- (1 - ó)s -f ós' - ((1 - b)T f óB, l ~3L f 2~3C) and s' E Ci((1 - ó)s f ós'). Condition
(S) is now violated since s~ O. Of course, in our example O is not closed. It is not
known whether any closed set of Nash equilibria that satisfies (M~`) necessarily satisfies
( S).
Swinkels already showed by example that an EES set need not exist.. However, his
example was non-generic. One might conjecture that for generic (two person) normal
form games always at least one EES set exists. This is not true. We will give an example
below. First we will discuss the alternative condition formulated by Swinkels.
(T) For all s E 0 and for all s' E S that are Nash equilibria in the game restricted to
Ci(s), there exists ó' ] 0 such that (1 - b)s ~ ós' E 0 íor all ó E [0, b').
Swinkels introduced this condition because it is easier to verify than (S). 1Vloreover,
he claimed that (T) is the entry condition used in Matsui's characterizat.ion of an mCSS,
and that (T) is implied by (S). It is not difficult to check that, for two person games,
(T) is equivalent with (M~). But this is no longer true for games with more than two
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The set of Nash equilibria of this game consists of two components. The first com-
ponent just contains 6. The second component is Xl U X2 U X3, where X; is the set of
all strategy profiles in which each player j~ i plays a~ for sure. Let O be the second
component, that is, 0 is the set of all Nash equilibria except b. It is not difficult to check
that O is an EES set and an mCS5. But 0 does not satisfy (T): b is a Nash equilibriucn
in the (restricted) game where players choose strategies in Ci(a). If O satisfies (T), then
there exists e 1 0 such that (1 - e)a f eb E O, but that strategy profile is clearly not an
equilibrium.
Swinkels claimed that any EES set must contain an mCSS. What he in fact "showed"
was that any EES set satisfies (T). His proof is only correct for two person games. We
will now prove Swinkels' original claim.
Lemma 2.4 If O satisfies (1) and (S~ then it also satisfies (M).
Proof. Let O be closed and let b' ) 0 satisfy the requirement in (S). We will show that
O satisfies (M~). Suppose not.
LetsEO,s'ESandël0besuchthatforalleE[O,i-),alliENandalla;EA;
u;((1 - e)s ~ es'; s;) ? u;((1 - e)s ~ es'; a;), (2.3.1)
but suppose t.hat (1 - e)s ~ es' ~ O for some e E[0,~]. Let É- sup{~' E[O,é]~(1 -
e)s ~- es' E 0 for all e E[0, e']}. It follows that 0 C É C é. Consider the strategy profile
s-(1 - é)s ~- És' E O. By (2.3.1) and (S) it follows that for all 0 G e C min{Ë - É, b'},
(1- (e f(1- e)É) )s ~(~ ~- (1 - e)É))s' -(1- e)s~ es' E O. This contradicts the definition
of É. ~
tiow we will give a generic example of a two person game that does not admit an EE5
set. Note that it follows from our previous obseraations that in two person games any
EES set satisfies (T). In the example we will show that there does not exist a non-empty
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set. of Nash equilibria that satisfies (T). It follows then that there does not exist an EES
set.
a Q 7
6,6 2,2 0,7 2,0
2,2 6,6 2,0 0,7
7,0 0,2 1,1 0,0
0,2 7,0 0,0 1,1
Figure 2.9.
b
The game from Figure 2.9 is not really generic in the sense that the same numbers
enter the payoff matrix several times. ~4oreover, the game is symmetric. However, the
following arguments hold for all srnall perturbations of the payoffs. First note that pure
strategy equilibria do not exist. Second, 2c f 2d is strictly dominated by 2a-f- 26, hence c
and d cannot both belong to the carrier of an equilibrium. Straightforward calculations
show that the only possibility for an equilibrium s with two pure strategies in its carrier
is when C(s) - {a, b} x {a, Q}. There are also two equilibria with three pure strategies
in the carrier. Without perturbations the equilibria are s' -(( z, 2, 0, 0), ( z, 2, 0, 0)),
2 4 3 2 4 3 2 3 3 4 2 3 4 2S-((gogvgi~)i(gigig~~)) and S-((gigi~eg)i(g~g'~'9~). f~ny EES set mllSt be
made up of some of these equilibria. However, no such set satisfies (T): If sZ is contained
in the set, s' may enter since it is an equilibrium of the game restricted to L3(s2). This
implies that, for small e) 0, (1 - e)s~ f es' is contained in the set, but this profile
is not an equilibrium. The same story applies when s3 is assumed to be contained in
the set. Hence, only {s' } remains as a candidate for an EES set. However, (a, a) is an
equilibrium in the game restricted to Ci(s'), hence, this set does not satisfy (T).
The following theorem lists some relations between EES, mCSS and curb retracts.
Theorem 2.2 Every EES set contains an mCSS. Every curb retract contains an mCSS.
If R is a curb retract and u(s) - u for all s E R, then R ís an EES set and an mC.SS.
Ira the case of two person games a síngleton mCSS is also an EES set.
Proof. Most assertions are trivial so we only prove the last one. We already observed
that in two person games (M~) is equivalent to (T). Hence, if {s`} is an mCSS then s'
must be an equilibrium, and it is the unique equilibrium of the game restricted to L3(s`).
Let m} and m- denote the maximum and minimum payoff that a player can obtain in
the game, respectively. Choose ó' ) 0 such that, for all i and all a; ~ B,(s')
(1 - 6')v,(s`) f b'm- )(1 - ó')v,(s`; a;) f b'm}.
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It follows that for all b E [O,b') and all s E S, B((1-b)s` fbs) C B(s'). In particular,
if s E L3((1 - b)s" ~- bs), then s is, under all best replies against s`, a best reply against
itself. But this means that s is an equilibrium in the game restricted to 13(s'). By
presupposition this only happens in case s- s`. Hence, ó' does the job in condition (S).
O
2.3.2 Forward induction
Let g-(A, u) be a two person normal form game. Suppose that this game has an
equilibrium s', such t.hat ut(s') ] x ] ut(s), for some (fixed) number x and for all
equilibria s~ s'. Let gout denote the game obtained from g by giving player 1 an
outside option, yielding him a payoff of x(and yielding player 2 an arbitrary number).
Hence, in you~ player 1 first decides whether to enter the subgame g or to take his outside
opt,ion. The notion of forward induction (Van Damme (1989)) then says that entering
the subgame is a signal, indicating that player 1 intends t.o play si. Player 2 should
recognize this signal and play s2, his part of the equilibrium. If he indeed does so, player
1 will enter the subgame and his preferred equilibrium will be played.
When new solution concepts are introduced their usefulness is often dernonstrated by
an example of an outside option game in which the solution predicts the outcome that
is consistent. with forward induction. Especially solution concepts with an evolutionary
flavor seem to be in favor of forward induction. (See N~ldeke and Samuelson (1993).)
Matsui (1992) showed that mCSS captures the notion of forward induction when the
underlying game is a battle of the sexes (or something slightly more general). Swinkels
(1992) noted that an EES set need not contain an element consistent with forward
induction. However, the example he gives is not correct.8 His example can be easily
corrected but then the underlying game will be non-generic. 5winkels states that it is
an open problem whether F.ES sets capture the notion of forward induction in generic
(two person) games. We will resolve t.his issue now.
First note that in the out.side option garne there are two equilibrium outcomes. There
is one equilibrium consistent with forward induction, and there are many equilibria in
which the outside option is chosen for sure. By Swinkels (1992, Theorem 3) we know
that an F,ES set is a maximal connected set, of equilibria. This implies that the,re are two
candidates for an EES set in the outside option game. ~Vith some abuse of notation we
"In his example there is a continuum of equilibria and there does not exist a number r such that
u1(s') 1 r~ u~(s), for all eyuilibria .c different from the preferred equilibrium s".
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let s` denote the preferred equilibrium of g, as well as the forward induction equilibrium
of gout It is straightforward to show that {s'} is an EES set of gout if and only if it is an
EES set of g. But this implies that forward induction has very little to do with EES sets.
Moreover, we have already seen that a generic game need not admit an EES set. If such
a game is extended with an outside option there will be no EES set that contains the
forward induction equilibrium. It may also happen that the underlying game does admit
an EES set but that the preferred equilibrium does not form an EES set. Of course, also
in this case the outside option game does not have an EES set that contains the forward







17,5 16,8 80;] '
Figure 2.10.
This game has three equilibria, namely s' - ((3, 3, 3), (3, 3, á)), Y~elding (
'33, 23 ),
S2 -(l5~ 5v~)v (7~0~ i)) Yielding (
261 56 ) and S3 -((0, 3, 3), (0, 3~ 3)) Yielding (~32, 3).
Since '33 1 i3~ 1~~i, player 1 prefers s'. However, it is easy to check that {si} is not
an EES set, while {s3} is an EES set. The reader may check that the game with an
outside option of x E(132, 133 ) does not admit an EES set.
On the other hand, it may also happen that the preferred equilibrium does form an
EES set, but that the outside option game has another EES set (in which the outside
option is chosen) as well. Hence, even in this case EES sets are not particularly in favor




0,4 15,0 0,15 0,0
0,4 0,0 15,0 0,15
0,4 0,15 0,0 15,0
1,1 4,0 4,0 4,0
3,3 3,3 3,3 3,3
Figure 2.11.
The mixed equilibrium that yields an expected payoff of (5,5) forms an EES set (both
in the underlying 4 x 4 game and in the outside option game). However, the set of all
Nash equilibria of the entire game that yield the expected payoff (3,3) is an EES set and
it contains no elements consistent with forward induction.
Chapter 3
Learning by Forgetful Players
3.1 Introduction
A product set of pure strategies is said to be closed under best replies if all best replies
against all possible mixtures of these strategies are contained in the set. Minimal sets
with this property are called minimal curb sets (Basu and Weibull (1991)). As we will
see later (and as readers of Chapter 2 already know), curb sets are closely related to
the better known persistent retracts. Kalai and Samet (1984) showed that every game
has at least one persistent retract and that every persistent retract contains at least one
(proper) Nash equilibrium. This enabled them to introduce the persistent equilibrium
as a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept.
Both concepts have been used in the literature. Kalai and Samet (1985) used persis-
tency to achieve efficiency in unanimity games that are repeated as long as no agreement
is reached. Blume (1993a) used the persistent retract as a set-valued solution concept in
sender receiver games. Blume (1993b) shows that, in one-sided cheap talk games, equi-
libria in minimal curb sets sometimes select the sender's preferred outcome. In Chapter 4
we show that, in games where several players have the possibility to send costly messages,
minimal curb sets always select the outcome preferred by all senders. In Chapter 6 the
concepts of curb and persistency are applied in games of endogenous timing. Balkenborg
(1993a) used these concepts in finitely repeated games.
In most of these papers it is argued informally that the concepts of curb and persis-
tency have a dynamic and evolutionary flavor. However, few or no attempts have been
made to support this idea with an evolutionary foundation of the concepts.
We construct a dynamic learning process to support these concepts. Roughly speak-
ing, the learning evolves as follows: A particular game is played at discrete points in
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time. For each role in this game there is a pool of players. At the beginning of each
period one player is drawn from each pool. These players will play the game in that
period. Players have a bounded memory. On the basis of strategies played in the recent
past, they form expectations about the strategies the other players will use, and best
respond to these expectations. We assume that different players within the same pool
may have different beliefs and therefore they may choose different actions. It is shown
that, if the memory is long enough, play will settle down in a minimal curb set.
In some respects our results are stronger than those obtained thus far in the literature
on learning. First, in contrast to Young (1993) we do not need to restrict attention
to a special class of games. Second, the set of curb strategies is a subset of the set
of rationalizable strategies (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984)). Hence, our learning
process reduces the number of "plausible" strategies. This is in contrast with Milgrom
and Roberts (1991) who show that a sequence that is consistent with adaptive learning
will eventually lie within the set of serially undominated strategies, which is a superset of
the set of rationalizable strategies. In the final section we show that it is the forgetfulness
of the players that accounts for this difference.
From the main and basic theorem we derive several results for learning processes
where players learn in a somewhat different way. Play still settles down in minimal
curb sets when some players do not play best responses to past play, but are more
sophisticated than that, or, on the contrary, are less sophisticated. If we allow players
to have beliefs as if the other players in the game correlate their actions, play settles
down in a primitive formation (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)), a variant of a minimal
curb set. When players are uncertain, the process does not converge to a curb set but
to related solution concepts as curb~`, robust or persistent sets, depending on how the
uncertainty is modeled. The learning processes presented in this chapter may give the
reader some insight in the differences and similarities between these related concepts. We
also characterize two classes of games where our results go through, even if the players
only observe the outcomes of past play, instead of the strategies.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we introduce some
preliminaries concerning Markov chains and curb sets. Section 3.3 describes the model
of learning as a Markov chain. Section 3.4 contains the main result: the ergodic sets
of the Markov chain correspond one-to-one to the minimal curb sets of the underlying
game. In Sections 3.5 and 3.6 the above mentioned variations of the learning process are
considered. In Section 3.7 we consider the possibility that players make mistakes with
small probability. Section 3.8 compares this chapter to Milgrom and Roberts (1991).
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3.2 Preliminaries
Notation will be as introduced in 5ection 1.3. For readers who skipped Chapter 2, we
introduce the definition and some properties of minimal curb set.s. For other readers, we
recall them.
Definition 3.1 A non-empty cartesian product set C- jj;1 C; C A is said to be closed
under óest replies ~or C is a curb set~ if B(]-jti 1 0(C;)) C C. Such a set is called
a minimal curb set if it does not properly contain a curb set. Strategies contained in
minimal curó sets are called curb strategies.
It is straightforward to show that B(11;` i 0(C;)) - C for any minimal curb set C.
The notion of curb sets was introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991). Curb is mnemonic
for closed under rational behavior.
A strict Nash equilibrium is a curb set as a singleton. Strict Nash equilibria have
almost all desired properties one can hope for, except existence. A lct of these properties
carry over to minimal curb sets. For instance, every curb set contains the support of a
proper equilibrium (Kalai and Samet (1984), Balkenborg (1992)). Moreover, every game
has at least one minimal curb set since A is curb.
Minimal curb sets can be viewed as a set-valued generalization of strict equilibria:
When an outsider recommends to all players to play strategies from a minimal curb set
C, then all players will follow this recommendation if they expect the other players to
do so. The comparison with strict equilibria is not completely valid: minimal curb sets
may contain weakly dominated strategies.



















LL LR RL RR
4,4 4,4 1,1 1.1
1,1 1,1 2,2 2.'~
3,4 0,1 3,4 0.1 '
0,1 1,2 0,1 1.2
Figure 3.1 c.
Example A. Let g be given by the normal form in Figure 3.1a. This is a pure coordi-
nation game. Since (T,L) and (B, R) are strict equilibria it is easy to see that {(T, L)}
and {(B, R)} are minimal curb sets, and that there are no other ones. In particular, the
support of the mixed equilibrium is not contained in any minimal curb set.
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Example B. Now consider the game in which player 1 has the choice between playing
the game from Figure 3.1a and an outside option O, yielding both players a payoff of 3.
The normal form representation of this game is given in Figure 3.1b. This game has a
unique minimal curb set, namely {(T,L)}.
These two examples are nice because the minimal curb sets are singletons, and hence
consist of one strict Nash equilibrium. In the following example, in contrast to those
above, the unique minimal curb set is not a singleton.
Example C. Suppose that player 1 can send one of two messages, mo or rnl, to player
2 before the game from Figure 3.1a is played. 5uppose that it costs player 1 i units to
send m`. Let ma denote player 1's strategy "I send message m and choose action a" and
let aoal denote player 2's strategy "I choose action a` if I receive message m"'. Then the
(reduced) normal form of the game with pre-play communication is given in Figure 3.1c.
Now it can be checked that {moT} x{LL, LR} is the unique minimal curb set of this
extended game. The set is not a singleton but it consists only of equilibria that involve
sending the cheapest message and then playing the equilibrium preferred by player 1.
In Chapter 4 similar results will be obtained for a whole class of games with n players
among which k have the possibility to send a costly message.
In the next section we will describe the learning process by means of a Markov chain.
Therefore we will need some basic notions from the theory of Markov chains.
A finite stationary Markov chain is characterized by a pair (X, P), where X is a finite
state space and P: X x X- ~ [0,1] is a transition matrix. The interpretation is that
P(~, x') is the probability that the process will move from ~ to x' in one period. We
will denote x~.~' if there exist k E N U{0}, xo, . .., xk E X with xo - x, .r~ -,r' and
P(x„ ~;tl )) 0(i - 0, .. . , k- 1). Now -~-~ defines a weak order on X. Hence, we can
define an equivalence relation on X:
~~y f~ x~.,~yandy~x
Let [x] denote the equivalence class that contains .~ and let Q-{[x] ~x E X} denote the
set of equivalence classes. We define a partial order ~ on Q.
[~] ~ [y] ~ y ;r~
The minimal elements with respect to the order ~ are called ergodic sets. The other
elements are called transient sets. If the process leaves a transient set it can never return
3.3 The learning process 35
to that set. And if the process is in an ergodic set it can never leave this set. The
elements of these sets are called ergodic and transient states, respectively. We have the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 In any finite Markov chain, no matter where the process starts, the prob-
ability a.fter k steps that the process is in an ergodic state tends to 1 as k tends to inftnity.
Proof. See e.g. Kemeny and Snell (1976). ~
3.3 The learning process
According to the Bayesian approach, a player forms some expectation about the strate-
gies that will be played by the other players, and best responds to his expectation. How
these expectations are formed is not clear. When the same game has been played be-
fore, possibly by different people, it seems reasonable to suggest that expectations are
formed on the basis of information on past play. One way of using this information is to
assume that a player's belief corresponds to the empirical frequency of strategies used
in the past. This way of forming beliefs, known as fictitious play (Brown (1951) and
Robinson (1951)), makes perhaps sense in matching models, but it is certainly not the
only possible way of forming beliefs. One drawback of fictitious play is that it assumes
that all people always form expectations in the same way. This implies that if different
people have the same information, they will form the same beliefs and consequently they
choose the same action. One can create some stochastic variability in the process by
assuming that people only draw an incomplete sample of the information, as in Young
(1993). There it is assumed that players learn how the game was played in rn out of the
most recent fí periods. The players use a fictitious play rule to map samples into beliefs,
and best respond to these beliefs. The great technical advantage of Young's approach is
that the learning process can be described by a finite Markov chain on the state space
H- Ah~, consisting of all sequences of length K drawn from A. In order to determine
the ergodic sets of such Markov chains, one needs only to specify which transitions occur
with positive probability, and which occur with zero probability.
We will also describe a learning process by means of a finite Markov chain, but we
allow more variability in the responses of the players. In fact, we allow the degree of
variability that is present in Milgrom and Roberts' (1991) definition of adaptive play.1
1See Section 3.8 for a comparison between this chapter and Milgrom and Roberts (1991).
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Let g-(A, u) be an n-person normal form game. Fix a positive integer lí . Suppose
we have a finite population of individuals that is partitioned into non-empty classes
Vl, ..., Vn. The members of V; are candidates to play role i in the game, and they all
have the same payoff function u;. Let t- 0,1, 2, ... denote successive time periods.
Game g is played once every period. In period t one individual is drawn from each class
V. These individuals are going to play the appropriate roles in the game this period. We
will refer to the individual that is drawn from V to play the game in the current period
as player i, although the identity of this player may change from time to time. Player i
receives some, but not necessarily all, information about play in the recent lí periods.
Then he chooses a pure strategy according to some rule. We will define below what kind
of information a player may receive, and how he chooses a strategy as a function of this
information. Then the players are put back in their class. This ends period t and we
move up to period t~ 1.
Since we will assume that all the rules are time-independent, this learning process
can be described by a stationary Markov chain on the state space H- Ah~. Call h E H
a successor of h E H if h is obtained from h by deleting the left most element and
by adding some element a E A to the right. Let r(h) denote the right most element
of h E H. For h-(a-h~, .., a-i ) E H let zr;(h )-{a;h,..., a; i} denote the set of
strategies played by player i in the recent past. We will assume that our learning process
is described by a transition matrix P E P, where P is defined as follows.2
Definition 3.2
Let 7~ denote the set of transition rnatrices P, that satisfy for all histories h, h E H,
h is a successor of h, and
P(h, h) ~ 0 a
r~(h) E B~( ) f ;~~ (~( )) i )s-; or some s-; E j[ 0 zr h all z
We will give two interpretations of a learning process that is described by some P E P.
The first interpretation is close to the model of Young (1993). Fix a positive integer L.
Before player i chooses a strategy in period t, he receives information about how the
game was played by player j in the recent past, for all j~ i. He receives L draws with
replacement from the set {a~(t-Ií ), ... , a~(t-1)}. A way of thinking about this sampling
procedure is that player i passively hears about L precedents concerning the way player
j played the game before. But player i is unaware of the fact that he might hear about
ZA transition matrix describes a learning process for a fixed game, g, and a fixed length of the
memory, K. We will however suppress superscripts g and !í.
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t,he same precedent several times. Assume that all draws are independent, but more
importantly, assume that each combination of draws occurs with positive probability.
Player i's belief about the behavior of player j corresponds to the empirical frequency of
strategies in the sample of size L. Hence, this belief is one of a finite number of possible
probability distributions. Namely, let h-(a(t - Ií ), ..., a(t - 1)) denote the recent
history and let ~r~(h) -{a~ (t - lí), ..., a~ (t - 1) } denote the set of strategies played by
player j in the recent past. Now player i's belief about player j's behavior is contained
in the set
Gr~(h,L) - {s~ E 0(~r~(h))~s~(a~) - l~L for some l E {0, 1,..., L}}.
We call the set Gr`(h, L) - jj~~; Gr~(h, L) the L-grid distribution space for i induced by
h. Note that as L increases, the grid becomes finer and finer, and Gr'(h, L) "approaches"
jj~~; ~(a~(h)). There exists a`generic' class of games for which it suffices, for the purpose
of this chapter, to choose L sufficiently large. However, in general we need a little bit
more and therefore we assume that our learning process is described by some P E T~.
Another interpretation of a learning process that is described by a transition matrix
P E P is the following. Suppose that the individuals in a class have different personal
characteristics: They use the information on past play to know which strategies will
certainly not be used (namely the ones that have not been played in the recent history).
But each individual makes his own personal assessment of the probabilities with which
the remaining strategies will be played. Some people are very optimistic and expect the
best, while others are very pessimistic and expect the worst. And there will be a lot who
have some intermediate beliefs. Of course, we need sufficient diversity in the different
classes when this learning process is to be described by some P E ~. Note, however,
that this does not necessarily mean that these classes are large. Suppose that for each
strategy a; E A;, there is some individual in V who plays a;, whenever it is a best reply
to some belief that puts positive weight only on strategies that were played recently.
(And he chooses a best reply to the most recent strategy otherwise.) Then we only need
~A;~ individuals in class V,.
In the next section we will state and prove the main theorem of this chapter: Play
will sett,le down in a minimal curb set.
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3.4 Ergodic sets
Fix K E N as the length of the histories. Recall from Section 3.2 that h M h means that
there exist k E N, ho, ..., hk E H- Ah such that ho - h, hk - h and P(h',h't~ )] 0.
Now ~ defines a weak order on H and hence we can define an equivalence relation on H
and an order on the set of equivalence classes of H. We will be interested in the minimal
elements of this order, the ergodic sets.
Let C be a minimal curb set of g- (A, u). We say that h E H is a C-history if
h E Ch~. We call h a curb history if it is a C-history for some minimal curb set C.
Now we are ready to state the main theorem.
Theorem 3.2 There exists Ií E N such that for all It ~ lí and every Markov chain
with a transition matrix P E P
(i~ If Z C H is an ergodic set then Z C Ch for some minimal cvró set C.
(ii~ For every minimal curb set C there exists exactly one subset Z C Ch that is ergodic.
(iii~ For each minimal curb set C and each strategy á E C there exists an ergodic state
h with r(h) - á.
The theorem states that, if the history is long enough, any ergodic set is a set of
C-histories for some minimal curb set C and that the set of C-histories contains one
ergodic set. Hence, the ergodic states are curb histories. Moreover, once the ergodic
set contained in Cr` is entered, every strategy á E C is played infinitely often. From
Theorem 3.1 then the following corollary follows.
Corollary 3.1 The probability that the players are playing a curb strategy profale after k
steps of the learning process tends to 1 as k tends to infinity, if histories are suffic~iently
long.
The intuition for the theorem is quite clear. By having a large enough memory, players
may have beliefs with large supports. This means that best replies against all kinds of
mixtures will be played now and then. This creates so much stochastic variability that
players sooner or later will play curb strategies. When they keep drawing the "right"
samples, they will keep best responding against curb strategies, and hence they will
play curb strategies again. It might happen that they will do this Ií periods in a row.
The probability that this happens at a specific point in time is only small, but with
probability one it will happen eventually. By that time all non-curb strategies will be
forgotten. The strategies that will be played from that point on, will depend on the
sample drawn, but it is sure that it will be curb strategies again.
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Before we give a formal proof we make two remarks about Theorem 3.2. First, note
that assertions (i) and (ii) do not impiy that Ch~ is an ergodic set whenever C is a
minimal curb set. 5ti11, the reader may think that the only ergodic set contained in CK















Consider the game in Figure 3.2. This game has only one curb set, namely the set of
all pure strategy combinations. But the profile h-(c, c, ..., c) cannot be reached under
the learning process from any other history. This is so because c is only a best reply
against soitie mixtures of a and b. Hence, there exists no ti with P(h, h) ~ 0 and ie is
not contained in the ergodic set.
The second remark concerns the length of the histories. In the proof of Theorem 3.2
we will use a lower bound on Ií , but that bound is not tight. On the other hand, it is






4,4 2,2 2,2 2,2
2,2 5,0 0,5 0,0
2,2 0,0 5,0 0,5
2,2 0,5 0,0 5,0
Figure 3.3.
r
It is not difFicult to see that if Ií - 2, then the set of histories {(a-~,a-i)~a-' E
{T, M, B} x{l, c, r} } contains an ergodic set. Take for example the history (Tl, Mr).
Agents from pool Vi will play a best reply against al -F (1 - a)r, for some a E[0, 1].
Hence, they will play T or B. But the unique minimal curb set is the singleton {(X,x)}.
So the history must not be too short. Note that if lí - 3 and the process is in state
(Tl, Mr, Mc), then there will be some agent in Vi who will play X, since X is the best
reply against 3l f 3c f 3r.
Note that the game from Figure 3.3 has a unique equilibrium, namely (X, x). This
equilibrium is strict. Since every curb set contains the support of a Nash equilibrium and
since a strict equilibrium forms a curb set as a singleton, it follows that this game has a
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unique minimal curb set. Hence, if players behave as described by our learning process
then they will eventually play the equilibrium. This reasoning holds for all games that
have a unique equilibrium that happens to be strict. So we proved
Corollary 3.2 Suppose that a is the unique Nash equilibrium of g and that a is strict.
The probability that players are playing the equilibriu~n after k steps of the learning
process tends to 1 as k tends to infinity, if histories are sufficiently long.
The remainder of this section contains a formal proof of Theorem 3.2. First we
introduce some notation and state a lemma.
Let F be a non-empty subset of A. We define the projection of F on Ai as p;(F) -
{ f; ~ f E F} and we define span(F) - jj; ~ pi(F). Hence, span(F) is the smallest cartesian
product set in A that contains F. Similarly, for a history h- (a-h ,..., a-1) we define
a;(h) - {a;h,...,a; 1} and span(h) - j~j; 1 ~ri(h). We say that B C A spans F if
span(B) - span(F).
For a history h let ~ind(h) - {s E S~supp(s) C span(h)}. This set contains all
independent beliefs a Bayesian player might have when the process is in state h. Similarly,
we define for a set F C A, 13ind(F) - {s E S~supp(s) C span(F)}. Let M - max; ~Ai~.
Lemma 3.1 Let a', ..., aT E A be such that a'fr ~ span({ai, ... , a'}) for all t-
1,...,T-1. ThenTC~i 1~A;~-(n-1).
Proof. Easy and hence omitted. ~
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Take h-~~ 1 ~Ai ~ -(n -1) f M and let Ií ) h. Let P E~.
Let h~ -( ~h~-~, .. , x', a', ..., at) be a particular history and assume that Fi -
span({a',...,ai}) is not a curb set. Then there exists a~}' E B(13'nd(Ft)) ~ Fi. Let
htfl -(xk-t-i xl ar atfl) Then P(ht.ht}1) 1 0. Starting from an arbi-
trary history h' we can apply this argument repeatedly. By Lemma 3.1 we know
that there exists T C Ii - M such that h1 ~ hT -(xh~-T xl, a', ..., aT ) and
such that FT - span({al, . .., aT }) is a curb set. Let C C FT be a minimal curb
set and let {b',...,bM} span C. Since every strategy in a minimal curb set is a
best reply to some belief concentrated on this set and since Ii ~ M~- T, we have
hT M( a' aT b' bM )~.., ( bl bM bM bM )... ..... . ..... ,..., ~ ,...,
The above shows that for every history h, there exists a minimal curb set C such
that for every set {b', ..., b`y} that spans C, we have h~(b', ..., bM, bM, ..., 6M).
Furthermore, the definition of ~ implies that if h is a C-history and h M h, then h is
also a C-history.
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The second observation implies that the set of C-histories contains an ergodic set, for
any minimal curb set C. The first observation then implies that the set of C-histories
contains exactly one ergodic set, and that there are no other ergodic sets. Assertion (iii)
follows from the observation that the spanning set {bl, ..., bM} can be chosen such that
b`N-á. 0
3.5 Variations on the same theme
We remarked before that one only needs to know which entries of the transition matrix
are positive and which are zero in order to characterize the ergodic sets. In the proof
of Theorem 3.2 we used that certain entries are positive (together with Lemma 3.1) to
show that the process can move from any history h to a curb history h in a finite number
of periods. Furthermore, we used the fact that certain entries are zero to ensure that
the process can not leave the set of C-histories, for any curb set C.
It is possible to prove Theorem 3.2 for an even bigger class of transition matrices. Let
P E P and let P be a transition matrix that satisfies, for any minimal curb set C,
P(h, h) ) 0 ~ P(h, h) 1 0 (3.5.1)
h E Ch and P(h, h) 1 0 ~ h E Ch~ (3.5.2)
Let P denote the set of all such transition matrices. It is obvious that Theorem 3.2
holds for all P E 7~. We will consider two subsets of 1~, namely Psoph and P~"n`. The
transition matrices in these sets correspond to learning processes where some players are
more sophisticated (in the case of Psoph) or less sophisticated (in the case of Pmim) It
turns out that for these two classes we can prove slightly stronger results.
3.5.1 More and less sophisticated players
Suppose that not all individuals in the classes are Bayesian players, but that some
individuals are mimickers. Mimickers don't form expectations but just observe how
other agents in the same role have played the game during (some of) the last K periods.
Then they choose one of these strategies at random. When we retain our assumption
about the Bayesian players, this learning process can be described by a transition matrix
P E Pm'n`, where Pmim is defined as follows.
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Definition 3.3
Let Pmim denote the set of transition matrices P, that satisfy for all hístories h, h E H;
P(h, h) ~ 0 a
h is a successor of h, and
ri(1i) E Bi(~ ind(It)) or ri(h) E~ri(h) iall i)
Obviously, ~m~m C P, hence Theorem 3.2 holds for all P E~mim We can prove a
slightly stronger result: All curb histories are ergodic states.
Theorem 3.3 There exists Ií E N such that for all K 1 lí and for every Markov chain
with a transition matrix P E ~m`m Z C H is an ergodic set if and only if Z- Cx for
some minimal curb set C.
Proof. Using the proof of Theorem 3.2, it suffices to show that if C is a minimal curb
set and h and h are C-histories, then h-~-~ h.
Let h -(a-h ,..., a-1). We can choose a set B-{bl, ..., bM} that spans C such
that a-~ E span({6M-~f~, . .. , bM}, for j- 1, ..., M. From the proof of Theorem 3.2 we
know that h M(b', ..., b`~, a-k, . .., a-1M}~1) -: h. Because of the special way we chose
B (and because players sometimes mimic) we have h M h. O
It is possible to prove Theorem 3.3 with a smaller lower bound on the length of the
memory by making full use of the presence of mimickers. We will not pursue that here.
We just remark that for weakly acyclic games, the class of games considered in Young
(1993), we could take Ii - 1.
The learning process we considered implies that Bayesian players play best responses
against past play. If a player knew that other players are following this process, he
could do better by playing a strategy that is a best reply against a strategy profile,
consisting of best responses for the other players against past play. Of course, we may
have players who foresee that others are going to play best responses to best replies to
past play. We could have even more sophisticated players. When we assume that in a
class many different levels of sophistication are represented, we have a learning process
with sophisticated players. (See also Milgrom and Roberts (1991).)
Formally, let h be a particular history and let To(h) - span(h). Define recursively
T~}'(h) - span(T'(h)UB(Ciind(T'(h)))). Since T~t1(h) ~ T~(h) and A is finite, T~(h) -
span(U~oT~(h)) is well-defined. Again, we define a whole set of transition matrices that
correspond to learning processes with sophisticated players. We will denote this class by
Psoph where 7~soph is defined as follows.
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Definition 3.4
Let Psoph denote the set of transition matrices P, that satisfy for all histories h, h E H,
h is a successor of h, and
P(h, h) 1 0 t~ ~d ~
r(h) E B(Ci (T (h)))
It is obvious that Psoph C 1~ and hence Theorem 3.2 is valid, also for this class.
We can prove a stronger result: In the presence of sophisticated players we only need
a memory of length one. The intuition for this result is that sophisticated players can
do all the learning in their heads. They might foresee all the steps that needed to be
executed in the case of no sophisticated players.
Theorem 3.4 For all Ií ) 1 and all Markov chains with a transition matri.r P E Psoph
we have Z C H is an ergodic set if and only if Z- Ch for some minimal curb set C.
Proof. For notational convenience we just give the proof for lí - 1. Now H- A and
we can define T~(a) for all a E A. Note that T~(a) is a curb set and hence there exists
a minimal curb set C C T~(a). If á E C then P(a, á) 1 0.
Note that if a E C for some minimal curb set C then T~(a) - C. Hence, if a, á E C,
then P(a,á) 1 0. O
The reader may have noticed that this sophisticated learning process has some sim-
ilarities with the notion of rationalizability (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984)). The
difference is that rationalizability corresponds with a process of iterative elimination of
strategies that are never best replies (starting with the whole space of strategy profiles)
whereas our learning process implies the addition of best replies (starting from a history).
The bounded memory of the players causes play to settle down in a minimal curb set.
The similarity of rationalizable and curb strategies has already been pointed out
by Basu and Weibull (1991) and Balkenborg (1992): Call a set C- jj; 1 C; tight if
B(]-j; 1 ~(Ct)) - C. The maximal tight set is the set of rationalizable strategies, the
minimal tight sets are just the minimal curb sets. In particular, every curb strategy is
rationalizable.
3.5.2 Uncertain players
Consider the game from Figure 3.4.








This game has a unique curb set: it consists of all pure strategy profiles. When players
behave as described by any of the learning processes they will regularly be playing (B; R)!
This might seem a bit strange. It could not happen if the players were careful and only
played undominated best replies. Then they would finally be playing only (T, L~.
This example shows a drawback of the notion of minimal curb sets: They can contain
strategies that are weakly dominated. Therefore let us recall from Basu and Weibull
(1991) the notion of sets that are closed under undominated best replies. Let UB(s)
denote the set of pure best replies against s that are not weakly dominated.
Definition 3.5 A non-empty cartesian set C - jI; 1 C; is closed under undominated
best replies (or C is a curb~ set~ if UB(j-j; t 0(C;)) C C. Such a set is called a minimal
curb ~ set if it does not properly contain a set that ís closed under undominated best
replies. Strategies contained in minimal curb~ sets are called curb~ strategies.
It is easy to adjust the learning process so that players will end up playing curb~`
strategies. Just replace `best replies' by `undominated best replies' and analogs of The-
orems 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 can be proved easily. On the level of Bayesian players this means
that, although they have certain beliefs, they are not completely sure that these beliefs
are "correct".3 Therefore they should be careful and only play undominated best replies.
The approach taken above is a bit unsatisfactory since the uncertainty is not modeled.
We will do that now. Remember the sampling procedure described in Section 3.3. Every
time an individual is drawn from class V„ he hears about L precedents concerning the
way player j played this game before. This sample is transformed (by the fictitious play
rule) into a belief s-; from the L-grid distribution space Gr'(h, L), where h denotes the
recent history of plays.
Now suppose that the final belief of this player is not necessarily s-;, but some s-;
"close" to s-;, reflecting the uncertainty of this player. This uncertainty may stem from
the fact that the player realizes that he only draws a sample, and that s-, is only a point
3The uncettainty of the players could stem from the fact that players may realize that other players
have different samples. Anyway, sometimes players "are right" to be uncertain since it is possible that
a history h is followed by the play of a, where a~ span(h).
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estimate of the distribution of strategies. The final belief s-; could be a draw from some
"confidence interval" around s-;. This draw might depend on personal characteristics, as
well as on other external factors. We will just assume that s-; is drawn from the uniform
distribution over BE(s-;) -{s' ; E S-;~d;,L6z(s-;,s' ;) C e}, where E 1 0 is fixed4 and
where d;,~as(s-;, s' ;) - maxa-~Eq ~ ~s-;(a-;) -s' ;(a-;)~. Note that, for large L, the union
of these intervals over all L-grid distributions induced by h, consists of all probability
distributions close to jj~~; 0(~r~(h)).
What consequences does this have for our learning process? Or, in other words, what
strategies will be played with positive probability after each possible history? Well, let
h E H and let a; E A;. Before we had that a; was played with positive probability,
whenever there was some s-; E jj~~; ~(~r~(h)) such that a; E B;(s-;). Now we have that
a; is played with positive probability, only if the stability region of a;,
Stt(a;) -{s-; E S-;~a; E B,(s-;)},
has positive probability under the uniform distribution over BE(s-;), for some L-grid
distribution s-; induced by h. For suffiiciently large L, this is equivalent to
s-; E cl(int(St;(a;))), (3.5.3)
for some s-; E jj~~; 0(~r~(h)), where cl(.) and int(.) stand for closure and interior (in the
topological space S-;), respectively.
Note that if s-; E int(St;(a;)), then a; is a best reply against each strategy in an open
neighborhood of s-;. Up to equivalence, a; is then also the unique (and undominated)
best reply against this neighborhood, and a; is called a robust best reply against s-;.
If only (3.5.3) is satisfied, there is some non-empty open set close to s-; against which
a; is the unique best reply, and we call a; a semi-robust best reply against s-;, which
is denoted by a; E SRB;(s-;). As opposed to robust best replies, semi-robust best
replies always exist, and there may exist several semi-robust best replies against some
s-;, even if player i has no equivalent strategies. It is easy to see that semi-robust best
replies are not weakly dominated. Similar to the case with the (undominated) best reply
correspondence we define
Definition 3.6 (Balkenborg ( 1992))
A rzorz-empty cartesian set C- jI;1 C; is closed under semi-robust óest replies (or C
4~tie could take e- 1~L to reflect the intuition that bigger samples should result in smallet confidence
intervals.
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is a robust set~ if SRB(j-j; 10(C,)) C C. Such a set is called a minimal robust set if it
does not properdy contain a set that is closed under semi-robust best replies.
The learning process where players are uncertain can be described by a Markov chain
that is very similar to the ones we had before. Just replace `best replies' by `semi-robust
best replies' and analogs of Theorems 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 can be proved easily. Play will
settle down in a minimal robust set.
For `generic' normal form games the minimal curb, curb~` and robust sets coincide
with the persistent sets. Persistent sets consist of the extreme points of persistent re-
tracts (Kalai and Samet ( 1984)). As a matter of fact, for games in which no player
has equivalent strategies, the minimal robust sets coincide with the persistent sets (see
Balkenborg ( 1992)). However, many normal form games are interesting because they are
the normal form representation of an extensive form game, and these are not `generic'
in the class of normal form games. This is due to the fact that there may be strategies
in the extensive form game that preclude some information sets ( or subgames) from be-
ing reached. This implies that curb sets may differ from robust sets. To illustrate this
difference consider the following example.
Figure 3.5.
Consider the game in Figure 3.5. Player 3 can decide to burn one unit before players
1 and 2 play a simultaneous move coordination game. Consider the strategy profile
aineff - (RR, rr, "burn 0"). The singleton set containing this profile is persistent and
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robust: Player 3 has a unique best reply against aineff namely "burn 0"; players 1
and 2 have a lot of (undominated) best replies against a'neff but they have a unique
semi-robust best reply. In a small neighborhood outside {aineff} players 1 and 2 have a
unique best reply, since they have an interest in choosing the same action: in a small
neighborhood player 1 plays `R' with a very high probability, whether or not player 3
burnt something, and hence player 2 has to choose `r', whether or not player 3 burnt
something.s Since players 1 and 2 have a lot of (undominated) best replies against a'neff
it is easy to see that {aineff} is not curb or curb~`. In fact, the only minimal curb (or
curb~`) set of this game consists of all strategy profiles yielding the payoff vector (3, 3, 3).
The latter set is also persistent and robust.
It seems that the learning processes introduced in this chapter are a bit peculiar in
the case of extensive form games. In the process that leads to minimal curb sets, some-
times players are absolutely sure that a particular information set will not be reached.
Therefore they are free to choose any action in this information set. On the other hand,
if we add a little bit of uncertainty, players are still quite certain about the strategies
that will be used, but they are also certain that all information sets will be reached with
positive probability. Therefore they have to play a best reply against the strategy profile
that they believe to be played almost certainly, in all information sets, although many
of these information sets will not be reached if this strategy profile is indeed played.
These peculiarities are due to our assumption about the information that players
have. In our learning process we assumed that players know the strategies played in
the past. For extensive form games it makes more sense to assume that players only
observe the outcorrces of actual play, and that they may hold any beliefs about strategies
in unreached information sets. We deal with this issue in Section 3.6.
3.5.3 Dependent beliefs
Throughout this chapter we assumed that a player's belief about the strategies of the
other players is independent, i.e. is an element of S-;. This was a consequence of
the sampling procedure we described in Section 3.3. Players receive information about
the strategies of the players individually. Moreover, if players realize that the players
are deciding simultaneously and independently, then it is natural to have independent
beliefs. There are however two problems concerning the independency of beliefs.
First of all, do players indeed decide independently? After all, the choices of all
SThis result depends on the assumption of independent beliefs. See also Section 3.5.3.
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players depend (via the samples) indirectly on the same recent history. History might
act as a correlation mechanism. Secondly, our other interpretation of the learning process
was that personal characteristics are important to form beliefs. All players expect that
strategies that have not been played recently, will not be played, but different players
may have different assessments of the probabilities with which the remaining strategies
are played. In view of this interpretation, an individual from class V, might have a
dependent belief, i.e. an element of 0(A-;). For instance, he might believe that the
other players can correlate their strategies. It does not really matter whether or not the
other players do correlate, what matters is that some individuals may believe that they
do.
In this section we will examine the consequences of allowing players to have depen-
dent beliefs. We will assume that the classes are very diverse: If h denotes the recent
history and a; E B;(s`;) for some s` E 0(span(h)), then a; will be played with posi-
tive probability. Again, we will define a whole set of transition matrices describing such
learning processes. Let I3dep(h) - {s` E 0(A)~supp(s`) C span(h)} denote the set of all
dependent beliefs a player may have.
Definition 3.7
Let Pder denote the set of transition matrices P, that satisfy for all histories h, h E H,
P(h, h) ~ 0 a
h is a saccessor of h, and
r(h) E B(Cidep(h))
Remark. Note that our definition of the transition matrices does not correspond to
what one may call "correlated learning". Suppose that in a three player game player 3
observes that the other players played TL and BR in the last two periods. Then, under
our assumption of dependent beliefs, it is possible that player 3 believes that TR and
BL will be played, both with probability 1~2. One may feel that only beliefs of the
form aTL f ( 1 - a)BR should be allowed. We do not know whether such "correlated
learning" processes converge to some static set-valued solution concept.
We can prove a theorem similar to Theorem 3.2. Of course, the process will in general
not converge to a minimal curb set, but to a cartesian set F- j-j; ~ F; that is minimal
with respect to the following property: If s` E 0(F) and a; E B;(s`;), then a; E F;.
Following Harsanyi and Selten (1988) we call such a set a primitive formation.s
6Harsanyi and Selten (1988) consider this concept in the agent normal form.
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Theorem 3.5 There exists lí E N such that for all K 1 IC and for every Markov chain
with a transition matrix P E Pdep
(i) !f Z C H is an ergodic set then Z C Fh~ for some primitive formation F.
(ii~ For every primitive formation F there eaists exactly one ergodic subset Z C Fh .
We omit the proof because it is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 3.2. We
just have to observe that if F is a primitive formation and a E F, then a~ is a best reply
against some (dependent) belief concentrated on F.
Obviously, analogs of Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 to the case of dependent beliefs also exist.
The same is true for the results of Section 3.5.2 on undominated best replies and semi-
robust best replies. Analogous to curb~ and robust sets we could define primitive~` and
robust formations. The reader should be aware, though, that the definition of semi-
robustness needs to be adapted. For details, the reader is referred to Chapter 2.
3.6 Learning from outcomes
Throughout this chapter we assumed that players know the strategies that were used in
the past. This assumption is reasonable when the players in the underlying game choose
their actions simultaneously. But if the underlying game is in fact an extensive form
game, it makes more sense to assume that players only observe the outcomes, i.e. the
paths in the tree generated by the strategies. Consider for example the "burning money"
game in Figure 3.5. Suppose player 3 chose to "burn 0" in the last period. How could he
know how players 1 and 2 would have reacted to "burn 1"? In fact, he can't, although
he may have some beliefs.
In this section we will consider the case where players only observe the outcomes in
the recent past. We assume that all agents form expectations on the basis of observed
outcomes, and that different agents within a pool may form different beliefs. We pose
only one restriction on the beliefs: When a player is able to conclude from the observed
outcomes that a particular strategy has not been played during the last lí periods, then
he expects it will not be played next period. As before, we assume that the classes are
very diverse: As soon as strategy a; is a best reply against some independent belief,
sat:sfying this restriction, then a; will be played with positive probability.
We will define a class of transition matrices that correspond to such a"]earning from
outcomes" process, and we denote this class by Poui Before we can do so, we need some
notation.
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Let g be an extensive form game. Let C~ denote the set of outcomes (i.e. paths in the
tree from the root to an endpoint) and let o: A -~ C~ be the mapping that assigns to a
pure strategy combination the outcome it generates. We will assume that there are no
moves of Nature in g, since this mapping is not well-defined if there are. For a history
h-(a-h,...,a-1), let outc(h) - {o(a-~),...,o(a-1)}. Note that outc(h) summarizes
the information a player has. Let cons;(h) -{a; E A;~~a-; E A-; s.t. o((a;,a-;)) E
outc(h)} denote the set of strategies of player i that are consistent with the observed
outcomes. Let cons(h) - ~~ ~ cons;(h).
Definition 3.8
Let 1~o~`t denote the set of transition matrices P, that satisfy for all histories h, h E H,
h is a successor of h, and
P(h, h) 1 0 ~
r(h) E B(13'~`d(cons(h)))
In general, it is not true that play will settle down in minimal curb sets. Note that
cons(h) ~ span(h). This implies that if P E~ and P(h, h) ~ 0, then Pout(h, h) ~ 0 for
all Pous E Pout Using part of the proof of Theorem 3.2, it follows that, if It is large
enough, for every history h and every Pou~ E Pout there exists a curb history h such
that h-~-~ h. The problem is that there might exist a history h, which is not a curb
history, such that h M á. This might even happen in `generic' extensive form games, as
the game from Figure 3.6 shows.
(6, 6) (1, 1) (3;3) (5,5) (2,2) (8,4)
1
Figure 3.6.
This game has a unique minimal curb set, namely {U,D} x{:rX,.rY,.~Z,yX}. How-
ever, suppose that in the recent (curb) history the strategy combina~ions (D..rY) and
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(U, yX ) were played. Hence, player 1 observes (amongst other things) the outcomes DY
and Uy. He might believe that the strategy yY was played, and will be played again
next period. If he does so, he will choose `Out', which is not a curb strategy.
The above example seems to suggest that there is no hope to obtain a result like
Theorem 3.2 in the case of learning from outcomes. There are however two classes of
games for which such an analog does exist. The first class consists of the extensive form
games without moves of nature, where each player has only one information set at which
he has to make a choice. For obvious reasons we call such a game an agent normal form
game without moves of nature, and we denote t.he class by ANF. The second class of
games consists of those games g that have the property that any minimal curb set C of g
corresponds to a single outcome, i.e. the set {o(c)~c E C} is a singleton. We denote this
class by SCO ( single airb outcome). Examples of these games are shown in Figures 3.1b,
3.1c and 3.5.
To prove the above claims we just need 'to show that 7~~~~ C 1~, where P is as defined
at the beginning of Section 3.5. Pa.rt (3.5.1) follows from span(h) C cons(h), part (3.5.2)
follows from the next lemma.
Lemma 3.2 Get g E ANF or g E SCO and let C be a ~nini~nal cvrb set of g. Then
h E Ch ~ cons(h) C C
Proof. First consider the case g E ANF. Let j be a player. If there is an out-
come o(a-~`) E outc(h) that does not intersect j's information set, then it follows that
B~(a-n`) - A~. This implies that C~ - A~ ~ cons~(h). If there is no such outcome, all
outcomes intersect j's information set and cons~(h) - n~(h) C C~. Hence, cons(h) C C.
Now consider the case g E SCO. Let á - r(h). Now we have outc(h) -{o(á)}. Let j
be a. player and suppose a~ E cons~(h). In any information set of j that intersects o(á),
a~ picks the same action as á„ since a~ is consistent with h. Since g E SCO, we have
that á~ is a best reply against á-~. But this implies that a~ is a best reply against á-~
as well, and hence a~ E C~. ~
The reader can check that there are also analogs of Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 to the
case where players learn from outcomes. The definition of a mimicker needs to be
adapted, since players don't observe strategies. We may assume that mimickers choose
at random a strategy from the set of strategies that are consistent with (some of ) the
observed outcomes. "There is also an analog of Theorem 3.5, where players' beliefs are
not, independent. There are however no analogies for the results of Section 3.5.2 on
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the refined notions of undominated best replies or of semi-robust best replies. This is
due to the fact that strategies that are consistent with a curb~` history, may be weakly
dominated. The game of Figure 3.6 shows an example of such a case: The only curb~
strategy is (U,.~X), but xY and xZ are consistent with the curb~ outcome.
3.7 Learning and experimentation
In many papers on learning, experimentation plays a prominent role. (See e.g. Kandori,
Mailath and Rob (1993), Samuelson (1994), Young (1993) and Fudenberg and Kreps
(1988)).
In Young (1993), Samuelson (1994) and Kandori et al. (1993) the possibility of
experimentation (or mistakes, or mutations) implies that the Markov chain describing the
learning process becomes irreducible, and hence has a unique stationary distribution. By
taking the limit as the experimentation rate tends to zero, one stationary distribution of
the unperturbed process is selected. In Young (1993) and Kandori et al. (1993) this yields
typically a unique so called stochastically stable state because they consider a special
class of games. Samuelson (1994) considers games with alternative best replies and then
the support of the limit distribution consists usually of one or more line segments.
It turns out that the introduction of experimentation does not change the results
of this chapter, at least not for two person games. If a two person game has multiple
minimal curb sets, experimentation will not yield the selection of a particular one: the
limiting distribution puts positive weight on all states that are ergodic under the unper-
turbed process. The intuition behind this result is that only one mistake by one player
is necessary in order to move the system from one ergodic set to another. When the
game has inore than two players, it might happen that a particular minimal curb set is
selected. One can characterize the selected minimal curb set graph-theoretically.
In order to prove these results formally, we would have to recall the essential definitions
and theorems from Young (1993). We refer the reader to the original paper for a formal
treatment. We will just illustrate the result by means of an example.
Consider again the coordination game from Figure 3.1a. As we have seen before this
game has two minimal curb sets, {(T, L~} and {(B, R)}. Suppose the system is in state
hT~ -(TL,...,TL) and player 1 makes a mistake and plays B. Since sampling occurs
with replacement, player 2 may receive a draw containing many B's, in which case he will
play R. It may happen that from then on player 1 receives draws with many R's while
player 2 keeps drawing many B's. It follows that, after the initial mistake, the system
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can move to hBR -(BR, ..., BR), without making any further mistakes. Hence, only
one mistake is needed to move the system from hTL to hBR. Similarly, only one mistake
is needed to move the system from hBR to hT~. Since the mistake probabilities are of
the same order, the limiting distribution puts positive weight on both ergodic states.
This result is in contrast with Young (1993). In Young (1993) the players also have
information about play in the recent history: Every player draws a sample of m, plays
out of the plays of the most recent K periods, but without replacement. Then players
play a best reply in a fictitious play fashion. Consider again the coordination game from
Figure 3.1a. Suppose that the system is in state hTL and that player 1 makes a mistake
and plays B. If no further mistakes occur the system will move back to hTL, if the sample
size is at least 2: Since sampling occurs without replacement, every sample contains at
least as many T's as B's. and player 2 will always play L(unless he makes a mistake).
It is easy to see that in this example at least 3m~4 mistakes are needed to move the
system from hT~ tn hBR; while only m~4 mist,akes are needed to move the system in the
other direction. It follows that hTL is the unique stochastically stable state.
3.8 Concluding remarks
We have considered learning processes where the players have a bounded memory and
play best replies against past play. The importance of the bounded memory can be
elucidated by comparing our learning process with Milgrom and Roberts (1991). In
general they consider games with compact strategy sets that are played continuously.
Translated to the context of a two player finite normal form game which is played re-
peatedly at discrete points in time, they define a sequence of plays {a(t)}~o to be
consistent with adaptive learning if for all t, there exists a t such that for all t) t,
a(t-f 1) E B(L3'nd({a(t),a(t ~ 1),...,a(t)})). We could similarly define this sequence to
be consistent wi~th learning with bounded memory, if there exists K E 1[V such that for all
t, a(t f Ii) E B(C3'~d({a(t),a(t f 1),...,a(t -F I( - 1)})). This definition illustrates the
similarity between this chapter and Milgrom and Roberts (1991).
Consider for example the pure coordination game of Figure 3.1a. The sequence
TR, BL, TR, BL, TR, ... satisfies both definitions of consistency. However, the finite-
ness of the memory and of the strategy space allows us to obtain a finite Markov chain,
from which we can compute that the probability of obtaining the above sequence is zero:
Only sequences with tails TL, TG, TL, ... or BR, BR, BR, ... are obtained with positive
probability.
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Milgrom and Roberts (1991) show that sequences that are consistent with adaptive
learning will eventually lie within the set of serially undomínated strategies, which is
a superset of the set of rationalizable strategies. They give some examples of games
with strategic complementarities where this set is a singleton, which implies that these
sequences must converge to the unique equilibrium. We get the same results in these
games because the set of curb strategies is a subset of the set of rationalizable strategies.
But we get similar results in some games where the set of rationalizable strategies is big.
In every game that has a unique and strict equilibrium á, {á} is the unique minimal
curb set. Hence, in such games our learning process leads the players (with probability
1) to the unique equilibrium (Corollary 3.2). An example of such a game is given in
Figure 3.3, where all strategies are rationalizable.
Another example is the discretized version of the following three player Cournot
oligopoly game. Player i chooses to produce q; at zero costs to maximize q;(D - ql - q2 -
q3). The unique (and strict) equilibrium is (D~4, D~4, D~4). The set of rationalizable
strategies is [0, D~2] x [0, D~2] x [0, D~2].
Chapter 4
Multi-Sided Pre-Play
Communication by Burning Money
4.1 Introduction
Given a game in normal form, Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992) investigate the consequences
of allowing some players to signal future actions by incurring costs before the game is
played. They consider equilibria that survive repeated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies. Their main result is that, in a certain class of two person games, if only one
player can signal, then repeated elimination of weakly dominated strategies selects her
most preferred outcome. Moreover, the player does not have to incur any cost to achieve
this.
While this result is nice, it has some important limitations. First of all, Ben-Porath
and Dekel consider only two player games. As we will show later by example, repeated
elimination of weakly dominated strategies need not work in games with more than two
players. Furthermore, they show that if both players have the opportunity to signal
(simultaneously), then signaling future actions is not possible, not even if the game has
common interests. Finally, they need that a player can burn a considerable amount of
money.
We consider a more general case. We extend n-person games by allowing k of the
players to signal future actions by incurring costs. In order to obtain results similar to
those of Ben-Porath and Dekel we work with a stronger solution concept. Van Damme
(1989) showed that stable equilibtia do not necessarily lead to efficient outcomes. We
show that, if the notion of curb or curb~` retracts (Basu and Weibull (1991)) is used,
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then signaling future actions is possible. Roughly speaking, if the players that can burn
money have common interests in the underlying game, then curb and curb~` retracts
select their preferred outcome. Furthermore, in all models of pre-play communication,
no costs are actually incurred. Moreover, if there are two players then the notion of
persistence (Kalai and Samet (1984)) gives the same results.
In the next section we will consider a simple example of a two person game in which
only one player can signal. From this example the reader can develop some feeling for
the solution concept we employ. Moreover, this example shows a difference between our
approach and that of Ben-Porath and Dekel's. At the same time it shows that it is
important that messages are costly.
In Section 4.3 the formal model is introduced. In Section 4.4 we prove the theorem for
the concepts of curb and curb~ retracts for the general case. In Section 4.5 we consider
the persistent retracts in the special case of two person games. Moreover, it is shown that
in games with more than two players persistence need not work. Section 4.6 examines
the consequences of analyzing the game in the agent normal form instead of the normal
form. We close this chapter with some concluding remarks.
4.2 An example: the Battle of the Sexes
Consider the Battle of the Sexes game represented by the normal form in Figure 4.1.
The woman (the row player) prefers to go to a soccer match (`S'), the man (the column









Figure 4.1: the Battle of the Sexes.
Suppose the woman can send one of two messages, mo or mr. Message mo is costless
and message mr costs c. Later we will consider the cases c- 0, c- 1 and e- 2. Let m'F,
denote the woman's strategy when she sends m' and visits event. E. Let eoer denote the
man's strategy when he goes to event e; if he receives message m'. Then the game with
one-sided pre-play communication can be represented by the normal form in Figure 4.2.







First we will consider Ben-Porath and Dekel's approach. Consider the case c- 2.
Action m1T is (weakly) dominated by moT. So the man should go to the soccer match
if he receives message mi. This means that st and tt are dominated. If the woman
knows that the man will play ss or ts, then the action moT is dominated by m1S. So
tbe man knows that the woman will go to the soccer match, hence, he should go to the
soccer match also (st is dominated by ss). If the woman knows that, she will send mo
and go to the soccer match (rn1S is dominated by moS). Hence, repeated elimination
of weakly dominated strategies selects the outcome where both go to the soccer match
and no money is actually being burnt. Notice that this reasoning does not go through
if c- 0 or if c- 1. In these cases no player has a dominated strategy. For example, if
c- 1, m1T can only be dominated by a strategy that puts at least weight 6 on moT,
and at least weight 5 on moS.
In this chapter we will use the concepts of curb, curb~` and persistent retracts. These
were introduced in Chapter 2. Now look at our example. Suppose Ri x R2 is a retract that
is closed under best replies. It is easy to check that we have the following implications
(for all values of c under consideration).
m1T E R~ ~ tt E R2 ~ moT E R~ ~ ts E R2 ~
m' S E R I
SS St tS tt
9,5 9,5 0,4 0,4
4,4 4,4 6,7 6,7
9-c,5 -c,4 9-c,5 -c,4
4-c,4 6-c,7 4-c,4 6-c,7
~ ss E R2 ~ moS E R~ ~ ss, st E R2
In the cases with c) 0 the set of strategy profiles where the woman plays moS and the
man mixes between ss and st is closed under best responses. The series of implications
shows that this set is the unique minimal one.
If c- 0 the series of implications continues:
ss,st E RZ ~ m1S E R~ ~ ts E R2.
Since moT and m~T are best replies against zst ~- Zts, we conclude that the only set
that is closed under best responses is the set of all strategy profiles.
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Hence, if talk is costless, then on the basis of curb no sharp predictions can be made
in this game.l
4.3 The model
In this section we will formally set up the model of multi-sided pre-play communication
in n-person games. We will use notation as introduced in Section 1.3. For the definitions
of curb, curb~ and persistent retracts the reader is referred to Chapter 2.
Let g -(A1, ..., An, ul, ..., un) be an n-person game with player set N. We split
up the set of players into C and D. C is the set of players that can send a message
in the pre-play communication stage ( communicating players); D is the set of players
that cannot ( dumb players). Note that the players in D are dumb but not deaf. It is
important that they can hear. We assume that C is not empty. D may be empty.
We will assume
Assumption 4.1 There exists a' E A such that u;(a') ) u~(a), for all i E C and all
a~ a' and such that u~(a') ~ u~(a'~,a~) for all j E D and all a~ ~ a~.
Notice that if C- N then g is a common interest game (Aumann and Sorin (1989)).
Assumption 4.1 says that the game has a strict Nash equilibrium that gives all commu-
nicating players their highest payoff.
We assume that all communicating players have the same set of inessages M-
{mo, mt ,..., m~ } at their disposal and that the cost of sending message mp is c(m~)
for all of them. These assumptions are made for notational convenience only. They do
not play a role in the results we will derive. We assume that c(mo) - 0, c(m~) 1 0 is
`small' and c(m~) 1 c(m~) for all p) 1. In fact, c(ml) is so small that
c(m1)Gu;(a')-u,(a) foralliECandalla~a'.
This implies that any communicating player that can induce the play of a` by sending
message ml will do so, unless sending mo induces the play of a' also.
iBlume ( 19936) shows that the equilibria in a curb retract of the one-sided cheap talk game select
the equilibrium preferred by the sender, provided that the risk associated with this equilibrium in the
underlying game is sufficiently low. Indeed, if the payoff to ( S, t) is changed from `0, 4' into '2, 4' (which
reduces the risk of (S,s)), then the unique curb retract does not contain moT, m1T or tt, and alI
equilibria in the curb retract yield 9, ~.
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(We use the following convention if C- {i}: f; : M0 -~ A; corresponds to a single
element of A;.) With some abuse of notation we have for m f E T- j-ji 1 Ti,
vt(mf) - uo(f(m)) - c(m~) (~ E C)
v~(mf) - u~(f(m)) (7 E ~)
Remark: The way we have defined the strategy space here means that we are looking
at the reduced normal form (as did Ben-Porath and Dekel). In the normal form a
communicating player's strategy also depends on his own message. It does not matter
for our results whether we analyze the normal form or the reduced normal form. However,
in the normal form the communicating players have a lot of equivalent strategies and this
makes the proof for persistence quite tedious. We could also look at the agent normal
form (Selten (1975)). We will do that in Section 4.6.
4.4 Results for the general case
In this section we will prove the theorem for the curb and curb~ retracts. We will deal
with the general case with n players among which the players in C can communicate.
Theorem 41 P~(g) has a unique curb ~cur6~~ retract, and every strategy profile in this
retract yields player l ui(a') (l E N~.
Proof. We will denote a vector with all coordinates equal to rno by mo. (Depending on
whether this vector is in the domain of a dumb or of a communicating player, it has ~C
or ~C - 1 coordinates. No confusion will result.) Define
F-{mf E T~m - mo , f~(mo) - a~ for all l E N}
Notice that F consists of all pure strategy profiles that yield the payoff vector u(a`).
We will show that every curb~ retract has a non-empty intersection with F. If this is
the case then every curb~ retract is contained in R- jIi r 0(F~), since R is closed under
undominated best replies. Since every curb retract contains a curb~ retract, we know
then that every curb retract has a non-empty intersection with R. Since R is closed
under best replies itself, any curb retract is contained in R. Since all strategy profiles
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in R yield the payoff u(a'), it follows that R is the unique curb retract, and that the
unique curb~ retract is obtained from R by deleting every strategy that has pure weakly
dominated strategies in its support. Then the proof has been completed.
Let R be a curb" retract and let mf E R~ F. Now player l has a]ot of undominated
best replies against (m f)-~. 'This is so because a player has a lot of freedom in how to
react on tuples of inessages that he does not receive. In particular, there exists m' f' E R
such that (i) for all i E C and all m-; ~ m,-;, f,'(m-;) - a; , and (ii) for all j E D and
all m~ m, f~(m) - a~.
If m'f' E F we are ready, because then F n R~ 0.
So suppose m' f' ~ F.
Case 1: m~ mo. There exists i E C wit.h in; ~ mo. All best replies for i against m'f'
involve sending mo. In particular, if f;'(m) - a,` for all rn, then mo f," is an undominated
best reply to m'f' and hence contained in R;. For each j E C`{i}, all best replies
against z-(mo f;', m' f' ~) involve sending mo. In particular, if f~'(m) - a~ for all m,
then mof~' is an undominated best reply to z and, hence, it is contained in R~. Thus
FnR~O.
Case 2: m - rno. Let i E C. All best replies for i against m'f' involve sending na~.
Hence, there exists m f E R` F with m~ mo. This brings us back to case 1. ~
4.5 Further results for two player games
Let us first state the following lemma which will prove to be useful in the two player
case. The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 4.1 Let g-(Ar,A2,ur,uz) be a game. For F- Fr x F2 C Ar x Az, let
H; - A, ` F,. If (I) for all f, f' E F, u;( f)- u;(f'), (2J for all f E F and h; E H;,
u;(h;, f~) G u;(f), and (~J every persistent retract has a non-empty intersection with F,
then every persistent retract is contained in R-,,(F~) x~(F2).
From now on we will assume
Assumption 4.2 No player has equivalent strategies in the game with pre-play commu-
nication.
Then we have that the extreme points of every persistent retract of this game are
pure strategies. For a proof see Chapter 2.
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4.5.1 One-sided pre-play communication
First we will consider t.he case with one-sided pre-play communication, hence C-{1}.
Assumption 1 is now equivalent to saying that the underlying game has a strict Nash
equilibrium yielding player 1 a higher payoff than any other strategy profile.
Theorem 4.2 . Every strategy profele in a persistent retract of P{i}(9) yields player l
u~(a') (l E N~.
Proof. Let R be a persistent retract and let ma1 E R~.
Case 1. m~ mo. Then there exists f E Rz with f(mo) - az. This is so because all
best replies against (1 -e)mai -~emoai have this property. This implies that rnoai E Ri,
since it is the unique best reply against f.
Case 2. m - mo and a~ ~ ai. Using the same trick as before we see that there
exists f E R2 with f(m' )- a2. If f(mo) - a2, then moai E Rl. If f (mo) ~ a2, then
m'al E R~. This brings us back to case 1.
Hence, moai E Rl. It is easy to check that the set of extreme points of
F- {moai } x ~( { f: M~ A2 ~ f(mo) - az} )
satisfies assumptions (1), (2) and (3) of Lemma 4.1.
Then it follows from Lemma 4.1 that R C F. Notice that every strategy profile in F
yields player l u~(a') and the theorem has been proved. o
4.5.2 Two-sided pre-play communication
Now we turn our attention to the two-sided pre-play communication game, i.e. C-
{ 1, 2}. Recall that. Assumption 4.1 now says that. the underlying game has common
interests.
Theorem 4.3 Euery strategy profile in a persistent retract of PC(g) yields player l a
payoff of u~(a`) ~l E N~.
Proof. Let R be a persistent retract and let m f; E R;. Let j - 3- í.
Case 1. m~ m~. Then there exists m'f~ E R~ with f~(mo) - a~. Hence, there exists
~n~ f;' E R; with f,'(mo) - a;.
Case 2. m- mo and f,(mo) ~ a,'-. Then there exists m'f~ E R~ with f~(m') - a~. If
f~(mc) - a1, then there exists mo f~ E R; with f;'(mo) - a; . If fj(ma) ~ a~, then there
exists m' fi' E R,. This brings us back to case 1.
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Let F; -{rrzo f ~ f(mo) - a; }. The two cases showed that F; fl R; ~ ~. It is easy to
check that F, and FZ satisfy assumptions ( 1), (2) and (3) of Lemma 4.1. Hence, any
persistent retract is contained in 0(F,) x 0(F2). Notice that any strategy profile in this
set yields player 1 u~(a`) and the theorem has been proved. 0
4.5.3 A three player counterexample
The following example shows that persistence need not work in games with more than
two players.
Example. Let n- 3, C-{3}. Player 1 chooses between rows R, and Rzi player 2
chooses between columns C, and C2 and player 3 chooses X. (Player 3 has only one










Now consider the following strategy profile: players 1 and 2 play their second strategy
after all messages and pla.yer 3 sends the costless message and then `chooses' X. This
yields the strictly dominated payofE vector (1, 1, 1). Nevertheless, this strategy profile
is a persistent retract as a singleton and, hence, a persistent equilibrium. In a small
neighborhood of the retract player 3 has a unique best reply. Players 1 and 2 have a lot
of best replies against the retract, but in a small neighborhood outside the retract, t.hey
have a unique best reply. This is due to the fact that players 1 and 2 have an interest in
choosing the same action: in a small neighborhood player 1 plays RZ with a very high
probability, after any message, and hence player 2 has to choose C2, after any message.
Repeated elimination of weakly dominated strategies does not work either. In this
example the messages are not important to signal t,he intended action of player 3, since he
has only one action. Hence, our results are not related to forward induction. The reason
that the dummy player has an effect on the outcome (when curb or curb~` is applied),
is that he is willing to try a different (and possibly more costly) message, whenever the
first two players fail to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium.
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4.6 Agent normal form
As remarked at the end of Section 4.3, we have analyzed the pre-play communication
game in the reduced normal form. In this section we will look at the agent normal form
(Selten (1975)). The agent normal form is obtained by splitting every player into several
agents. Each agent corresponds to one information set of that player and each agent has
the same utility function as that player. In the agent normal form different agents of the
same player take their decisions independently.
Consider for example the one-sided pre-play communication game of the Battle of
the Sexes of Section 4.2. The extensive form of that game (when c- 2) is given in
Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4.
Player 1 has three information sets, namely ~, {mo} and {m' }. So in the agent. normal
form there are three agents for player I; call them lo, 1(mo) and 1(m'). Player 2 has
two information sets, namely {moS,moT} and {m'S,m'T}. Call the agents 2(mo) and
2(m' ). So the agent normal form of this game has 5 agents (or players).
It is well known by now that a lot of refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
may give different results in the normal form and in the agent normal form.
In the agent normal form of the game in Figure 4.4 no agent has a weakly dominated
strategy. Hence, repeated elimination of weakly dominated strategies does not work in
the agent normal form.
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For persistence we have similar problems. Consider the strategy profile where agent
lo sends mo, agents 1(mo) and 1(mi) play T and agents 2(mo) and 2(m~) play t. One
can check that this profile is a persistent retract as a singleton.
It is not surprising that persistence and repeated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies give different results in the agent normal form and in the normal form. By
splitting up the players into agents we have made a five player game out of a two player
game. We have already seen that these solution concepts give different results in games
with more than two players.
In principle we could have the same problems with curb and curb~`. In general it is
not true that the curb and curb~` retracts in the normal form correspond to those in the
agent normal form. However, the class of games considered in this chapter is special.
We have
Theorem 4.4 The agent normal form of P~(g) has a unique curb (curb~`) retract. All
strategy profiles in this retract yield every agent of player l, u~(a') (l E N).
Proof. For i E N let i(m) denote the agent of player i with information set {m}. For
i E C let io denote t.he agent of player i that sends a message. The number of agents is
~C ~(~N) x( ~M)~~. Let A be the set of agents. A strategy profile is denoted by
ma. Let mo be the vector with ~C coordinates, all equal to mo.
Define
F-{ma~m - mo , a.l~ol - a; for all i E N}
F consists of all pure strategy profiles that yield the payoff vector u(a`).
We will show that every curb~` retract has a non-empty intersection with F. If this
is the case then every curb~` retract is contained in R- j-j~E,~ 0(F~), since R is closed
under undominated best replies. Since every curb retract contains a curb~` retract, we
know then that every curb retract has a non-empty intersection with R. Since R is closed
under best replies itself, any curb retract is contained in R. But then the theorem is
proved since every strategy profile in R yields all agents of player l u~(a').
Let R be a curb~` retract and let má E R`F.
Case 1. m ~ mo.
For all agents i(m) with m~ m we have that a; is an undominated best reply against
má. Hence, má;l;,~la' ilml E R. An agent io with m;o ~ mo has a unique best reply
against this profile, namely to send mo. Hence, morrz-;oa;l;,~la';~;,il E R. Against this
strategy, each agent jo has a unique best reply, namely to send mo. Now it is shown that
RnF~O.
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Case 2. m - mo.
For all agent,s i(m) with m~ m we have that a; is an undominated best reply against
rná. Hence, má~~;,~~a';~;,~~ E R. Every agent io has a unique best reply against this
strategy, namely to send m'. Hence, there is a strategy profile má E R with m~ mo.
This brings us back to case 1. ~
4.7 Conclusion and related literature
We have generalized the result of Ben-Porath and Dekel into two directions. We consider
games with more than two players, and there may be more than one player that has the
possibility to burn money. We have shown that curb and curb~` retracts select the
equilibrium that is preferred by the people that have the possibility to burn money.
A class of related results can be found in some of the literature on cheap talk. This
literature usually restricts attention to two person games, but it also applies set-valued
solution concepts. Blume (1993b) shows that all equilibria (but not all strategy profiles!)
in a curb retract of the game with one-sided pre-play communication, select the outcome
preferred by the sender, if the risk associated with this equilibrium is not too high.
Matsui (1991) shows that cyclically stable sets (see also Chapter 2) select the optimal
outcome in common interest games with two-sided pre-play communication. Kim and
Sobel (1991) apply the concept of an equilibrium evolutionarily stable set (Swinkels
(1992), see also Chapter 2). They obtain efLiciency in common interest games when the
players speak consecutively. However, they show that inefílciency may occur in common
interest games (but not in equilibrium common interest games), when the players speak
simultaneously.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let R be a persistent retract, and let VI x V2 ~ R be an open
neighborhood that is absorbed by R. Let x; - u;(f) for (all) f E F and define
m; - max u;(a)
m; - min u;(a)
ó(hi) - ~~ - ÉF~u~(h~,Iz) (~~ E H,)
b(hz) -~~ - ÉF uz(f~, ~s) (hz E Hz)
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Notice that (2) implies ó(h;) ) 0. Let ó; - minh;EH, ó(h;). Let e~ ~ 0(j - 3- i) satisfy
(1 - e~)(x; - ó;) ~ e;m;~ G(1 - e~)x; f e,m; .
Let s;(a;) denote the weight that s; puts on a,. Define V,(e;) - {s; E V,~ ~h,EH, s;(h;) G
e;}. Then Vi(el) x Vz(ez) is an open neighborhood of R fl R. We claim that this
neighborhood is absorbed by R fl R.
Let sz E Vz(~z), hl E Ht, f~ E Fl. Now
ui(hi, sz) C ~ sz(fz)(~i - ó(h1)) f~ s2(hz)mi
FZ HZ
G (1 - ez)(~i - ói) ~ ~zmi
G (1 - ez)~i f ezm~
~ ~S~(f2)xl ~ ~S21h2)ul(fle h2) - ~1(fl~s2)
F~ Hz
Hence, there are no best replies against strategies in Vz(ez) in Hl. Hence, the best
replies are in Fl. Reversing the roles of the players then proves the claim. Hence, every
persistent retract is contained in R. O
Chapter 5
Signaling by Burning Money
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapier we studied pre-play communication in garnes with symmetric
and perfect information. Players can send messages to indicate which action they take
in the game. The messages may serve as a coordination device. However, they do not
reveal any new information. Signaling games are different. In t,hese games some players
have private information. The action taken by a privately informed player will typically
depend on this information. Therefore, it may reveal (some of) this information to
players who still have to take an action. These players will take that information into
account when they make their decision.
There are many economic situations in which asymmetric information and signaling
play a role. For example, an incumbent firm may have better information about demand
and cost parameters than a potential entrant. Now it may happen, for instance, that
a high price set by the incumbent, signals that demand is high, and therefore provokes
entry. As another example, consider a worker who is privately informed about his ability
and skill. He may try to signal his skill to a potential employer by choosing an appropriate
education level. Of course, low skilled workers will want to hide their information, that
is, they want to pool with the high skilled workers.
In this chapter we will only be concerned with the most basic form of a signaling
game, namely the Sender-Receiver game. There are two players, the sender and the
receiver. The sender has some private information (about his type) and sends a message
to the receiver. The receiver then takes an action. Payoffs for both players depend on
the type of the sender and the action taken by the receiver (and sometimes also on the
message).
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A drawback of the use of Sender-Receiver games is that they often give rise to a host of
equilibria, giving the theory little predictive power. This is often the case in games with
"cheap talk". Here the sender can send any message from some (finite) set of available
messages without bearing any direct cost. (The payoffs are indirectly dependent on the
message because of the influence of the message on the decision of the receiver.) The
introduction of refinements can reduce the set of equilibrium outcomes. Blume (1994)
shows that persistence (Kalai and Samet (1984)) rules out pooling outcomes in games
that have strict separating equilibria, if the message space is "small". Consider for
example a Sender-Receiver game in which the two types of sender are equally likely.
Payoffs are indicated in Figure 5.1: Each cell corresponds to one type-action pair. The












If there are only two (costless) messages available, then the pooling equilibrium (i.e.,
the equilibrium in which both types of sender choose the same message), which is at-
tractive to the sender, is not persistent.
The results of Blume (1994) are not robust to an extension of the message space.
This is caused by the fact that if there are unused messages, the receiver is indifferent
between a lot of best replies. This implies that the sender can be indifferent between
using some messages because they can lead to the same action and they are all costless.
Indifferences cause "drift", i.e. the receiver may switch between different best replies and
the sender may switch between messages. This amounts to very large persistent retracts
that contain both pooling and separating equilibria. Hence, the predictive power is very
low.
Blume (1993a) introduced the notion of perturbed message persistency. Roughly
speaking, he considers persistent equilibria of the signaling game in which the strategy
of the sender is perturbed. This means that involuntarily used messages have some
residual meaning, and the receiver is no longer indifferent. One of Blume's results is
that, if there exists an equilibrium in which all types of sender get their preferred action,
then any perturbed message persistent retract consists of such an equilibrium. In order
to obtain this result he assumes that the perturbation is a so called effective language.
This means that there are some nominal costs for certain messages, and that the message
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space is very large.
In this chapter we assume that messages are costly, and more importantly that they
all have different costs. These differences in the costs of the messages let the indifference
on the side of the sender disappear. An advantage of our approach is that we only need
that the number of available messages exceeds the number of types. The results of this
chapter are therefore robust to an extension of the message space.
The main result of this chapter is that, when there exists an equilibrium in which
all types of sender get their preferred action, then every strategy profile in a persistent
retract yields all types of sender their preferred action. This is also true if "persistent" is
replaced by "curb" or "curb~"' (Basu and Weibull (1991)). For the definitions and some
properties of these solution concepts the reader is referred to Chapter 2.
5.2 Sender-Receiver games
Nature draws the type of sender: t E T- {tl, ..., tt} with probability p(t) 1 0. The
sender ]earns his type and then sends a message m E M-{ml, ..., m,y~ } to the receiver.
Observing the message sent but not knowing the type of the sender, the receiver chooses
an action a E 1i -{al, ..., a~ }. We will consider only the normal form of this signaling
game. Hence, the set of pure strategies for the sender is
.~-{f:7-,.n~},
and the set of pure strategies for the receiver is
~-{g:N1~A}.
The payoff of a sender of type t that sends message m and gets action a is denoted by
u(t, a) - c(m). The payoff for the receiver is then v(t, a). The total payoffs for the sender





We assume that every type of sender t has a unique preferred action ai, i.e.
{a~ }- arg maxa u(t, a). Notice that different types may have the same preferred ac-
tion. Without loss of generality we write {ai ~t E 7} -{al,...,ak} (k C ITI)-
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We assume that the number of inessages exceeds the number of types, i.e. ~,M~ ~ ~7~.
Moreover, it is assumed that different messages have different costs, and that there are
enough cheap messages. Formally, we assume that c(ml) - 0 and c(m,) G c(m;fl).
Furthermore, for all t E 7 and all a ~ a~
u(t, at ) - c(ml7lti ) 1 u(t, a).
This assumption implies that if the sender has the possibility to induce his preferred
action by sending a relatively cheap message, he will do so.
Before we go further we need some more notation.
f(7) -{ f(t) ~t E T} (all f E.~)
f-1(m) -{t E 7~f(t) - m} (all f E .~,m E ~ti1)
Now we come to a major assumption.
Assumption 5.1 There eaists a pure strategy combination (f, g) satisfying
~i~ g(f(t))-ai foralltE7
(ii~ for all m E f(7), {g(m)} - arg maxa ~iE j-~l„~l p(t)v(t, a)
This assumption tells us that the cheap talk variant of the game has a pure Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in which all types of sender get their preferred action and in which the
receiver's best replies after equilibrium messages are unique.
This does not exclude the possibility that there might exist equilibria that are better
for the receiver. Consider again the example we studied in the introduction. If types are
equally likely then the pooling equilibrium yields all types of sender the preferred action
a3 and the receiver a payoff of 2, but the separating equilibria yield the receiver 3.
Theorem 5.1 Every strategy profile that is contained in a persistent, curó or r,urb~`
retract of the costly signaling game is an equilibrium and yields all types of sender the
preferred action. Moreover, the messages used in such equilibria are the ~ cheapest ones.
Proof. Note that, as long as ~,A~ 1 1, the sender has no pure equivalent strategies.
Therefore, we know that the extreme points of any persistent retract are pure strategies.
We introduce some notation.
P' - {t~ai - a;}
P(t) - {t'~ai, - ai }
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~k is the set of permutations of { 1, ..., k}
.P'-{fE.~~f(T)-{mr,...,mk} and ~TEPk s.t. f-'(m;)-PTI'1}
Hence, .P' is the set of pure strategies for the sender that partitions the types according
to their preferred action, using only the k cheapest messages.
The proof consists of three steps. The first step is quite complicated. Therefore, we
first give the proof under the stronger assumptions that ~~1~ ) 2~7~ and that, for all
tE7andalla~a~,
u(t, ai)- c(mzlTl )~ u(t, a).
Step 1. Let R be a persistent, curb~ or curb retract. Let f E Rr be a pure strategy.
Let m;, ,..., m;k be the k cheapest unused messages in f. There exists g E B( f) fl R2
with g(m;~ )- a~ (j - 1, ..., k). Then for every f' E B(g) we have g( f'(t)) - a~ , for all
l. iVloreover, all types t' E P(t) choose the same message (namely the cheapest message
that induces a~ ). Hence, g E B( f').
Step 2. Let R be a persistent, curb~` or curb retract. Let ( f, g) E R be an equilibrium in
which all types ofsender get 4~heir preferred action and in which all types t' E P(t) use the
same message, for all t. Then there are k messages used, but it need not be the k cheapest
ones. Let m~, ,..., m~, be the used messages that are at least as expensive as m~ fr. Then
there are also r unused messages that are at least as cheap as mk: m;, ,..., m;,. There
must be g' E R2 such that g'(rrz) - g(m) if m E f(7~) and g'(m;,) - g(m~,) (1 C s G r).
Now B(g') C ,P'.
Step 3. Let f E.~`. Then { f} x co(B( f)) is absorbing, has the curb~ property and is a
curb retract. Hence, every persistent, curb~` or curb retract that contains f is contained
in the above retract.
Step 1 showed us that any persistent, curb` or curb retract contains an equilibrium in
which all types of sender get their preferred action. Step 2 shows then that it must also
contain an equilibrium in which the sender plays a strategy from the set .~'. By step 3
we know that all persistent, curb~` or curb retracts that contain f E.P" are contained
in one of the retracts described there. Every strategy profile in the retracts described
there is an equilibrium and gives all types of sender the preferred action and uses only
the cheapest k messages. This completes the proof under the stronger assumption on
the number of inessages.
Now we continue without making this stronger assumption. The proof of step 1 given
before, is now no longer correct, because we cannot be sure that there are k unused
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messages. Steps 2 and 3, however, remain valid. We only need to adjust the proof of
step 1. The basic idea of the proof is to separate the types step by step.
First, we introduce some more notation.
.~' -{ f E .~~dt, t' E P' tlt" ~ P` f(t) - f(t') ~ f(t")}
.~s -{f E.~~t,t' E S ~[ f(t) - f(t') t~ t' E P(t) ]} (S C 7)
~` is the set of strategies for the sender that separates the types in P` from other
types. Note that .~T -.~~ n... n.~k. We need to show that .~T n Rl ~ Í~.
Let f E Rl n.~1 n... n.~s (0 G s G k). Since there is at least one unused message,
there exists g E B( f) n R2 such that for all f' E B(g)
for all t E Ui}iP' g(f'(t)) - ai
Hence, for all f' E B(g) we have f' E.~u~tlP,. (And at least one such f' must be in R~.)
Let m;~ denote the message sent (according to this f') by types in P~ (1 C j C s f 1).
Now we can have two different cases. Either f' E.~1 n... n,Pstl or
~t ~ u,}~P' s.t. f'(t) E{f'(t)~t E u~}'P~}. (5.2.i)
Consider the latter case. Let
z~ -
( 1 if 3t ~ UIt'P` s t f'(i) E{ f'(t)~t E P~}
Sl 0 otherwise
W.l.o.g. zl -...- zy - 1 and zy~7 -...- zs~l - 0. Then there are at least y~ 1
unused messages in f', say ini, . .., rnyti. Then there exists g' E B( f') n R2 such that
9~(mt,)-9(m~,)~fyflGjGs~l
g'(m~)-g(m,)iflGjGy
g'(r'rzy~l) - ai where t' is as in (5.2.1)
Now we have for all f" E B(g') that f" E.Fu;f'P~uP~il.
Again either f" E.Pl n.., n.~5}1 n.P~ (where ~ is such that P~ - P(t)) or there
exists t' ~ Uit1P' U Pr such that
f"(t') E{ f"(t)~t E U;}1P` U Pr}.
(Compare with (5.2.1).)
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Repeating the same argument at most ~7~ times gives us
.~'n...n.~SnR,~O ~ .~ln...n.~sf'nR,~O.
Repeating this argument at most k times gives us
R,n.~T-R,n~'n...n.~k~0.
Now step 2 and 3 can be applied and the proof is completed. O
Note that the bound I7I ~ IMI is tight: We already saw that the separating equilibrium
of the cheap talk game from Figure 1 forms a persistent retract if there are only two
messages. This remains to hold when the messages are costly.
One might think that the theorem can be generalized in the following sense. If there
exists an equilibrium in which all types t E T' C T of sender get their preferred action,
t.hen in every equilibrium that. is contained in a persistent, curb or curb~ ret.ract. a.ll
types in T get their preferred action. This is however not true in general. The following
example shows a game in which for every type there is an equilibrium which yields that






5,3 1,4 0,0 3,3
5,3 0,0 1,4 0,0
0,0 0,0 1,4 5,3
Figure 5.2.
a2 a3 a4
All types are equally likely. The equilibria in which t, and t2 pool, yield these types
their preferred action a,. The equilibria in which tl and t3 pool, yield t3 the preferred
action a4. But there does not exist an equilibrium in which all types get their preferred
action.
5.3 Related literature and concluding remarks
Cheap talk games often give rise to a multitude of equilibria because unused messages
cause indifferences on the side of the sender and the receiver. In this chapter we got
rid of the indifference on the side of the sender by assuming that messages are costly.
Blume, Kim and Sobel (1993) made the same assumption. They used the notion of an
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EES set (Swinkels (1992), see also Chapter 2) and obtained a slightly weaker result: EES
sets exist and consist of ef~icient equilibria (less of signaling costs) if the interests of the
sender and the receiver are aligned (Propositions 3 and 4). In case the interests are not
aligned, they show that there exists an EES set in which the sender gets the preferred
action (Proposition 5). However, they also provide an example that shows that there
may exist other EES sets in which the sender does not get the preferred action (Figure 3,
p. 560).
Blume (1993a) solved the indifference on the side of the receiver by introducing per-
turbations, which give residual meaning to unused messages. Another possibility to solve
the indifferences was introduced by WSrneryd (1993). He assumes that the receiver has
a preference for using less complex strategies.
In this chapter we applied persistency. In Chapter 3 we presented a learning process
that results in the play of persistent strategies. However, it was assumed there that
players observe the strategies used in the past. Probably it makes more sense to assume
that players only observe the outcomes and not the full descriptive strategies, if the game
is in fact an extensive form game. However, the learning process could be adjusted to
produce the same result if players only observe outcomes in so called single curb outcome
games, i.e. games wit,h the property that all strategies in the same curb retract yield the
same outcome. There was a problem with games with moves of Nature: It might happen
that in a bounded history certain types are never chosen by Nature. It is interest,ing to
note that Canning (1993) considers a Sender-Receiver game with costly messages, very
similar to the model of this chapter. He presents a learning process that is similar to the
one of Chapter 3. By assumption all types are always present. Under the assumption
that players draw a random belief for those messages that are not observed in the recent
history, Canning (1993) shows that in common interest signaling games with probability





One of the most important ideas in game theory is the value of commitment, the idea
that it may be advantageous to constrain one's own behavior in order to induce others
to behave in a way that is favorable to oneself. Schelling's (1960) classic The Strategy
of Conflict is filled with examples that illustrate this idea that it might pay to reduce
one's flexibility, that it may be opt.imal to burn the bridges behind oneself. The simplest
commitment possibility that Schelling discusses ( and what he calls the "pure uncondi-
tional commitment" ) is equivalent to obtaining the first move: to preempt one's rivals
by choosing and communicating an action before they do. In the economics literature,
this first-mover advantage has been known at least since Von Stackelberg ( 1934) pointed
out that in a quantity setting duopoly game, the leader has higher profits than the fol-
lower and than a Cournot competitor. Various authors have argued that the fact that
each duopolist has an incentive to move earlier than his opponent makes the Cournot
equilibrium somewhat, suspect. Of course, if the duopolists are indeed forced to move
simultaneously ( as the standard game model of the duopoly situation assumes), then
there is nothing wrong with the Cournot equilibrium, but one may wonder whether in
real situations the rules are indeed that rigid as to prevent commitments from being
made.
The above observation naturally leads to the more general question of which Nash
equilibria are still viable when players have the opportunity to commit themselves. This
ï5
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question has been addressed recently in Rosenthal (1991). Rosenthal defines an equi-
librium s of a 2-person game g to be commitment robust if s is also a subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome of each of the two games where one of the players moves first. He
argues that "failure of commitment robustness ought to signal t,hat there is a sensc in
which the equilibrium is questionable if in the intended application the rules can be mod-
ified in the appropriate way sufficiently inexpensively by the player who stands to gain".
However, this argument is not entirely compelling. Rosenthal compares the simultane-
ous move game wit.h t.he t,wo perfect information sequential move games in which the
leader is exogenously specified, but it is not clear why the latter games are relevant to the
study of the former situation. The original problem derives from the possibility that each
player might or might not choose to move before the other. Both players simultaneously
have the possibility to commit themselves, no player can unilaterally change the rules of
the game, hence, one would like to see the commitments arise endogenously. Rosenthal
seems well aware of this problem with the definition that he proposes. He writes: "In
defining commitment-robustness, one might require consideration of more than just the
alternative games GI and G~~; after all there could be opportunities for both players
to invest in commitment possibilities. It seems best, therefore, to think of the defining
conditions here as being in the nature of necessary conditions."
The question we would like to raise is whether Rosenthal's definition indeed gives
necessary conditions. Specifically, could it not be that, even though each player could
profit from moving first, no player dares to commit since he fears that the opponent might
commit simultaneously? Hence, could it not be that, as a consequence, the players end
up in the Nash equilibrium after all? Certainly, the latter seems a real possibility in
cases where committing to an action is risky, as it is, for example, in the quantity setting
duopoly game. To address these issues we make use of the game of action commitment
that was proposed in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The rules are as follows: There are
two periods and each player has to move in exactly one of these periods. Choices are
simultaneous, but, if one player chooses to move early (i.e. to commit) while the other
moves late, the latter is informed about the former's choice before making his decision.
Hence, in this game, each player can commit, no player has the sole privilege of being
able to do so. We investigate which equilibria of the original game can arise as "sensible"
equilibrium outcomes of the action commitment game. Are indeed only those equilibria
viable at which no player has an incentive to move first? Is commitment robustness, as
defined by Rosenthal, a necessary condition for equilibrium outcomes to survive when
the sequencing of the moves is endogenous?
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A first important result is that a mixed strategy equilibrium indeed is viable only if no
player has an incentive to move first at this equilibrium (Theorem 6.2). Only in this case
does the action commitment game have a subgame perfect equilibrium that produces this
outcome. The intuition is quite straightforward: The actions actually resulting from the
players' mixed strategies need not be in equilibrium, ex post players have an incentive
to deviate. Hence, each player will have an incentive to wait, thereby guaranteeing that
he is best responding no matter which action the opponent is actually choosing. But if
a player waits, the opponent frequently will prefer to commit to his Stackelberg leader
strategy.
For pure strategy equilibria, the situation is much different and it turns out that these
are not as easily eliminated: An immediate commitment of each player to this equilib-
rium is part of a subgame perfect equilibrium of the 2-stage action commitment game
(Theorem 6.3). Furthermore, such an immediate commitment constitutes a perfect equi-
librium in the normal form of the action commitment game (Theorem 6.4). Intuitively, if
each player expects an unattractive outcome in case the timing game reaches the second
stage, then it is optimal for each player to commit to the pure equilibrium immediately if
he expects his opponent to do the same. Hence, requiring perfectness does not allow one
to conclude that only pure equilibria in which no player has an incentive to move first
are viable when the timing is endogenous. Consequently Rosenthal's conclusion appears
premature.
To see whether Rosenthal's intuition can be given some foundation we then turn to
more refined equilibrium notions. The literature offers two types of refinements, the
distinction being whether an evolutionary or an eductive interpretation of equilibria is
adopted. An example that we discuss extensively in the next section shows that the
eductive perspective does not allow one to conclude that only commitment robust equi-
libria are viable when the timing of the moves is endogenous: Also other pure equilibria
may result from proper (Myerson (1978)) and even stable (Kohlberg and Mertens (1986))
equilibria of the action commitment game.
The main result of this chapter, however, shows that Rosenthal's intuition can be
supported by a variety of set-valued solution concepts that have an evolutionary flavor.
These concepts seem to correspond more closely to the interpretation of an equilibrium
as a fixed point of an unspecified dynamic process, than to the interpretation of an
equilibrium as a self-enforcing agreement. Specifically, our main result shows that the
concepts of persistent equilibria (Kalai and Samet (1984)) and curb~-equilibria (Basu
and Weibull (1991)) force players to coordinate on the commitment robust equilibrium
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whenever this is unique and pure (Theorem 6.6). Hence, if we accept curb~ or persistent
equilibria as the relevant solution concept, the results in this chapter allow us to identify
two classes of games for which we can unambiguously determine the outcome if the order
of the moves is endogenous, viz. zero-sum games and games with common interest.
While the result concerning zero-sum games is not surprising, it is remarkable that one
has to turn to very restrictive equilibrium notions to "justify" playing the Pareto-effiicient
equilibrium in common interest games.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 we give an ex-
ample of a coordination game to show that the intuition, that only commitment robust
equilibria are viable when the timing is endogenous, might be misleading. In Section 6.3
we introduce notation and give a definition of commitment robust equilibria that differs
slightly from that of Rosenthal. We compare the two concepts and derive characteriza-
tions of them. Section 6.3 also formally introduces the 2-stage action commitment game.
In Section 6.4 we show that a mixed strategy equilibrium is viable with endogenous tim-
ing only if it yields each player at least his Stackelberg leader payoff. In contrast it is
shown in Section 6.5 that requiring perfectness in the timing game does not eliminate
pure equilibria of the underlying game. In this section we also discuss the relat,ed work
of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Section 6.6 investigates whether players will automat-
ically coordinate on a commitment robust equilibrium when the order of the moves is
endogenous. Section 6.7 concludes and discusses some related work.
6.2 A coordination game
In this section we discuss a simple example to show that the intuition that, when the
timing of the moves is endogenous, only equilibria in which no player has an incentive
to move first are viable, is not completely reliable. We show that one needs to employ
quite restrictive solution concepts in order to arrive at this conclusion. Specifically, the
following example demonstrates that even if a game has a strict equilibrium that is also
the unique Stackelberg equilibrium outcome in each of the two games where one of the
players is forced to move first, it is by no means obvious that players will necessarily
coordinate on this equilibrium when the order of the moves is determined endogenously.
Consider the common interest coordination game g given in Figure 6.1a. When players
have to move simultaneously, there are three equilibria: (T, L), ( B, R) and a mixed
equilibrium that yields each player the payoff 3. When one of the players is forced to
move first, with this player's choice being revealed to the other, the subgame perfect
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outcome is (T, L), irrespective of which player moves first. According to Rosenthal's
definition only the equilibrium ( 'l, L) is cornrnitment robust.
T'
T 2 2 0 0 Tz
B D 0 1 1 B2
B'
1,' Lz R2 Rr
2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0
2 2 2 2 0 0 1 1
2 2 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 6.1a: A coordination game. Figure 6.1b: The (reduced) normal form
of the 2-period game of endogenous timing
associated with the game from Figure 6.1a.
Let us investigate whether this equilibrium is the unique "sensible" outcome of the
2-stage game of action commitment, described in the introduction, in which the order
of the moves is endogenously determined. In this action-commitment game both players
have 10 pure strategies. (A player has two possibilities to commit himself; if he does
not commit he might be in three different information sets in period 2 and in each of
these he can choose between two possible actions.) Figure 6.1b displays a reduced form
of this normal form: It only lists those strategies in which a player plays a best response
in the second period whenever the opponent has unilaterally committed himself in the
first period. Since this reduction makes it easier to see the intuition for our results, our
discussion in this section will be based on it. Note, however, that our formal results
are based on the full, unreduced, game. In Figure 6.1b, Xr denotes the pure strategy
"commit to X in period 1", while XZ denotes "wait till period 2, play the unique best
response if the opponent has already moved in period 1 and, otherwise, play X." The
question we want to address is whether "2,2" (i.e. the commitment robust equilibrium)
is the unique "sensible" outcome in the game of Figure 6.1b. Alternatively, can one
perhaps also give good arguments in favor of "1,1", or in favor of the mixed equilibrium?
Inspection shows that the game from Figure 6.1b has three Nash equilibrium out-
comes: There is a connected set of eyuilibria with payoff (2,2), there is also a connected
set of equilibria with payoff (1,1) and there is a completely mixed equilibrium in which
each player plays (1,2,4,8)~15. The latter yields each player the payoff 14~15. Hence, we
see that the endogenous sequencing of the moves eliminates the mixed strategy equilib-
rium. The intuition is simple: If my opponent commits himself to the mixed equilibrium
L R
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in the first stage, I have an incentive to wait since in that case I guarantee that we either
coordinate on (T, L) or (B, R), i.e. I prevent a disequilibrium outcome. However, if I
wait, my opponent does better by committing to his 5tackelberg leader strategy.
Having eliminated the mixed equilibrium from Figure 6.1a, let us now turn to the
Pareto dominated pure strategy equilibriurn "1,1". A glance at Figure 6.Ib shows that
this is not as easily eliminated. Namely, B' and Rr are undominated strategies in
Figure ó.lb so that (B~, Rt) is a perfect equilibrium. Even stronger, (BI, R~) is a proper
equilibrium (Myerson (1978)): For any E~ 0 t,hat, is sufficiently small the strategy
pair in which each player plays the complet,ely mixed strategy (e3, e2, e, 1 - e- ez - e3)
is a 2e-proper equilibrium in Figure 6.1b. In fact, one may show that, in the game
of Figure 6.1b, the connected set of equilibria with payoff "1,1" contains a stable set
as defined in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Intuitively, if players expect mistakes to
occur with a relatively large probability in the second period, or if they believe that
the unattractive mixed strategy equilibrium would be played in case the second period
would be reached, then each player has a strong incentive to commit to the equilibrium
"1,1" in the first period if he expects his opponent to do the same. IIence, it seems that
Rosenthal's (1991) conclusion that only (T,L) makes se~nse in the gatne of Figure 6.1a
when aspects of commitment are taken into account was premature.
The concept of Nash equilibrium allows two interpretations. The first is as a necessary
requirement for a self-enforcing agreement and the concepts of perfectness, properness
and stability all correspond to this interpretation. Hence, from the preceding paragraph
we may conclude that an agreement on "1,1" is self-enforcing even when the timing
of the moves is endogenous. An alternative interpretation of a Nash equilibrium is
as a fixed point of an (unspecified) dynamic evolutionary or learning process. Several
refinements have been proposed that correspond to this interpret,ation and it turns out
that some of these allow the conclusion that players will coordinate on "2,2" when the
timing of the moves is endogenous. Specifically, the concepts of persist.ent equilibria
(Kalai and Samet (1984)) and curb~`-equilibria (Basu and Weibull (1991)) force players
to coordinate on (T, L). Let us illustrate this result for curb~`-equilibria, i.e. for equilibria
that belong to minimal sets of mixed strategy pairs that are closed with respect to taking
undominated best responses.~ The game of Figure 6.1b has two sets t.hat are closed under
(undominated) best responses, viz. the ent,ire strategy set and the set of strategies in
iSince we here consider the reduced game, in this section this result holds also for curb-equilibria,
i.e. equilibria that belong to minimal sets of mixed strategies that are closed with respect to taking best
responses.
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which zero probability is assigned to B' and R1. Obviously, only the latter set is minimal.
Furthermore, each equilibrium in this set induces the outcome "2,2", hence, each curb~`
equilibrium of the game of Figure 6.1b produces the commitment robust equilibrium of
Figure 6.1a. In Section 6.6 we show that the above argument generalizes to any game
that admits a unique and pure commitment robust equilibrium. In particular, for each
common interest game we, hence, have a"just,ificat.ion" for playing the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium.
6.3 Commitment robust equilibria
We start our analysis from a given finite 2-person normal form game g-(Al, Azi ul, uz).
To avoid trivial cases we assume throughout this chapter that ~A;~ ) 2. We write
S; - ~(A;) for the set of mixed strategies of player i in g and we denote a generic
mixed strategy by s;. We write C(s~) -{a; E A; : s;(a~) 1 U}. The set of mixed
strategy pairs is S- Si x S2i and, for s E S, C(s) - C(si) x C(s2). Throughout this
chapter we assume the mild regularity condition that different outcomes are associated
with different payoffs, i.e.
if a ~ a',then u,(a) ~ u;(a') (i E {1,2}) (6.3.1)
Obviously, (6.3.1) is satisfied for generic games. This condition implies that the best
reply against any pure strategy is unique. We denote the best reply of player j against
a; by b(a,) and write
u;(a,) - u;(a~,b(a,)) (6.3.2)
and
u; - max u;(a;). (6.3.3)a~EA~
Hence, u;(a;) is player i's payoff when he commits to a; and u; is this player's payoff
when he acts as the Stackelberg leader. Note that (6.3.1) implies that there is a unique
strategy attaining the maximum in (6.3.3). We say that a player has an incentive to
move first if he would be better off if he would be allowed to act as a Stackelberg leader.
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If no player prefers being a leader to playing simultaneously, the equilibrium is said to
be commitment robust. Formally:
Definition 6.1 (iJ Player i has an incentive to move farst at s if u~(s) G u;.
(ii~ An equilibrium is commitment robust (is a CRE~ if no player has an incentive to
move farst at s.
Note that any pure strategy Nash equilibrium s satisfies u;(s) C u; for i- l, 2. Hence,
if a pure equilibrium s is a CRE, then u;(s) - u; for i - 1, 2 and s is a subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome in each of the two games where one of the players is forced to move
first. Conversely, if s is pure and s is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of each
of these two games, then s is a Nash equilibrium of g and no player has an incentive to
move first at s. Obviously, any such equilibrium must Pareto-dominate any other pure
Nash equilibrium and we have proved
Corollary 6.1 A pure strategy equilibrium s is a CRE if and only if s is an SPE outcome
of the two games in which one of the players is forced to move first. A pure CRE Pareto-
dominates any other pure Nash equilibrium. Hence, two pure CRE are payoff equivalent,
and, therefore, each game has at most one pure CRE.
It is easy to construct games without any CRE, take the Battle of the Sexes, for
example. On the other hand, the set of games with a pure CRE is certainly not of
A 1~~~ca~u~c ~~~u. r~ii ~eiue~ ina~ eie ~iwc ~u tiie gauie iium i~igure u.ia iiave ( T,i,) as a
pure CRE. Two classes of games that do admit CRE are the strictly compeY,itive games
(Friedman ( 1983)) and the common interest games (Aumann and Sorin ( 1989)). The
game g is said to be strictly competitive if for all s,s' and i~ j, if u;(s) ) u;(s'), then
u~(s) G u~(s'). The game g is a game with common interest if there exists s such that
u;(s) 1 u;(s') for all i and s'.
Lemma 6.1
a~ If g is strictly competitive and s is a Nash equilibrium of g, then s is a CRE.
b) If g has cornmon interest and s is the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium of g, then s
is a CRE.
Proof. The proof of 6) is trivial, so we only prove a). Assume s is an equilibrium of
a strictly competitive game g and ui(s) G iii. Let ui - u~(ái) - ui(ái,áz). Then
u2(ái,az) C uz(ái,áz) for all a2, hence, ui(ái,az) 1 ui(ái,á2) ~ u~(s) for all a2. But
then by playing ál player I could guarantee himself more than the equilibrium payoff
u1(s), which is impossible. p
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Corollary 6.1 is no longer correct for mixed equilibria. For example, the zero-sum
game of Matching Pennies has a unique (symmetric) mixed strategy equilibrium. No
player has an incentive to move first at this equilibrium: each player is sure to lose the
game if he is forced to disclose his action before the opponent. However, the game in
which player i is forced to move first has no SPE with the same outcome as the mixed
equilibrium of Matching Pennies. Furthermore, a pure CRE may be Pareto dominated
by a mixed equilibrium: Add to Matching Pennies a third strategy for each player such
that if both play this strategy both lose half a penny, but both players lose one penny if
only one player chooses this strategy. In each Stackelberg outcome, both players clroose
the third strategy, but the resulting equilibrium is Pa.reto dominated by the original
mixed equilibrium of Matching Pennies.
The above problems associated with mixed strategies can be avoided by considering
the two games where one player is allowed, but not forced, to move first. Hence, in
these games the timing of one player's decision is determined endogenously. Formally,
in round 1 player i chooses between to commit to an action a; or not. If he commits
himself, then the commitment a; is revealed to player j. If not, player j is informed that
player i did not commit himself and players choose their actions simultaneously. The
reader can now easily verify that .s is a CRE if and only if each of these two games has
a subgame perfect equilibrium with outcome s.
Corollary 6.2 An equilibrivm s is a CRE if and only if s is are SPE outcome in each
of the two games in which one player is allowed to move first.
The definition of commitment robustness given above differs from that given in Rosen-
thal (1991). The difference concerns t,he treatment of mixed strategies. Rosenthal defines
an equilibrium s to be commitment robust if s is an SPE outcome of each of the two
games in which one of the players moves first by committing to a mixed strategy. Specif-
ically, Rosenthal assumes that the nvxed strategy that the player commits to can be
communicated. Hence, he~ works with what Schelling (1960, p. 185) calls "fractional
commitments" and Schelling already points out that these may be more efFicient than
pure ones. (Compare our discussion of the extended matching pennies game in which a
mixed strategy equilibrium Pareto dominates the pure strategy equilibrium.) Of course,
having the opportunity to commit to a mixed action can never be worse than having the
opport.unity to commit to a pure action and, hence, any equilibrium that is commitment
robust according to Rosenthal (which will be called an RCRE) is also a CRE. As we
have seen, a CRE need not be an RCRE. However, the reader may easily verify that for
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each of the two classes of games considered in Lemma 6.1 any CRE is also an RCRE.
As Corollary 6.2 shows, there are three differences between our concept and that
of Rosenthal. First, although players can commit to mixed actions in both settings,
only Rosenthal allows them to communicate these mixtures. In our case, the actual
outcome of the randomization has to be communicated. Secondly, we allow the players
to commit themselves, but we do not force them. In Rosenthal's setup players are
forced to commit themselves. ,Another difference between the two concepts is that our
concept is characterized by auxiliary games, while Rosenthal uses such games directly
in the definition of his concept. The following theorem shows that, for games satisfying
a regularity condition that is slightly different from (6.3.1), RCRE could have been
similarly defined directly by means of a pair of inequalities. The regularity condition in
question has first been introduced in Lemke and Howson (1964) and is also satisfied for
generic games. For s~ E S~ write B(s~) for the set of pure best replies of player i against
s~ and define the matrix u;s~ as the restriction of u; to B(s~) x C(s~). The regularity
condition that Lemke and Howson impose is
rank (u;s )~ ~B(s~)~ for all j E{1,2} and all s~ E S~. (6.3.4)
Condition ( 6.3.4) states that there are no linear dependencies between the rows and
t.hP cnliimna n{ t}ta navnff matr;rP~ 1t ,.l;o~ th~t rl.~ ~ .aa.r:~ „I.,F,.,l ~,7 Fh.,a. ., -----.... -. .!'?r-.,~. ...., . .--~ ~yL....... .... ....... ............... ....... .......,
the number of equilibria is odd.
Theorem 6.1 For a game g and a player i define ui by means of
u; - max max u;(s;, a~ ).
s~ES~ a~EB(s,)
Let s' be a Nash equilibrium of g. If u;(s') ~ u} for i- 1, 2, then s' is an RCRE. If g
satisfies ~6.3.4~, then s` is an RCRE if and only if u;(s') ~ u; for i- 1, 2.
Proof. See Appendix. p
If g does not satisfy (6.3.4), then an RCRE s need not satisfy the inequalities u;(s) )
u; (i - 1, 2). The game from Figure 6.2 provides an example. (The game does not satisfy
(6.3.1) but the payoffs may be slightly perturbed to satisfy this condition. However, care
should be taken that the third pure strategy of player 2 remains a best response to the
equilibrium strategy of player 1.) In this game, the equilibrium s in which both players
choose each of the first two pure strategies with probability 1 ~2 is an RCRE. Player
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1's equilibrium payoff is 1 while ui - 3, hence, ur(s) G u~ . We note that a Nash
equilibrium s satisfying v;(s) - u} (i - 1,2) is called a Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) in
d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1980). Hence, we have that. each SE is an RCRE and
that each RCRE is a CRE and that neither of the converses holds. We leave furtlrer







In comparing our concept of commitment robustness to that of Rosenthal, we be-
lieve that the setting corresponding to our definition is more natural, however, we do
not want to be dogmatic: In our main result, CRE may be replaced by RCRE. Perhaps
rnore irnportantly, as we already argued in the introduct,ion, both concepts are somewhat
ttnsa,tisfactory since they are based on games with asytnrnetric commitment possibilities.
We would want, to give both players the possibility to commit themselves so that com-
mitments could arise endogenously. Hence, we want to investigate which equilibria of
the original game are still viable when the order of the moves is endogenous. `To for-
mally address this issue, we use the 2-stage game of action cornmitment that, has been
introduced in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In this garne, which will be referred to as
y~, each player can choose between committ,ing to an action in period 1 or to wait till
period 2. Formally, the rules are as follows
Stage 1: Simultaneously the players choose t,o commit to actions in At and A2, respec-
tively, or to wait ti11 stage 2.
Stage 2: Each player i who did not yet choose an action in A; is informed about what
action his opponent j took in stage 1. After having received this inforrnation, the
player is required to choose an action in A; with players moving sirnultaneously if
both still have to make a choice.
Payoffs: "I'he players' actions in y2 lead to a uniyue outcome in :1. If a E A results,
then player i's payoff in y~ is u;(a). IIence, there is no discounting, moving late





I[ence. the question to be addressed in the remaining sections is whether only commit-
rnent robust eyuilibria of g correspond to '`sensible" equilibrium outcomes of y~. We
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game each equilibrium in undominated strategies is perfect (Van Damme (198 ï, Theorem
3.2.2.)). Since á; is undominated in g and g satisfies (6.3.1), á; can be dominated in g2
only if it is dominated by a strategy in which player i moves only in period '2. Suppose
this strategy tells player i to play the mixed action s; in the second period in case the
other player also waited. Let a~, á~ E A~ and consider a strategy for player j that tells
him to wait till period 2 and then to play a~ if player i committed to á;, and to play á~
otherwise. It follows that u;(á;,a~) C u;(s;,á~) for all a~,a~ E A~. Since each player has
a unique best reply against each pure strategy, substitution of a~ - a~ - á~ implies that.
s; - á;. Hence, u;(á„a~) - u;(á) for all a~ E A~. "This contradicts (6.3.1). 0
At this stage it is appropriate to compare our work with Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).
Hamilton and Slutsky consider the game g~ where g is the standard quantity setting
Cournot duopoly game. In their Theorem VIII they claim
"the two Stackelberg equilibria are the only pure strategy equilibria in un-
dominated strategies. Playing the Cournot equilibrium strategy at the first
turn is dominated by waiting to play after one's rival."
This claim obviouslv is inconsistent with "I'heorem 6.4. ~iow it, is certaiuly true that
the standard Cournot duopoly game does not fit our context and discretized versions
of this game need not satisfy (6.3.1). Nevertheless, it is not diffïcult to see that the
,hn,.p ~~a; c uirnna Plavina thP ('rnirnnt r~nnilihrinm stratPCw at the first. st.aee ~souldw-. ~ . ~ -.,~ - -~ ~ ~ . ... ~
indeed be dominated if players could be sure thac they would continue with the Cournot
equilibrium in the second stage in case both players still have to move, and if each player
could be sure that the opponent would always best respond to a rmilateral commitment.
However, players cannot be sure of this since the logic of the perfectness concept, forces
them to consider the possibility of mistakes in the second period. The total quantity in
the second period rnight be. above~ the Cournot quantity, if only by rnistake, and in this
case it pays to cornmit to the Cournot quantity if the opponent does the same~. It is our
impression that, although not stating it explicitly, Hamilton and Slutsky actually had
this truncated game (that excludes sec.ond period mistakes) in mind when making the
above claim. (See also their companion paper Hamilton and Slutsky (1993) in which in
the proof of Theorem [II t.hey display the payoff matrix of the truncated garne rather
t.han of the full garne g~.)
Although the relevance of the truncated game may be questioned after all, what
is the rationale for allowing mistakes in the first period of -t~~ but excluding them in
the second period`? - w~e can state a result about it that generalizes the observation of
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Hamilton and Slutsky about the quantity setting duopoly game: .An equilibrium s of the
original game is an outcome of a perfect equilibrium of this truncated game if and only
if it is a CRE. If s is pure, the proof of this result is straightforward. In the case s is
in mixed strategies, the proof follows the same lines as that of Theorem 6.2. Formally,
if s' E S, write ryZ(s') for the extensive form game that results from y2 if we force each
player to best respond in period 2 to a unilateral commitment of the opponent in period
1 and if we replace the subgame w at stage 2 in which both players still have to move
by an endpoint with payoff vector (u~(s'),u2(s')). Let g~(s") be the associated normal
form. We have
Theorem 6.5 s' is a commitment robust equilibrium if and only if there exist a perfect
equilibrium o- of g2(s') with outcome s'.
Proof. See Proposition 4 in Van Damme and Hurkens (1993). []
6.6 Endogenous timing and coordination
In this section we investigate whether more refined equilibrium notions allow one to draw
the conclusion that only commitment robust equilibria are viable when the order of the
moves is endogenous. Specifically, we address the question of whether in a game that
has a unique and pure CRE, endogenous timing will force the players to coordinate on
this CRE. We will show that some set-valued "evolutionary" concepts, viz. the notions
of persistent equilibria (Kalai and Samet (1984)) and of curb~` equilibria (Basu and
Weibull (1991)) do indeed allow this conclusion. For the definitions and properties of
these concepts the reader is referred to Chapter 2.
Before we come to the main result of this chapter, we state
Lemma 6.2 In g2 no player has equivalent strategies among his pure undominated ones.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that player i has equivalent strategies among his pure
undominated ones in g2. Hence, there exist a;, á; E A; such that either (i) a; is equivalent
with á; , or (ii) a; is equivalent with á? or (iii) a? is equivalent with á?. In all cases it
follows that u;(a„a~) - u~(á;,a'~), for all a~,d E A~. This implies that u;(a;,a~) -
u;(a„a'~), for all a„a'~ E A~. But this contradicts (6.3.1). O
The main result of this chapter is3
3Since any RCRE is a CRE, this theorem remains valid when "CRE" is replaced by "RCRE".
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Theorem 6.6 Assume á is a pure CRE of g. Then
~i~ Any curb~`, resp. persistent equilibrium of gz yields each player i a payofj~ of at
least u;(á).
~ii~ If á is the unique CRE of g, then each curb~, resp. persistent equilibrium of y2
results in the outcome á.
Proof. In this proof, let "~" stand for "curb~"' or "persistent". By Lemma 6.2 and
Theorem 2.1(ii) we know that x-retracts are convex hulls of pure undominated strategies
and different x-retracts are disjoint. Let the retract R be defined by
A;-{á;}U{a?: a;EA~}, R;-OA;, R-R,xR2.
Note that R is closed under undominated best replies and absorbing. We will show that
any ~-retract is contained in R.
The proof is easy in case some player i has a dominant strategy á; in g. Then
á; - á; and we have that for all a; ~ á;, a? is dominated by á2. Moreover, for all
a~ E A~ and all a; ~ á; we have U,(á~ , a~ ) 1 U,(a; , a~ ) (since á; is dominant in g) and
U,(á~ , a~ )) U,(a; , a~) (since á; is player i's unique Stackelberg leader strategy). This
implies that if R is an x-retract, then
R C 0({á;,á?}) x 0(Á~) C R.
Now assume that no player has a dominant strategy in g. Then it is easily seen that
á? is an undominated strategy for each player i. Furthermore, for each j there exists
some á~ such that át ~ B(á~). We will show that, if a~ ~ á~, then committing to a~
cannot belong to any .r-retract. Note that if R is an ~-retract and a~ E R~, then á~ E Ri.
Namely, á? is an undominated best response against a~ (hence á? E R; if .~ stands for
curb~, and á~ is the unique best response against (1- 2E)a~ f eá~ -}-eá~ (so that á~ E R~ if
x stands for persistent). Now, since á~ is the unique best response against (I -e)á;~-eá;
it follows that (ái, á2) E R whenever a; E R; for some a; ~ á;. Since R is closed under
undominated best replies and absorbing, we have that. any ~-ret.ract that contains (nl, á2)
is contained in R and there does not. exist an .x-retract containing some a; with a; ~ á;.
Hence, any ~-retract is cont.ained in R.
Now note that, if players are restricted to choose strategies from R, then each player
i can guarantee the payoff u;(á) by playing á;. Consequently, if ~ is an a-equilibrium
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of g2, then C(o) C R and u;(Q) ~ u;(á) for i- 1,2, which proves the first part of the
theorem.
Now assume that there exists an x-equilibrium a that results in an outcome different
from á. Then for each player i we must have a;(á; ) C 1. Define the mixed strategy s; of
player i in g by
s~(dt) - (1 -Q;(ai))-'~;(a~) (d; E A~)
Since v is an equilibrium of y2 we have that s is an equilibrium of g and, furthermore
u;(s) ~ u; for i- 1,2, since each player i can guarantee u; by playing a,. Hence, s is a
CRE of g. This completes the proof. O
6.7 Conclusion and related literature
We have addressed the question of whether only equilibria at which no player has an
incentive to move first are viable when the order of the moves is endogenously deter-
rnined and players have the opportunity to commit, themselves. We have seen that in
order to answer this question in the affirmative one needs quit,e strong equilibrium con-
cepts. However, if one is willing to accept such concepts, one can indeed conclude that
endogenous timing forces players to coordinate on a unique and pure commitment. robust
equilibriutn. We have restricted ourselves in this chapter to 2-person games and we have
only allowed one point in time at which a player can commit himself. It is important
to investigate the extent to which our results depend on these assumptions. One can
easily define the game ryt in which there are t- 1 periods in which a player has the
opportunity to commit. (Obviously -yr - g.) The reader can verify that our main results
remain valid in this extended context. Hence, mixed eqlrilibria are typically not viable
and any curb~` (resp. persistent) equilibrium of the game in which the players have t- 1
opportunities to commit themselves results in the commitment robust eyuilibrium. ~Ve
have not investigated whether our results extend to games with more than two players,
although we expect they do. It is clear, however, that in some cases (as in the proof of
Theorem 6.2) different techniques are needed.
For convenience we assumed throughout the chapter regularity condition (6.3.1) to
hold. It is worthwhile to remark that Theorems 6.3. 6.4 and 6.5 also hold under the
milder regularity assumpt.ions
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u;(a) - u;(á ) if and only if u~(a) - u~(a') (
and
(6.7.1)
~B(a;)~ - 1 for all a; E a; (~ -1,2) (s.7.2)
However, for Theorem 6.6 to hold we then need the additional assumption that players
have a unique Stackelberg leader strategy. To see why the latter assumption (which is
also implied by (6.3.1)) is essential, consider game g in Figure 6.3. Note that t.his game
satisfies (6.7.1) and (6.7.2). (T, L) is a CRE in this game, however, the unique curb;
(or persistent) retract of g2 contains all first period commitment strategies, so that, in
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Figure 6.3.
We conclude with discussing some related papers. We refrain from discussing the
(rather extensive) literature that is built on the idea that, if the equilibrium associated
with a certain timing of the moves Pareto dominates all equilibria associated with any
alternative sequencing, then the Paret,o optimal sequencing will result. (See the literature
that is cited in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in relation with "the extended game with
observable delay".) We have already discussed Rosenthal (1991) and Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990) in the Sections 6.3 and 6.5. In Hamilton and Slutsky (1993), the action
commitment game is studied for the special case where g is a 2 x 2 game in which exact.ly
one player (say player 1) has a dominant strategy. Obviously, g has a unique equilibrium
s' in this case. Hamilton and Slutsky consider the reduced game gz(s') introduced in
Section 6.5 and they show that this has a unique perfect equilibrium. By the above
Theorem 6.6 the outcome of this equilibrium is s' when s' is a CRE. If s' is not a CRE,
then the outcome is that player 1 commits to his dominated strategy. d'Asprernont
and Gérard-Varet (1980) define a Nash equilibrium s to be a Stackelberg equilibrium if
u;(s) - u; for i- 1,2. As we have already seen, a Stackelberg equilibrium is an RCRE,
but the converse need not hold. They point out that in a strictly competitive game,
each Nash equilibrium is a Stackelberg equilibrium. (Cf. Lemma 6.1, where we actually
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proved this slightly stronger result.) They also show that each "twisted equilibrium"
that is Pareto optimal is a Stackelberg equilibrium. (s is a twisted equilibrium if u;(s) G
u~(s„ s~) for all s~ and all i~ j, hence, if player i does not lose when j deviates.)
d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet do not discuss endogenous timing of the moves. Such
aspects are discussed in two papers by Robson. Robson (1989) considers a 2-stage game
that is closely related to the action commitment game that has been analyzed in this
chapter. The two differences are that mixed strategies can be communicated and that
moving early entails a cost. Specifically, if the outcome s results and i moves in period t
(t E {1, 2}), then player i's payoff is equal to u, - u;(s)- (2-t)c; where c; ~ 0. Robson's
most important result is that, if each Nash equilibrium is a Stackelberg equilibrium
(as defined in d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1980)), then all pure subgame perfect
equilibria of the timing game involve choosing a Stackelberg equilibrium. (The result
follows easily from the observation that there cannot be a pure equilibrium in which both
players move early.) It is worthwhile to point out that this result depends essentially
on the restriction to pure st,rategies. Namely, consider the game from Figure 6.1a and
assume that moving in period 1 costs e 1 0. Now (BI,RI) is no longer an equilibrium,
but there is a mixed equilibrium close to it, namely each player choosing (0, e, 2e, 1- 3e).
Hence, in this equilibrium each player commits immediately to "1,1" with probability
1- 3e; if the game reaches the second stage without any commitments being made,
players play the mixed equilibriurn of the underlying game. Robson (1990) generalizes
the model from Robson (1989) by allowing for more periods in which the players can
commit themselves. It is assumed that the earlier the player moves, the costlier it is and
it is shown that under certain conditions the timing game has a unique pure subgame
perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium outcome is that the player who gains most from
leading indeed becomes the leader. Again the result depends crucially on the restriction
to pure strategies. Another drawback of Robson's model is that the cost functions are
specified exogenously, i.e. it is not explained why there would be a cost of moving
early. For the special class of common interest games, Balkenborg (1993) has shown that
Theorem 6.6 continues to hold for another set-valued evolutionary concept, viz. that
of direct evolutionary stable sets, abbreviated DESS. Balkenborg shows that a set E of
mixed strategy vectors is a DESS if and only if
E- UoEF(~(~2) X ta2~) - UoEE(~(~t) X l~l~)
and he proves that a DESS of gz exists if and only if g is a common interest game.
Furthermore, in case g has common interest, there is a unique DESS and it consists of
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all strategy combinations yielding the Pareto efficient payoff vector.
In the game gz it is assumed that, if a player commits himself, this commitment is
perfectly observed by the opponent. Bagwell (1992) considers the case where only one
player can commit himself but where this commitment is only imperfectly observed and
he claims that in this case the strategic benefits of the commitment possibility evaporate.
As we will show in Chapter 8, Bagwell's result depends essentially on the restriction to
pure strategies: When mixed strategies are taken into account, there is continuity in
the sense that all "sensible" equilibria of the noisy game converge to the Stackelberg
equilibrium of the game without noise. We believe that a similar continuity result can
be established in the present setting with two-sided commitment possibilities.
It has to be admitted that the class of games with a commitment robust equilib-
rium, i.e. the class for which we were able to determine the outcome with endogenous
tirning in this chapter is quite limited. In the next chapter we address the question of
which outcomes can be expected for some economic games without a commitment robust
equilibrium.
Appendix
This Appendix provides the proofs of Theorems 6.1 and 6.`Z.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Consider the game y`' in which player i acts as a Stack-
elberg leader, with this player's mixed action being revealed to player j. Because of
the bilinearity of u;, player i's payoff if he chooses s; and j best responds, is at most
maxa~EBls,lu;(s;,a~). Hence, each SPE yields player i at most u; . If u;(s') - u; , then
any strategy pair o with a; - s; and a~ with v~(s,) - s~ and v~(s;) E B(s;) for all s; is
an SPE of ry'~. This proves the first part of the theorem.
To prove the second part, let s; E S; and a~ E B(s; ) be such that u;(s; , a~ )- u~ . Be-
cause of (6.3.4), there exists ~ E RA' with .~(a;) - 0 if a; ~ C(s; ) such that u~ (~, a~ )) 0
and u~(x,a~) - 0 for all a~ E B(s; )~{a~ }. (Here u~(x,a~) is shorthand notation for
~a, ~(a;)u~(a;,a~).) Write t -~a, x(a;) and s;(e,t) -(1 ~- Et)-i(sf ~ e.~). Then
s;(e, t) E S; if e is sufFiciently small, B(s;(E, t)) - {a; } and s;(e, t) --f s} as e-~ 0.
Hence, if s is an SPE outcome of ry`~ we must have u;(s) 1 u;(s;(e, t), a~ ), and, therefore;
u;(s) ) u;(s;, a~ )- u; . This completes the proof of the second part. of the theorem. o
Before we give the proof of Theorem 6.2, it will be convenient to first state a lemma
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that lists some properties of games satisfying (6.3.4).
Lemma 6.3 Let g satisfy (6.3.4~ and let s be an equilibriunz oJg that is not pure. Then
(i) I~(s~)I - Ic(s~)I - IB(s~)I - IB(s~)I
~ii) If s' is an equilibriu~n and C(s') - C(s), then s' - s.
(iii~ For each a; E C(s;), there e~ists a~ E C(s~) such that a~ ~ B(a;).
(iv~ For each a; E C(s;), there e~ists a~ E C(s~) such that a; ~ B(a~).
Proof.
(i) Since s is an equilibrium, we have C(s;) C B(s~) for i, j E{1,2}. Since the rank of
a matrix cannot exceed the number of columns, (6.3.4) implies ~B(s~)~ G ~C(s~)~
for all s~. Combining these observations yields ~C(si)~ G ~B(s2)~ C ~C(s2)~ C
~B(si)~ G ~C(si)~, hence, all inequalities must be equalities.
(ii) Assume s and s' are equilibria with C(s) - C(s'). If u;(s) - 0, then the columns
of the matrix u;s~ are dependent, hence, (6.3.4) is violated. So assume u;(s) ~
0. Consider the vector v with a~-th coordinate equal to v(a~) - u;(s')s~(a~) -
u;(s)s'~(a~). Then, if we premultiply v by u;s~ we get zero, hence by (6.3.4) v must
be the zero vector. Therefore, u;(s')s~ - u;(s)s'~ and since both s~ and s~ are
probability vectors u;(s') - u;(s). But then s~ - s~. A similar argument implies
that s; - s;.
(iii) This follows immediately from the fact that ~B(a;)~ - 1 and ~C(s~)~ ~ 2.
(iv) If a; E B(a~) for all a~ E C(s~), then {a;} - B(a~) for all such a~, hence {a;} -
B(s~) contradicting (i). ~
Before we come to the proof of Theorem 6.2 we need to introduce some notation.
Assumption (6.3.1) forces player j, in any SPE, to play b(a;) in the second period when
player i committed himself unilaterally to a;. Hence, an SPE strategy o-; of player i only
needs to tell which action from A; U{w;} to choose in stage 1 and what to do in stage
2 in the information set w-(wl, wZ) that corresponds to the case where both players
waited. For such a strategy, we write Q; -(v; , Q?) where Q; denotes the randomization
at time 1 and a; is the mixed action in information set w. For the case where ~; (w;) C 1,
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i.e. player i moves with positive probability in the first period, it will also be convenient
to write
w; - Q; (w;), s; -(1 - w;)-iQ; , and s~ - a~ (A.1)
hence, s; is the mixed action that player i plays if he moves in period L In this case we
will also write Q; -(w;, s; , s~). Writing
1 if a; - 6(a~)
b;(a) - (A.2)
0 otherwise,
we see that the outcome po of an 5PE a is given by
P (a) - ~1(a) ~ (1 - wl)wzai(al)bz(a) f wi(1 - wz)~z(az)bi(a) ~ wlwzaz(a), (A.3)
where we have used Qt(a) as a shorthand notation for al(al)~2(az).
Proof of Theorem 6.2.
Sufficiency. No player has an incentive to move first at s` if and only if u;(s`) 1 u;
for i- 1,2. In this case the strategy pair Q-(~l,az) with ~; - w;, a2 - s~ is a
subgame perfect equilibrium of ryz with outcome s'.
Necessity. Assume u;(s') C u; for some i and that v is a subgame perfect equilibrium
oi 7` with outcome s'. We will derive a contradiction. Without loss ol generahty
we may assume ul(s') C ul. The proof is divided into a number of st,eps.
Step 1. w; - v; (w;) C 1 for i- 1, 2, hence, each player moves with positive probability
in the first period.
Clearly, we must have ~2(wz) c 1, for otherwise player 1 can guarantee the payoff
u~ by committing in the first period, hence Ul(a) 1 ul and ~ cannot have the
outcome s'. Suppose that player 1 waits till the second period, i.e. Qi(wi) - 1.
Let a' be such that o2(a2) ) 0 and ai E C(s~)`B(a2). Then the outcome a` can
only be obtained if it is played in the second period, hence, po(a') c wzs'(a"), a
contradiction.
Step 2. w; - a;(w;) 7 0 for i- 1, 2, hence, with positive probability each player waits
till the second period of -yz in Q.
Namely, assume a,'(w;) - 0 for some i. Then Q; (a;) - s,(a;) for all a; and i
chooses at least two strategies with positive probability (Lemma 6.3). Furthermore,
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since there does not exist a~ E A~ with a~ E B(a;) for all a; E C(s; ), we have
U~ (a;, a~ )) Uj(o;, a~ ) for all a„ hence, vj (w~ )- L This contradicts step 1.
From the steps I and 2 we can conclude that the stage-2 subgame (wl, w2) is reached
wit.h positive probability if Q is played in ryz. Since Q is a subgame perfect equilibrium
of ry2, QZ must be a Nash equilibrium of g. Furthermore, obviously C(QZ) C C(s'). We
will distinguish two cases:
Case A C(v2) - C(s'), hence (by Lemma 6.3) a2 - s'.
Case B C(a2) ~ C(s'), hence ( by Lemma 6.3), there exists for each player i a strategy
a; such that a; E C(s; )~C(o; ).
We first continue the proof for case A.
Step A3. For each player i: If v, (a;) ~ 0, then u;(a;) ) u;(s'), hence, a player commits
himself only to strategies that yield more than the e~quilibrium payoff.
Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists some á; such that a; (á;) ~ 0 but
u;(á;) G u;(s'). Since player i must be indifferent between á; and a? for any
a; E C(s'), we must have
~ ai(ai)ur(a~~a~) ~ wiu;(a~) - ~ a~(ai)ut(a~) ~ w~uti(s~)
hence
u;(á;) - u;(s') and
u;(á;,a~) - u;(a~) for all a~ E C(v~).
In particular, á ; must be a best response against any pure action that player j plays
with positive probability in the first period. From Lemma 6.3 we can conclude that
there exists a~ E C(s~ ) such that á; ~ B(a~ ) and a~ ( a~)- 0. We may assume that
a~ E B(á;), since otherwise by (A.3)
v
P á~, a~)- wiw2s~(at, a~ ) G s`(á;, a~ ).
Applying Lemma 6.3 once more we see that we can find a,` such that a~ ~ B(a; ).
Then, for a' - ( ai,a2),
p(a') - w~w2s'(a`) G s`(a'),
another contradiction.
Step A4. Conclusion of the proof for case A.
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We have seen up to now that each player must move in both periods with positive
probability and that for each player i and for each action a; with a,'(a;) ] 0 we
have u;(a;) ~ u;(s'). Since U;(v) - u;(s') and since waiting is a best response for
each player we have
~ a~(ai)u~(ai) f wiu;(s;) - u:(s~)
so that there must exist a~ with v~ (a~) ~ 0 and u;(a~ ) G u;(s`). Hence, Q~ (a~ )) 0
and u;(a;,a~) C u;(s') for all a; E A;, and, therefore
a~(a~) 1 0 and a~ ~ B(a;) for all a; with v; ( a;) ) 0.
Consider a' - (ai,a2). Then pv(a') - v'(a') ~wiwzs'(a'), hence, since
we must have
a1(a') - (1 - wiw2)s'(a").
pa -
(A.4)
On the other hand, for each player i, we have by summing up (A.3) over all ai,
po(a;)- v; (a;) f w~wzst (a; ), hence
Qi(a') - (1 - wiwz)~s'(a'). (A.5)
Combining ( A.4) wiih ( A.d) and using a" E C(s') yieids wlw2 ~ tu, it. ï'sut this
contradicts the steps 1 and 2 and completes the proof for Case A.
We now continue with the proof of case B. Let a' be such that, for each player i,
a; E C(s,)~C(Q~).
Step B3. For all players i,j and all actions, if ai E C(s~) and ai ~ B(a,), then a; E
B(ai ).
Assume there exists ái E C(s~) such that ái ~ B(a~) and a; ~ B(ái). In ~ the
outcome (a;,ái) can occur only if both players play it in the first period, hence
s~(ai,ai) - ~'(a;,Q;). (A.6)
By summing up (A.3) over all a~ it follows that, for k~ l, sk(ak) - po(ak) ) ak(ak).
Combining this with (A.6) and (A.3) it follows that
o;(a;) - s;(a;) and a; ~ B(a~)if Q~(ai) ~ 0.
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This implies that. any outcome (a; , a~ ) with a~ ~ B(a; ) can occur only in the first
period, hence,
s'(a;,a~) - ar(a;,a~) for all a~ ~ B(a~),
and hence, s~(a~) - ar(a~) for a~ ~ B(a;). This implies that if player j acts in
period two, then he plays the unique á~ E B(a,') for sure. But this implies (by
Lemma 6.3(i)) that á~ E B(a,) for all a; E C(s; ). This contradicts Lemma 6.3(iv).
Step B4. Conclusion of the proof for case B.
Consider the pair a' -(ai, a2). Without loss of generality, step B3 allows us to
assume that ai E B(az). By Lernma 6.3 we have
if a~ E C(si), a~ ~ a„ then ar ~ B(a2).
By step B3, therefore az E B(al ) for all such a~. But then we have that az E B(Qi )
and a2 ~ C(QZ). By Lemma 6.3 this is impossible since Q2 is an equilibrium of g
and g satisfies the regularity condition (6.3.4). ~
100 Commitment Robust Equilibria and Endogenous Timing
Chapter 7
Endogenous Timing and Risk
Dominance
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we investigated endogenous timing in finite bimatrix games. We
showed that some solution concepts with an evolutionary flavor (in particular, persistent
and curb~` equilibria) select the commitment robust equilibrium, whenever it is unique
and pure. However, we did not provide much insight in games that do not have commit-
ment robust equilibria. As is well known, both players have an incentive to move first
in the standard Cournot duopoly model. Hence, t.his game has no commitment robust
equilibrium and the previous chapter does not tell us what will happen when timing is
determined endogenously.
Several authors have addressed the issue of timing in economic games before. Many
of these papers investigate first and~or second mover advantages. (See Ono (1982), Gal-
Or (1985), Dowrick (1986) and Boyer and Moreaux (1987)). This literature examines
for which parameters there exists a particular ordering of moves that is preferred by all
players.
In this chapter we will again employ the two period action commitment game intro-
duced by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The reason is that we want the order of moves be
determined endogenously. We will investigate some economic games with a unique Nash
equilibrium. The action commitment game then has three subgame perfect equilibria
in pure strategies: Either both players play the Nash equilibrium in period one or the
players play in different periods. Hamilton and Slutsky claimed that only the two Stack-
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elberg equilibria are in undominated strategies. As we showed in the previous chapter,
however, playing the Nash equilibrium in period one is also an undominated strategy.
We will make a unique selection among the pure subgame perfect equilibria on the basis
of risk considerations. Namely, committing in period one is quite risky, since the other
player may commit himself at the same time, and there is the possibility of Stackelberg
warfare. We will characterize the risk dominant equilibrium (in the sense of Harsanyi
and Selten (1988)) in three specific games: (1) the Cournot quantity competition, (2)
the (Bertrand) price competition with differentiated (substitutable) products, and (3)
the private provision of a public good.
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) defined the risk dominance relation between two equilibria
s and s' in terms of the bicentric prior and the tracircg procedure. The bicentric prior is
a vector of initial beliefs of the players when there is uncertainty whether s or s' is the
solution of the game. (We will see later how the bicentric prior has to be computed.)
The tracing procedure models the reasoning process of players who try to figure out
what to play. At the start of the tracing procedure each player computes the best reply
against his prior. Then he gradually puts more and more weight on the actual strategy of
the opponent, and adjusts his best reply accordingly. Eventually, he will put all weight
on the actual strategy of the opponent and play optimally against this belief. Hence,
players end up playing an equilibrium. Now equilibrium s is said to risk dominate s' if
the tracing procedure, starting from the bicentric prior based on s and s', ends up in s.
1'he tormal definitions ol the bicentric prior and the tracing procedure are quite com-
plex, as we will see later. However, Harsanyi and Selten gave a simple characterization
of the risk dominant equilibrium in 2 x 2 games. They showed that the equilibrium, at
which the so called product of the deviation losses is largest, is risk dominant. As an
example, consider the game in Figure 7.1 and compare the pure equilibria (T, L) and
(B, R). The product of the deviation losses at (T, L) is equal to (9 - 8)(9 - 8) - 1.
The product of the deviation losses at (B, R) is (7 - 0)(7 - 0) - 49. Hence, (B, R) risk







For larger games, such a simple characterization of the risk dominant equilibrium has
not been obtained. Most applications of risk dominance have therefore been restricted
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to 2 x 2 games.~ In this chapter we will employ the original notion of risk dominance
that is based on the bicentric prior and the tracing procedure. We will also compare the
risk dominant equilibrium with the equilibrium at which the product of the deviation
losses is largest. We will see that they do not always coincide.
It is obvious that there is no risk dominance relation between the two Stackelberg
equilibria when the players are completely symmetric. We therefore assume that players
(or firms) differ in their (constant marginal) costs. We obtain the following results.
First, we show that both Stackelberg equilibria risk dominate the simultaneous move
equilibrium. Second, we show that the Stackelberg equilibrium with the low cost firm as
the leader, risk dominates the other Stackelberg equilibrium. This result is intuitive in
the case of Cournot competition. The low cost firm obtains the preferred role. This result
was already conjectured by Von Stackelberg (1934, p.66), who said that the most modern
firm should be the leader. However, in the case of price competition with differentiated
substitutable product-s, our result seems to be counterintuitive: In tlus situation each
firm prefers to be a follower t.o being a leader. Hence, it may happen, when the costs are
not too different, that the high cost firm makes a higher profit (as a follower) than the
low cost firm (as a leader). Also in the case of the private provision of a public good,
our result seems to be counterintuitive, because it selects the inefficient equilibrium.
However, we select on the basis of risk considerations and not on the basis of efficiency.
The message of this chapter is that committing is risky, but it is less risky for low cost
firms.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2 we explain the notion
of risk dominance. We adjust the definition from Harsanyi and Selten (1988) in order to
deal with games in which the strategy sets are not finite. We also briefly recall the rules
of the action commitment game. Section 7.3 contains the results. Section 7.4 concludes.
Tedious proofs are to be found in the Appendix.
7.2 Preliminaries
In this chapter we work with games with infinite strategy sets. Notation will therefore
differ from that introduced in Section 1.3. Throughout this chapter, g-(A1, A2, u~, u2)
is a two person game where the pure strategy set is A; -[0, oo), and where u; : A~ x A; -~
1For a brief discussion of the exceptions see Van Damme (1994b).
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R is "sufficiently" differentiable. We assume that for each ai E A~ the function
a; r-~ v; ( ai ; a; )
is concave and has a unique maximizer, denoted B;(ai). We also assume that the function
C(ai) - ui(B~(ai);ai)
has a unique maximizer, denoted a~ , which is obtained by the first order condition
C'(a~)- 0. We refer to a~ as player j's Stackelberg leader strategy, and to aF -
Bi(aL) as his Stackelberg follower strategy. Furthermore, we assume that g has a unique
(interior) Nash equilibrium, a~, which is in pure strategies. Let
Nt - T~;(a~; a;v)i Lt - u:(a~i a~)~ Fi - ui(aj ; ai
denote i's payoff in the Nash equilibrium, as a Stackelberg leader and as a Stackelberg
follower, respectively. Note that L; 1 N;. We assume that at least one player has
an incentive to move first at aN, i.e. L; ~ N; for some i E{1,2}. Hence, aN is not
commitment robust.
As in the previous chapter, we let -y2 denote the two period action commitment game.
We briefly recall the rules of this game. There are two periods and each player has to
move in exactly one of these periods. Choices are made simultaneously, but, if one player
r}inncoc tn mrws~ c.arlv ii P tr~ rnmmit~ iR~hilP 41iP nt}iPr mnvac ~ata t}ia ~attar ic in{nrmarÍ
about the former's choice before making his decision. Our assumptions imply that the
proper subgames of 72 are easily solved. Namely, the subgame that is reached when
both players wait has a unique equilibrium, aN. Furthermore, in the subgames that are
reached when there is a unilateral commitment in period 1, there is a unique best reply
for the player who waited.
In this chapter we will apply elements from the equilibrium selection theory of
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) to the action commitment game. Their theory prescribes
that first the solutions of the smallest subgames must be determined. As we stated
before, this is very easy in our action commitment game, since all proper subgames of
ry2 already have a unique solution. Let g2(aN) denote the game that results from -y2 by
substituting these solutions. According to the theory of Harsanyi and Selten we now
have to determine the solution of gz(aN). This is then also the solution of ry2.
We may write g~(aN) -(Ai, Az, ui, u2), where
A,`-A;U{W;},
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and where, for all a E A
u;(ai;a;) - u;(a~;a;)
ui(Wi;a;) - u;(Bi(a~)~at)
u!(a~; W;) - u~(a~~ Bt(a~))
u; (W~; W;) - u;(aN; a;~)
Hence, in g2(aN) the strategy a; means "player i commits himself to a; in period 1" ~
while W; means "player i waits till period two and best responds to j's commitment, if
there is one, and plays a~ if j did not commit".
Two remarks are in order here concerning the game g~(an`). First, it is easy to see
that g2(aN) has three pure equilibria: Either both players play in period one (in which
case they must play aN), or players move in different periods. The pure equilibria are
therefore
N :- (ai~ ai ), Sr :- (ai , W2), and Sa :- (Wi, az ).
Second, note that against each strategy a~ E A~, player i is not worse off by waiting than
by playing a;~. If a;`' is not dorninant in g(as we will assume from now on), then a;`' is
weakly dominated by W;. In fact, each strategy a2 E A; for which u;(B~(a;); a;) G N;, is
weakly dominated by W;.
According to the theory of Harsanyi and Selten, we now have to determine the set
of candidate solutions of g2(aN). The candidate solutions are the primitive (or curb)
equilibria of g2(aN). Of course, in Chapter 2 we defined the concept of curb sets only
for finite games, but it can be easily extended to games with infinite strategy spaces.
(See Basu and Weibull (1991).) It turns out that curb sets do not have much bite here,
but curb~` sets do. Namely, if aF is weakly dominated by W;, then {S~} is closed under
undominated best replies (but not under best replies). Since, W; is an undominated best
reply against each strategy a~ E A~, we can have three different situations:
(i) If aF is weakly dominated by W; for i- 1,2, then g2(aN) has two minimal curb~`
sets, namely {Sr } and {SZ}.
(ii) If aF is dominated by W;, but aF is not dominated by LI~„ then g2(aN) has a unique
minimal curb~` set, namely {S~}.
(iii) If aF is not dominated by W;, then g2(aN) has a unique minimal curb~` set, in-
cluding Sr and Sz, and possibly some other, mixed, equilibria. Since aN is weakly
dominated, we know that N cannot be an element of this minimal curb~` set.
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According to this slightly adjusted version of Harsanyi and Selten's theory, in situation
(ii) the solution is S~. In situation (i) a selection has to be made between the Stackelberg
equilibria, while in situation (iii) a selection has to be made between the Stackelberg
equilibria and the mixed equilibria in the minimal curb~ set. Note that in all cases the
equilibrium N is excluded from the set of candidates.
In this chapter we will diverge from the theory of Harsanyi and Selten. Namely, we
will take the set of candidates to be {N, Sl, SZ}. The main reason for this is that the
final selection between the candidates will be based on the notion of risk dominance,
which is in turn based on the tracing procedure. The tracing procedure is a process
that, starting from some given prior beliefs of the players, gradually adjusts players'
plans and expectations until they are in equilibrium. It models the thought process of
players, who, by deductive personal reflection, try to figure out what to play. On the
other hand, primitive solutions (here, the curb~` equilibria) are relevant in an evolutionary
context, where the game is repeatedly played by a large population of players who receive
feedback from the evolution of play during the game. (See Chapter 3.2) Hence, it seems
that the theory of Harsanyi and Selten mixes arguments from an evolutionary context
with arguments from a deductive context.
We have some additional reasons for taking {N, Sl, S2} as the candidate set. Namely,
it is quite easy to show that N is risk dominated by S~ and SZ (Theorem 7.1). Therefore,
we can exclude N as the solution of the game solely on the basis of risk considerations.
Then we only need to compare the Stackelberg equilibria. This comparison has to be
made also in cases (i) and (iii) if only primitive solutions are candidates. The reason for
excluding mixed strategy equilibria from the candidate set is simpfy that they are very
difficult to compute in games with infinite strategy sets.
As mentioned before, the final selection between the candidate solutions will be based
on the notion of the risk dominance relation.3 Risk dominance is defined in terms of the
bicentric prior and the tracing procedure. Before we can formally speak about priors,
we need to introduce some notation for beliefs over the (infinite) strategy spaces A;
(i - 1, 2).
ZOf course, Chapter 3 only deals with finite games.
3According to Harsanyi and Selten ( 1988), payoff dominance should precede risk dominance. In our
action commitment game it may happen that Sl and Sz payoff dominate N. (This is the case in a
differentiated product market where prices are the strategic variables.) Harsanyi and Selten would then
eliminate N on the basis of payoff dominance. However, we are more interested in the risk associated
with committing, and will therefore select on the basis of risk dominance only. In Section 7.3 it is shown
that N is always risk dominated by Sl and SZ.
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To that end, we need a topology on A; . We extend the Euclidean topology on A; to
A; in a natural way: A set T C A,` is called open if and only if T f1 A; is open in the
Euclidean topology on A;. Now we call any probability measure p~ on A; a belief for
player j. Such a belief can be decomposed into a pair (~i„ F~), where ~~ -~~(W;') is
the probability that j assigns to i playing W;, and where F~~(1 -,0~) is a conditional
distribution function over A; (conditional on i not playing W;).
Now we can describe the mechanics of the tracing procedure. Let ~- ( ~1ipz) be
a pair of ( prior) beliefs. For any t E [0, 1] we define the strategic form game g~~~ -
(Ai, A2, u~'~, uz~`) as follows:
t,~ui (a2; ai) - tui(a2; ai) -}- (1 - t) ui(azi ai)d~i
Az
t,~a
uz (ai; as) - tuz(ai; a2) f(1 - t) u2(ai; ai)d1~2
A~
Hence, for t- 1 this game coincides with gz(aN), while for t - 0 we have a trivial game
in which each player's payoff depends only on his prior and his own action, but not on
the action of his opponent. Write I'~~~ for the graph of the equilibrium correspondence,
i.e.
I't~~ -{(t; s)~t E[0, 1], s is an equilibrium of g`~~}.
In the case of nondegenerate fznite games it can be shown that this graph contains a
unique distinguished curve that connects the unique equilibrium of go~~` to an equilibrium
of gi~~`. (See Schanuel et aL (1991) for details.) For infinite games as the ones we are
interested in here, however, such results have not been obtained. In the examples we
will consider in this chapter, there is always a distinguished curve. The equilibrium of
gl~~ on this curve is the outcome of the tracing procedure.
Now we define the bicentric prior ~o(s, s'), based on two equilibria s and s' of gz(aN).
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) have in mind the situation in which it is common knowledge
among the players that either s or s' is the solution of the game. Each player i will
initially assume that his opponent j already knows which of the two is the solution.
Player i will assign a subjective probability z; to the solution being s(and, hence, to j
playing s~) and he will assign the complementary probability 1-z; to j playing s~. After
having constructed these beliefs, i will play a best response b;(z;) against z;s~ f(1-z;)s~.
(For convenience, assume that this best reply b;(z;) is unique for almost all z;.) Player
j does not know i's belief z;, and, according to the principle of insufFicient reason, j will
assume that z; is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Hence, j's belief about player i will be
of the form
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F~0(s,s~) - (Q~~Fi),
where
,Q~ - ~({z E [0,1]~6;(z) - W;})
and where
F~(a;) - Prob(i plays some strategy in [O,a;])
- ~({z E [0,1]Ib;(z) E [~, a,]}),
(7.2.1)
where .~ denotes Lebesgue measure.
Note that player j's expected payoff from playing a~ E A~, when his belief is given by
the prior ~CO(s, s'), is equal to
0A u~(at;a~)dF~~ - ~iu~(W;;a~)-F A,u~(a;;a~)dF~
- ~iu~(W~;a~) ~ ~;~~A,)
u~(b;(z);a~)dz
For this reason it will be more convenient to write the prior ~CO(s, s') as
~ rxT ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~.~,~ .. ~ ; ~ ~,~~~w4,
b~ ~ (A, )
although this is with some abuse of notation. Note that, if player j has this prior, where
(~~ - 0 and where b;(z) is not a constant function, then his best reply is to wait. Namely,
in that case j is sure that i will commit himself, but he is not sure to which strategy.
Risk dominance is now defined as follows. Equilibrium s risk dominates another
equilibrium s' if the outcome of the tracing procedure, starting with the bicentric prior ~o
as defined in (7.2.1), is s. In case the outcome of the tracing procedure is an equilibrium
different from s and s', then neither of the equilibria risk dominates the other.
7.3 Economic games of timing
In this section we consider the risk dominance relation between the three pure equilibria
of g2(aN). Our first result states that playing the Nash equilibrium in stage one is risk
dominated by both Stackelberg equilibria. In order to determine which one of the Stack-
elberg equilibria risk dominates the other, we restrict attention to three special examples.
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In particular, we will investigate a standard Cournot duopoly model, a(Bertrand) price
competition model with differentiated products, and a model of private contributions
to a public good. When players are completely symmetric, there is no reason why one
Stackelberg equilibrium should be preferred over the other. Therefore, we will introduce
an asymmetry between the players: We assume that firms differ with respect to marginal
costs.
Theorem 7.1
If player i has an incentive to move first at aN, then S; risk dominates N.
Proof. Without loss of generality we just prove that Sl risk dominates N when player
1 has an incentive to move first. Note that L1 ~ N~ implies that ai ~ al and a2 ~ a2 .
First we have to calculate the bicentric prior.
Suppose player I plays zai ~(1 - z)ai . Since a2 ~ a2 , we have that for all z E(0, I)
player 2's best reply is to wait till period two. Hence, player I believes that player 2 will
wait till period two with probability one, and his best reply is to commit to ai .
Now suppose player 2 plays zW2 ~- (I - z)a2 . For every z player 1 can guarantee
his Nash equilibrium payoff by waiting but also by committing to his Nash strategy.
However, player 1's best reply is to commit to some al(z) ~ aN, for all z] 0: For the
optiimal commitment strategy al(z) it holds that
zc~(a~(z)) ~- (i - z) ~á~~ ~ ~~az ~a~~~11- o, (7.s.i)
where C(ai) - ui(B2(ai);ai). In particular, a~(0) - aN and ai(I) - ai. Suppose that
there is a z] 0 such that ai(z) - ai . Then it must hold that ai(z) - ai for all
z E[0, z]. Differentiation of (7.3.1) with respect to z at z- 0 yields C'(a~)- 0. But
this is impossible since aN ~ ai . Hence, player 1 will commit with probability one, but
player 2 is not sure to which strategy. Hence, the best reply of player 2 is to wa.it. Hence,
the tracing procedure already starts at t- 0 with the Stackelberg equilibrium Sl. But
then the players stick to this equilibrium from t - 0 to t- 1. ~
The above result is quite intuitive. In the (reduced) game g2(aN), a',~ is weakly
dominated by waiting. It is of course very risky to play such a strategy.
Now we will analyze which one of the Stackelberg equilibria risk dominates the other.
We will have to restrict attention to some very specific examples. Even in these sim-
ple examples it is already quite complicated to compute the outcome of the tracing
procedure.
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7.3.1 Cournot duopoly
There are two firms, 1 and `l. Firm i produces a yuantity q; ) 0 at a constant marginal
cost c; ) 0. The market price is linear: p- A- q, where g - qr ~ Q2. The profit of firm
i is then u;(q~; q;) -(A -q~ - qz - c;)q;. We assume that 3c; -2c~ G A(all i, j E {1, 2}).
This assumption implies that a Stackelberg follower will not be driven out of the market.
Let cx; - A- c;. We assume that c1 ) c2.
Now it is easy to check that the best reply (or reaction function) of player j is B~(q;) -
max{(a~ - q;)~2, 0}. Equilibrium actions and payoffs are given by
n, 2~; - a~
ai - 3 ,
N - (2c~; - a~ )~~ 9 ,
~ 20; - a~ F 3a; - 2a~
a~ - , a; -2 - 4
L-(2~; 8 ai)~, Ft - (
3at
162a~)~
In Figure 7.2a the reaction functions are drawn and the equilibrium quantities
cated. It is easily checked that
L;]N;~F;, ( - 1,2)
are indi-
so that bnth players have an incentive to move first. Since aF is weakly dominated by
W;, g2(a`v) has two minimal curb~` sets, namely {Sr} and {S2}. According to Harsanyi
and Selten only the Stackelberg equilibria are candidate solutions. As we argued before,
we also consider N to be a candidate.
From Theorem 7.1 we already know that Sr and S2 risk dominate N. The solution
of the game is thus found by comparing Sr and S2, and we obtain the same solution as
Harsanyi and Selten. Von Stackelberg conjectured that the most modern firm (the one
with the lower costs) will emerge as the leader, hence, he conjectured that S2 will be
played. We will confirm his conjecture by showing that S2 risk dominates S~.
We first have to compute the bicentric prior based on Sl and S2. Suppose player i plays
zaL ~(1 - z)W;. The optimal commitment strategy of player j is then to commit to
(z) - z(3~; - 2~;) ~( 1 - z)(2a~ - a;) a~ cY~ - a;
q' 2(z ~- 1) - 2(z f 1) ~ 2 ~
Note that q~(0) - a~ and q~(1) - aF and that ci ) cz implies that q2(z) ) qi(z) for
all z. Of course, committing to this strategy is only optimal if it yields a higher profit
than waiting. Committing to q~(z) yields
1
~~(z) - (z(3a~ - 2a;) f (1 - z)(2a~ - ~;))~,8(z ~ 1)




9t -~ ii 2~7 zy z -.




~~ (z) - 16(3a~
- 2a;)~ ~ g (2a~ - a,)~.
It is optimal for player j to commit only if z is not too high. More specifically, committing
is optimal for player j as long as z E[O,z~), where
(4a~ - 2a~)~
z~ - 18a~ - ( 4a~ - 2a,)z ~
This implies that the bicentric prior of player í is given by
I~a(si, S2) -(1 - z~, Fi) -(1 - z~)W~ ~ fz~ 4~(z)dz.
The priors are indicated in Figure 7.2b. From these priors we can develop the intuition for
why it is the low cost firm that will become the leader in the risk dominant equilibrium.
Namely, first note that our assumptions on the cost parameters imply that 2~3a2 G al C
a2i and, hence, that 1~17 C zl G 2~7 G z2 G 32~49. This tells us that firm 1 assigns a
higher probability to the event that firm 2 will commit than that firm 2 assigns to the
event that firm 1 will commit. Furthermore, note that q2(z) G qi(z) G 0. This implies
that the conditional distribution F2~z2 has a larger variance than Fi~zi. This tells us
that firm 1 is more uncertain about the commitment strategy of the opponent than firm
2. Both observations suggest that. committing is more risky for the high cost firm.
In principle, we can have 4 different situations concerning the best replies of the players
against their prior: (i) Both players prefer to wait, (ii) Only player 1 prefers to commit,
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(iii) Only player 2 prefers to commit and (iv) Both players prefer to commit. However,
below we will show that player 2 always (that is, for all allowed parameter values) prefers
to commit, while player 1 only prefers to commit in case the difference in cost is not too
large (Lemma 71).' This implies that situations (i) and (ii) never occur. In situation
(iii) it is obvious that the tracing procedure selects S2, since pla~yer 1 commits and player
2 waits from t - 0 till t- 1 in the tracing procedure. We will show that in situation (iv)
player 1 will be the first to switch to his waiting strategy (Lemma 7.2 and 7.3). Hence,
also in this situation S2 is selected.
~~'e define the following function
Gi(t, b~ 9~; 4i) :- (1 - t) ~~{ui(q;(z); 9~) - u~(4~(z); Bi(q;(z)))}dz0
-}-(1 - t)(1 - 6)(u~(B2(4i); 9~) - wN) (7.3.2)
ft(ui(42; 4i) - u~(4~; B.i(q~))
b
- (1 - t) ~ 4i(a~ - 4i - 4;(z)) - 4(~i - 4;(z))~dz
2~~ -2a; - 9i - (2ai3 aa)s)f(1 - t)(1 - b)(q;
1 2
~t(4~(~~ - 4~ - 9~) - 4(a~ - 4;) )
This function denotes the (expected) gain of player j from committing to q~ instead of
-..-.~.-- :- ,L- ~..- - '...- 1 ~ ~' ~ 1 1 ' ~ ll '. 1..~,~,,,~, ,,. ~,.c ~.c~a,,.,~ r.va,cuu,c a~ ~,iiic a, wiic,i piayct i ac~uaiiy wiiniiico í,u yt anu
player j's prior is (1 - b)W; f fó q;(z)dz. In particular, G~(t,z;,q;;q~) is player j's gain
from committing in the tracing procedure at time t, when we start from the bicentric
prior.
For all t E [0,1], let (qi(t), q2(t)) be the pair of optimal comtnitment strategies in the
tracing proeedure starting from the bicentric prior at time t, i.e.s
{q;(t)} -argmgxG;(t,z;,q;(t);q). (j -1,2)
We write G~(t) - G~(t,z„q;(t);q~(t)) for the expected gain from committing optimally.
In particular, player j prefers to commit at t if G~(t) ) 0 and prefers to wait if G~(t) C 0.
QSome intuition for this result can be obtained by computing the "worst case" scenario's for player
2, where cl - cz and il - 2~7, and for player 1, where al - 2az~3 and zz - 3`1~49. In the worst case
of player 2(which is equivalent to the best case for player 1), committing yields a higher payoff than
waiting. In the worst case for player 1, iC is optimal to waiL The remaining problem is to show that
committing becomes more attractive when the opponent's cost increases.
SThe Appendix provídes exact expressions for ql(t) and Q2(t).
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Lemma 7.1 (i) G2(0) ) 0.
(z:iJ Gi(0) 1 0 if a2~~~ G 1.0805 and G~(0) C 0 if nz~a~ ) 1.081.
Proof. See Appendix.
Hence, firm 2 always prefers to commit at the start of the tracing procedure. Firm
1 prefers to commit only for some parameter values. We assume from now on that the
parameters are such that Gl (0) 1 0. Our next lemma states that, as long as player 1
(weakly) prefers to commit, player 2(strictly) prefers to commit.
Lemma 7.2 Let t' - max{t' E[0, 1]~G1(t) ~ 0 for all t E[O,t']}. If t' 7 0 then
Gz(t) ~ Gi(t) for all t E[O,t').
The formal proof is relegated to the Appendix. We give a sketch of the proof here. It is
based on comparisons between payoffs in the tracing procedure starting with the bicentric
prior, and payoffs obtained in the tracing procedure that starts ~ti-ith the ~lternative prior
(1 - zz)W, f fó2 g;(z)dz for each player j. Hence, in this alternative tracing procedure
player 1 starts with the same ( bicentric) prior as before, but player 2 starts with a more
pessimistic prior: he overestimates the probability with which player 1 will commit. Let
(qi(t),q2(t)) be the optimal commitment strategies in the alternative tracing procedure,
i.e.
{q~(t)} -argmqxG~(t,z2iQ;(t);q). (j - 1,2)
In the Appendix we prove that. q2(t) ) q2(t) and qi(t) G q~(t). These inequalities are
intuitive: When player 2 is more pessimistic, he will be more cautious and commit to a
lower quantity. Consequently, player 1 will commit to a higher quantity in that case.
The lemma follows now from six inequalities:
Gz(t,zi~q~(t)~4z(t)) ~ Gz(t~zi,9i(t);qs(t)) ~ Gz(t,zz,4i(t);qz(t))
~ Gz(t, z~, 9~(t); 4z(t)) ~ G~(t, zz, qz(t); q~ (t))
~ G~(t,z~,9z(t);q~(t))?G~(t,z~,qz(t);4~(t))
The first inequality is by definition of q2(t). The second inequality follows from the
pessimism of player 2. The third inequality follows since ql(t) 1 Q1(t). The intuition for
the fourth inequality is that both players are equally pessimistic about the probability
with which the other will commit. But since qz(z) C qi(z) G 0, we have that q2(0) -
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qz(zz) 1 q~(0)-qi(zz). Hence, player 1 is moce uncertain about which strategy theother
player will commit himself. 'The fifth inequality follows from the definition of qt(t). The
last inequality follows from the fact that qz(t) ) Qz(t).
The above two lemma's are almost sufficient to show that player 1 will be the first to
give in and switch to his waiting strategy. We just need that for the t' from Lemma 7.2
it holds that t` C 1. That is, we just need to show that it is impossible that both players
will keep committing during the whole tracing procedure. If they would, the tracing
procedure would result in playing N. Fortunately, we have
Lemma 7.3 There exists so~ne t E (0, 1) such thot G1(t) G 0.
Proof. It is easy to see that q~ (1) - aN (j - 1, 2) and that Gl (1) - 0. The lemma
follows now from
- f~2{ui(qz(z);QN) - ul(9z(z); Bi(9z(z)))}dz - 0
f0 f 4i(1)(cri - 2aN - as )~ 42(1)(2ai - ai - 202 )
-~~~{ui(qz(z);a~) - ui(qz(z); B i(4z(z)))}dz 1 0
This completes the proof of
Theorem 7.2 In the Cournot duopoly model, the Stockelberg equilibrium with the low
cost fir~m as the leader aud the high cost firm as the follower risk dominates the .Stackelberg
equilibriurra where the roles are reversed.
To conclude this subsection we compare the products of deviation losses for both
Stackelberg equilibria. In order to do that, we need to know the payoff for the players in
case of Stackelberg warfare, that is, when both players choose their Stackelberg leader
strategy. It is easily computed that i,'s Stackelberg warfare payoff equals
1
~~ - 4(0~ - a~)(2cr~ - a~).
The product of deviation losses at S; is given by (L~ - N;)(F~ - D~). Substitution of the
previously computed payoffs yields that the product of deviation losses at .Sz is larger
than the one at Sl.
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7.3.2 Price setting duopoly with differentiated products
Assume there are two firms producing diffe~rentiated (substitut.able) products. Firm i
produces good i at constant marginal cost c;. We assume that firms compete in prices,
and that demand for good i is given by
4;-1-p~fap
where 0 C a C 1. The profit of firm i, when prices pl and p2 are chosen, is therefore
u;(p~; p~) -(p; - c~)(1 - p; -~ ap~). We will assume that 1~ ci ~ cz ~ 0. It is easy to
verify that B~(p;~ -(1 -~apt-}-c~)~2. From this one easily verifies that F; ) L, ) N„ that
is, both firms prefer to be followers, but of course they prefer to be a leader to playing







Figure 7.3a: Reaction functions. Figure 7.3b: Bicentric prior.
For further reference, we give the simultaneous Nash equilibrium payoffs
(2 f a ~- ac -{- (a2 - 2~c,~2
N; - ' .(4 - a~)~
The reader might. suspect that. the high cost firm will become the leader, so that the
low cost firm obtains the preferred role. However, it will turn out that the low cost firm
will be the leader in the risk dominant, equilibrium. Note that, if the costs differ only
slightly, the firm with t.he high cost makes a higher profit as a follower than the firm with
the low cost does as a leader. The intuition for this result is that it, is risky to commit
yourself. The low cost firm faces a smaller risk than the high cost firm, and therefore he
will take the leader role, although he would prefer the follower role. The formal proof
consists of a number of straightforward, but very tedious steps.
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First we have to consider the bicentric prior based on Sl and S2. Suppose that player
i plays zp~ -~ (1 - z)W;. The best player j can do is to commit to a certain price p;(z),
where
4~ 2a - 2a~ - a3 f 2ac; - a3c; ~- 4c; - 4a~c; ~ a4c; f a~z(1 ~ a~ (3 - a~)c;)
p~(z) - .
2(2 - a~)(a~z-~ 2 - a~)
Obviously, p;(0) - p~ and p;(1) - pF. Note that committing to pF is already strictly
better than waiting, for all z G 1. Hence, the bicentric prior for player i is given by
i
F~a(Si, S2) - ~ p~(z)dz.
Both players believe that the other player will commit with probability one, but they
are not sure to what price the other player will commit himself. Therefore, they prefer
to wait and see. Hence, the tracing procedure starts at t- 0 with both players waiting.
As time passes, players put more and more weight on the event that the other player
waits, and eventually one player will give in and move first. We will show that the low
cost firm will give in first. From the bicentric prior we can develop the intuition for this
result: It is easy to check that pz(z) G pi(z) G 0. (See also Figure 7.3b.) Hence, firm
1 is more uncertain about the opponent's commitment strategy, than firm 2 is. Hence,
committing is more risky for the high cost firm.
Let C;(t, p) denote player i's payoff at time t if he commits to p while the other player
still waits and best responds in period two, i.e.
rl
Ct(ti,P1 -( í - tt ~ u~(pilzl;p)dz t tu;l~~lp); pl.0
Let p;(t) denot.e the optima] commitment strategy, i.e. P,(t) - argmaxG,(t,.) for all t.
It is not difTicult to verify that
~(t) - (1 - t)(1 ~- c~ f a fó p;(z)dz) -~ t(2 ~- a f ac; ~(2 - a~)c~)~2
2 - a2t
Let W;(t) denote player i's payoff from waiting at time t, i.e.
W,(t) -(1 - t) ~r u;(pt(z); B~(p~(z)))dz f tN;.0
Let G;(t) - C;(t, p,(t)) - W;(t) denote player i's gain from committing. Note that
G;(0) G 0 G G;(1). As long as player j has not switched yet, player i will switch at time
t- i;, where G;(t;) - 0. Substitution of ~;(t,) in the latter equation and multiplying
both sides by 2- a2t; yields P;(í;) - 0, where
P;(t) - 8(2 - 2c; f 2a
J
~ p;(z)dz -~ t(a ~ ac; f a2c; - 2a
J~
p;(z)dz))z
-(2 - a~t)((1 - t) ~r u;(p;(z); B~(p;(z)))dz f tN;)
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P;(t) is a polynomial of degree 2(or less) and we already know that it has a root between
0 and 1. We need to show that tz C tl. Since the polynomial is of degree 2(or less)
an explicit solution could be obtained. The coefficients of this polynomial are very
messy and depend on the parameters a, cl and czi and this direct method will therefore
not render a solution to our problem. Therefore, we consider the difference polynomial
D(t) - Pi(t) - Pz(t). In the Appendix we prove
Lemma 7.4 D(t) C 0 for all t E [0,1] and all a E (0,1).
From this it then follows that tz C t~. Consequently, we proved
Theorem 7.3 In the price setting duopoly with differentiated products, the Stackelberg
equilibrium with the low cost firm as a leader and the high cost firm as the follower risk
dominates the Stackelberg equilibrium in which the roles are reversed.
This result is surprising and counterintuitive. Namely, it is well-known that the
follower makes a higher profit than the leader when both firms have the same cost. If
the cost differential is positive, but not too large, this remains true. In this case, the low
cost firm would have an incentive to inerease his cost. Theorem 7.3 can also be viewed
as an illustration of the fact that it may be beneficial to be "weak", that is, to have high
cost.
We conclude this subsection by computing the product of the deviation losses at each
Stackelberg equilibrium. It is easily verified that
a4(2 f a f ac; f(o.z - 2)c;)z
L; - N; -
8(2 - az)(4 - az)z
a4(1 -1- ac; - c;)z
F; - D; - 16(az - 2)z
It follows that the product of the deviation losses at S~ is larger than at Sz if and only if
(cl - cz)(2 ~ 2a ~(ci f cz)(az - 1)) 1 0.
Hence, the product of deviation losses is larger at Si than at Sz, although Sz is the rísk
dominant equilibrium.
7.3.3 Private provision of a public good.
We have two players, 1 and 2. Each player i can contribute to a public good, at a
constant marginal cost e,. When contributions a~ and az are chosen, player i's payoff is
u;(ai,az) - ai ~ a2 - c;a;.
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We assume that 2c2 ~ cl 1 c2 ] 0.
Let d~ - (2c~)-z. It is easily verified that the best reply function for player j is given
by B~(a,) - max{d~ -a;, 0}. It easily follows that ai - 0, a2 - d2i a~ - 0 and a~ - d~.
Reaction functions and equilibrium contributions are indicated in Figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4: Reaction functions.
We see that the leader wants to commit to contribute nothing. This game is a bit.
pecuiie.r since iiie ivasii eyuiiibrium outcome coincides with the Jtackelberg outcome
when player 1 is the leader. Theorem 7.1 can not be applied to exclude equilibrium
N, since player 1 has no incentive to move first. The timing game has a continuum of
(mixed) equilibria in which player 1 commits to contribute nothing, and player 2 mixes
between contributing d2 in period 1 and waiting. Denote the equilibrium in which player
2 plays in period 1 with probability ~ by s`(~). Hence, s'(~) -~N f(1 -~)Si. Note
that it is very easy to compare the products of the deviation losses of S2 and s'(~).
Namely, the deviation loss for player 2 at s'(.~) is zero, because he is indifferent. Since
the product of the deviation losses at S2 is strictly positive, .Sz has the largest product.
Theorem 7.4 S2 risk dominates s`(.~) for all ~ E [0, 1].
Proof. Suppose player 2 plays zsz(~) ~- (1 - z)a2. For all z E(0,1) player 1 has a
unique best reply, namely to wait. Hence, player 2 believes that player 1 will wait with
probability 1, and his best reply is to commit to contribute nothing.
Now suppose that player 1 plays zsi(.~) f(1 - z)Wl - zai -}- (1 - z)Wl. The unique
best reply for player 2 is to commit to contribute z2d2i for all z C 1. Hence, player 1 is
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almost sure that player 2 will commit, but he is not sure to which action. Consequently,
player 1's best reply to his prior is to wait.
Now it is clear that. the tracing procedure will lead to S2: On the whole path from
t- 0 to t- 1 player 2 commits in period 1 and player 1 waits till period '2. ~
Remark. It seems that Sr is more credible. If player 1 commits to contribute nothing,
and player 2 responds by contributing d2i then ex post player 1 still does not want to
contribute. However, if player 2 commits to contribute nothing, and player 1 responds by
contributing dr, then the situation is different. Ex post player 2 would like to corrtribute
d2 -dr (and player 1 would not mind!). The assumption that players can credibly commit
is very strong here. It must be absolutely impossible to renege on your commitment,
even if everybody would profit from such change of action.
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we endogenized the timing of the moves in some interesting economic
games without a commitment robust equilibrium. We made a selection between the three
subgame perfect equilibria on the basis of risk dominance. To our knowledge, this is the
first attempt to apply the tracing procedure in games where the strategy spaces are not
finite.s The reader might wonder whether the selection on basis of risk considerations has
any predictive power. Aft.er all, the tracing procedure is quite complicated. It seems very
unlikely that players actually will compute the outcome of this procedure. However, the
tracing procedure is meant to model the thought process of players. Players need not be
aware of how their thought process works. In any case, we believe that the bicentric prior
gives some idea about the risks that different players face, and that the risk dominant
equilibrium is more likely to prevail.
In this chapter we restricted ourselves to pure strategy equilibria (except for the
case of a public good). We did this merely for convenience. However, we suspect that
equilibria in which players play in both periods with positive probability will be risk
dominated. We also restricted ourselves to three specific games. Of course, there are
many other interesting economic games without a commitment robust equilibrium. For
instance, one could consider the quantity and price mode.l of this chapter where the
products are complements instead of substitutes. There is another interesting direction
SHarsanyi and Selten (1988) considered discretized versions of some games with infinite strategy
spaces.
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for further research: In the introduction to this chapter we reported about a number of
articles in which conditions are derived under which one particular ordering of moves is
preferred by both players. One could try to check whether this preferred equilibrium is
then in fact also the equilibrium selected by the Harsanyi and Selten equilibrium selection
theory. We conjecture that this is not always the case. However, we conjecture that the
preferred equilibrium is selected if there are at least two periods at which players can
commit. However, in this case the result is driven by the substitution of solutions of the
subgames, and not so much by risk dominance.
Appendix
This Appendix provides the details of the proofs that were left open.
Cournot duopoly
Consider the function G~(t, b, q;; q~) that was defined in (7.3.2). Note that only the
second term can be positive. This implies that if G~(t, b, q;; q~) ) 0 for some t C 1, then
q~ ) a!~. For a given q;, the optimal commitment strategy for player j is obtained by
differentiating G~(t, b, q;; q~) with respect to q~, and equaling the obtained expression to
zero. (Note that the second derivative is strictly negative.) This yields
opt 2~~ - cx; f(a; - 2q;)t f (1 - t)(cti;b- a~ ln(1 ~ b))
q' (t) - 2(1 -~ t ~ (1 - t)b)
. (A.1)
From (A.1) we obtain the optimal commitment strategies in the two tracing procedures.
Namely,
d,vl - tv2 d2v, - tv3
4~(t) - 2(d,dz - t~), 4~(t) - 2(dz - t~)'
-tvl -}~ d2v2 -tvl ~- d2v3
q~(t) - 2(d,dz - t~), 4s(t) - 2(d~ - tz) '
where
d; - 1-~tf(1-t)z;
v~ - 2oi - a2 f azt ~( 1 - t)(aiz2 - a21n(z2 f 1))
v2 - 2a2 - ai ~ aitf (1 - t)(azzi - oiln(ii ~ 1))
v3 - 2c~2 - a~ -{- a~t f ( 1 - t)(~zz2 - ai In(zz -}- 1)).
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In particular, we have that
and that
9~(1) - 9~(1) - aN
9,(0) - 2a~ - a; ~ a~z; - a; ln(z; f 1)
2 ( z; ~- 1)
Straightforward but very tedious computations yield then
c;(o,z;,4;(o);q~(o)) - 2(z; -~ 1)q;(o)~ -( 1 - z;)(~a~3 a;)z
2-1 3a~ - a; 2 1 a;z;
-4(z;( 2 )- 2as(3a~ - a;) ln(z; f 1) ~ 4(z; -~ 1))




18~z - (4x - 2)2'
f(~) - ls~~(ln(g(~) ~ 1))~ f 18(g(~) -1)(~ -~~) ln(g(~) ~ 1)
f2(2 - x)2 ~- 9(~)(-9 f 18~ - 18~2) ~ 9(x)2(1 - lOx t 7~2)
Then g(a;~a~) - z; and G~(O,z;,q;(0);q~(0)) 1 0 if and only if f(a;~a~) , 0. We will
show
Lemma 7.5 f(~) is decreasing on [2~3, 3~2].
Lemma 7.1 then follows by substitution of x- 1.0805 and x- 1.081.
Proof. Note that
f'(x) - 36x(ln(9(~) f 1))~
f[36x2 g~(~) f 18g'(x)(~ - x2) -I- 18(9(~) - 1)(1 - 2x) J ln(9(~) f 1)9(x) f 1
-f18(9(x) - 1)(x - x~) g~(~) - 4(2 - x) ~ 9(~)(-9 f 18x - 18x~)
9(x) f 1
~9(~)(18 - 36~) f 29(~)9~(~)(1 - lOx f 7~~) f 9(x)~(-10 -F 14~)
It is easily verified that the expression between square brackets is positive. Now we can
use the fact that
s
a' {18k~(]n(z; ~ 1))2 f 18(z; - 1)(k~ - k?)ln(z; -~ 1)
144(z; -}- 1)
~2(2 - k~)~ -f z;(-9 -b 18k~ - 18k~) f z~(1 - lOk~ ~ 7k~) }
ln(9(x) ~ 1) C 9(~) - 9(~)~~2 f g(x)3~6.
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This yields
f'(x) C 4 ~-768 ~ 17488x - 159024xz ~ 711888x3 - 1435844x'
- (xz f 8x - 2)s
f15300x5 f 4623516x6 - 4540008x' - 5577291x8 f 12076593x9
-8026610x1o f 2498964x'I - 402690x1z f 30145x13 ]
Call the expression between the brackets h(x). Substitution of x- y f 2~3 in h(x) yields
a polynomial in y of degree 13. We need to show that this polynomial is negative for
all y E(0, 5~6]. When we multiply this polynomial with a suitable number (in order to
avoid non-integer coefficients), we obtain
P(y):- 1594323 h(y ~ 2~3) -11,168,983,684 - 164,908,289,616y
-942,287,374,800yz - 2,469,754,612,944y3
-2, 090,175, 577, 236y4 ~ 3, 200, 389, 079, 004y5
f6, 449, 333, 520, 852ys - 1, 614, 959, 549, 496y'
-9,156, 952, 284, 759y8 - 3, 731,130, 088, lOlys
fl, 660, 321, 004, 418y'o ~- 514,122, 400, 692y11
-225,490,416,300y1z f 48,060,866,835y1a
To save space we let dk denote the coefficient of yk in P(y). Let
d - ~ dk(~)s-k.
k-o 5
By using that y E[0, 5~6] one verifies that
P(y) C dys ~ dsys f d~y' f dsy8
C 1012y5(-4 f ly - yz - 9y3) c 0
In the remainder of this Appendix we will make use of the fact that we only need to
consider the case where Gl(0) ~ 0. It follows that we only need to consider cases where
zz E[2~7, 7~20]. In order to prove Lemma 7.2, we need three more lemma's.
Lemma 7.6 ~i~ qi(0) - qi(0) ~ ai and Qz(0) ~ qz(0).
(ii~ For all t E (0, 1)
4i(t) C 9i(t) and qz(t) ~ 9z(t).
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Proof. From inspection of (A.1) it follows immediately that ql(0) - ql(0). Since
Gi(0) ) 0, it must hold that qi(0) ~ a~.
Fix t E [0, 1) and q~ G ai and consider f(t, ql, 6) - q2p` as in (A.1) as a function of b.
We have that áf~áb C 0 if and only if
(alfalb-az)(l~tf(1-t)b)-(l~b)(2az-a~~(al-2Q1)t-~(1-t)(alb-azln(b~l)) G 0.
Since the left-hand side of this expression is linear in t, it is enough to establish the
inequality for t - 0 and t - 1. For t- 0, the left-hand side is
(bfl)(al(b-} 1)-az)-2azfa1-arb-~azln(bfl)) - (6~1)(2a1-3azfazln(b~l)) G 0.
For t- 1, the left-hand side is
2(ai(b f 1) - az) -(b ~- 1)(2az - 2qi) G 2(ai(6 ~- 1) - az) -(b f 1)(2az - 2ai ~- az)
- 4(al - az) ~ 4alb - 3azb - az G 0
Hence, óf ~óó G 0. Now we take t- 0 and ql - 41(0). We have
9z(~) - f( ~, 9t, zi) ~ f(~, 9i, z z) - 9z(~)-
This establishes the proof of (i).
Now suppose that it does not hold for all t E (0,1) that Qz(t) 1 qz(t). By continuity
of qz(t), and by ( i), there must exist some t' E (0,1) such that qz(t') - qz(t'). Inspection
of (A.1) implies then that also ql(t') - gl(t'). But this implies, by taking ql - ql(t'),
that
9z(t~) - f(t~,4i,zi) ~ f(t~,9i,zz) - 9z(t').
This contradicts the definition of t', and hence, establishes that Qz(t) ~ qz(t) for all
t E (0, 1). A final inspection of (A.1) yields then ql(t) G ql(t) for all t E (0, 1). ~
We write G~(t) - GJ(t,zziq;(t);q~(t)) for the gain of player j from committing opti-
mally in the alternative tracing procedure. We will need
Lemma 7.7 For all t E [0, 1), Gz(t) ~ Gt(t).
Proof. The proof of this lemma involves straightforward but very tedious computations.
These computations yield
4s(d~ - t~)(Gz(t, zz, 9, (t); vz(t)) - G~ ( t, zz, gz(t); 4~(t)))
(a~ - az)(t - 1) -
(zz f 1)(zz - 2)(-2zz - 1) f t(zz - 1)z(4zz -~ 1)
ftz(-3 - zz - z2 ~- 4i2 - 2zz)~(zz ~- 1)
f6(z2 - 1-f t(-1 f 2zz - 2zz) f tz(zz - 1)z)ln(zz f 1)
-~s(t -1)(2 ~ 2z~ t t(s - 2zz))(ln(zz f 1))~
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We call the right-hand side of this equation g(t, zz). It is not difíïcult to verify that
g(t, zz) is concave in t for all zz E [2~7,7~20]. This implies that the minimum of g(t, zz)
is attained in t - 0 or in t- 1. Well, substitution yields
g(o, zz) - (zz -~ 1)((zz - 2)(-2z~ -1) ~ s(zz -1) ln(zz f 1) - 6(ln(z~ f 1))~)
?(zz f 1)((zz - 2)(-2zz - 1) -h 6(zz - 1)zz - 6z~)
- (zz-hl)(2-3zz-2z2)~0
9zz-6(zz~l)ln(zz~-1)
9(1, zz) - z2~1
) 3zz(1 - 2z2) ] 0
- zz -~ 1
for all zz E[2~7, 7~20]. Hence, g(t, zz) ) 0, and the lemma is proved. ~
Finally, we can prove Lemma 7.2. In fact, we will show the slightly stronger
Lemma 7.8 Let t' - max{t' E[0,1]~Gl(t) 1 0 for ald t E[O,t']}. Suppose that t' 1 0.
For all t E(O,t') it holds that
Gz(t) ~ Gz(t) ~ G,(t) ~ G,(t) (A.2)
Proof. Suppose it is not true. Then there is some t E(0, 1) such that (A.2) does not
L,~l,~ T At i},o tl,o .,~,., ~11 ,.1, 3 ~ In i 1 u. .,f: :f. ..,1 .1,,.. ,,,., ,,.,~. ~,. . ~~ ~.. .,..~'::~::"- - -- -- --- ------------ ...... ~.. .,~.,.. . .. . ~. ..,...,..-...., ....... ......- , i~ ~
lemma, it holds that
Gz(t) 1 Gz(t) ) Gi(t) ] Gl(t) ] 0,
where at least one of the inequalities is in fact an equality. Note that, since all the "gain
functions" are positive, it must hold that q;(t), q;(t) E(aN, a; ), i- 1, 2.
The first inequality cannot be an equality: First, we have Gz(t) 1 Gz(t, zl, ql(t); q2(t)),
by definition of Qz(t) and since qz(t) ~ qz(t) (by Lemma 7.6). Furthermore,
G~(~, z~, q~(t); Qz(t)) - Gz(t, zz, 9, ( ~); 9z(t)) -
-(1 - t) ~z~{uz(4i(z)~ 4z(t)) - uz(4T(z)~ Bz(4T(z)))}dz:,
f(1 - t)(zz - z,)(u~(B,(q~(t));qz(t)) - Nz) ) 0
Finally, we have
Gz(t, zz, 9~(t); 9~(t)) - Gz(t, zz, q~(t); q~(t)) -
t(9z(?)(9i(t) - 9i(t)) - 4(az - qi(t))z ~ 4(~z - 4i(?))z) -
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t(9~(t) - 9~(t))(9z(t) - ~(2a~ - 9r(t) - 9~(t))) ?
N 1 1 N
t(9i(t) - 9i(t))(az - 2az -~ 2a, )- 0
The second (weak) inequality cannot be an equality either when t) 0: If t ] 0 it
follows that
G(t,zz,qz(t);Qr(t)) ) Gr(t,zz,9z(t);Qr(t))
by definition of qr(t), and since q,(i) ~ g,(t) when t ) 0. Furthermore,
G~(t, zz, vz(t); 9r(t)) - G~(t, zz, 4~(t); 9~(t)) -
t(4i(t)(4z(t) - 4z(t)) - 4(~r - qz(t))z ~ 4(a r - 9z(t))z) -
t(q~(t) - q~(t))(9~(t) - 4 (zar - éz(t) - 9~(t))) ~
N 1 I N
t(92(t) - 4z(t))(ar - 2ar f 2az )- 0
Now consider the case that t- 0. Note that, by continuity, for small t ~ 0, we still
have q;(t),q;(t) E(aN,ai ). Therefore, we can repeat the whole story with small t) 0.
This shows that t - 0 if and only if G1(t) C 0 for small values of t 1 0. This contradicts
the supposition that t' ~ 0. O
Price setting duopoly with differentiated products
In the remainder of this Appendix we prove Lemrna 7.4. Straightforward but very tedious
computations show that D(t) - dztz -f dlt -1- do, where
dz - d(a4(-7a4 ~ 14az - 8) - 4(az - 2)(az - 4) In(2 2az )(ln(2 2az )- az))
di - d(-4a6 f 3a8 f 4(az - 2)(az - 4) ln( 2 2 az )(2 ln( 2 2 az ) - az))
do - d(2(4 - az)(a' - 2(2 - az)(ln( ~ ))z)2-az
and where
d- (cz - cr )(2 ~(a - 1)(cr f cz))(a ~ 1) G 0
32az(az - 2)(az - 4)
for all cr ~ ez and all a E (0,1]. We will show that each of the coefficients is negative,
implying that the difference polynomial D(t) only takes negative values for nonnegative
values of t.
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For k- 0,1, 2 let fk(x) denote the function such that fk(a~) - dk~d. Hence, fo(~) -
2(4 - x)(~~ - 2(2 -~)(ln(z~~))~). Let ho(~) - fo(.r)~(8 - 2~). Now ho(0) - 0 while
hó(~) - 2x f 2(ln( 2))2 - 41n( 2).2-a 2-x
Note that
Hence,
ln( 2 )-1-1n(lf ~ )-lC ~ -1( ~ )~-1c0.2-~ 2-x 2-x 22-~
2hó(x) -(ln(2 2~) - 1)~ -~ x- 1
3
~ ~ (48 - 123~ -F 120x2 - 53x3 f 9~4) ~ 0
- 9(2 - ~)s
for all x E ( 0, 1). Consequently, fo(a2) 1 0 for all a E(0, 1), and do C 0.
We have
Note that
fi(~) --4~3 -}- 3~4 f 4(x - 2)(x - 4) ln( 2)(21n( 2)-~).2-.T 2-~
ln 2 ln 1~
x ~ x 1 ~ z- 4~ - 3~~ ~ 0,
(2-~)- ( 2-x)-2-x-2(2-a) 2(2-~)~
and that, consequently,
2 3
21n( 2 1-.x) ~ -~ ~0-
'l - x' - (1 - ~)~
Hence, for all ~ E(0, 1),
2 2 - 3
f~ (x) ] -4a.3 f 3~4 ~ 4(x - 2)(z - 4)(
4a - 3x .~ :r
- 2(2 - ~)~)((2 - x)~)
(2 - ~)3
x3
(64 - Sx - 38a2 -~ 20.~3 - 3x4) 1 0.
We have
,fs(x) - :r~(-7x~ f 14x - 8) - 4(~ - 2)(.r - 4) lu( 2 )( ln( 2 ) - .r).2-~ 2-x
In order to prove that fz(x) ) 0 for all x E (0, 1) we will make use of
x-]n( 2 ) ~.~-( ~ - ~( ~ )~f ~( ~ )3).
2-x 2-~ 2 2-x 6 2-~
It follows that
3
f2(~) 1 ~ ( 384 - 1096~ f 1234a2 - 690.r3 f 192~4 - 21a5) 1 0
- 3(~ - 2)a





One of the most important insights in game theory is that the power to commit oneself
may confer a strategic advantage: it may be beneficial to constrain one's own behavior in
order to induce others to behave in a way that is favorable to oneself. One possibility to
commit oneself is to move early: to preempt the others by choosing and communicating
the (irreversible) action that one takes before the rivals take their actions. This idea
dates back at least to Von Stackelberg (1934) who demonstrated the existence of a"first-
mover advantage" in a quantity-setting duopoly. Schelling's (1960) classic The Strategy of
C,onflict generalized Von Stackelberg's initial insight in several dimensions by describing
richer commitment tactics as well as illustrating the ubiquity of the phenomenon that in
independent decision situations weakness confers strength, that power may result from
the power to bind oneself.
Schelling already pointed out that for a commitment to an ac,tion to be credible, the
commitment must be irreversible, at least reneging should be sufficiently costly. Schelling
also stressed that the efficacy of commitment depends on the communication structure
of the game. If the opponent is unavailable for messages, or can destroy all communi-
cation channels before any communication takes place, being able to commit oneself is
of no value. Hence, commitment can be beneficial only if the communication channel is
sufficiently reliable. Just how important this latter requirement is has been shown in a
recent paper by Kyle Bagwell (1992). Bagwell shows that a precise communication of
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the commitment is import.ant, that it is vital that there are no ambiguities, that there
are no misunderstandings about the action to which the player committed himself. In
fact, Bagwell claims that the first-mover advantage is completely eliminated when there
is even a slight amount of noise associated with the observation of the first-mover's ac-
tion. Specifically, he shows that, if there is some noise, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
outcome of the game in which one of the players can commit must be a Nash equilibrium
outcome of the game in which this commitment possibility is absent. This is a counter-
intuitive and striking result and it suggests that a reconsideration of the literature that
applies the idea of a"first-mover advantage" might perhaps be required.
The intuition for Bagwell's result can be easily conveyed. Let g- (Ai, Az, ur, u2) be a
2-person normal form game and consider the sequential move game with player 1 moving
first. However, assume that player 2 is only imperfectly informed about this commitment.
Specifically, if player I commits to a~ E A~, player 2 receives the signal ai E Ai with
probability p(a~ ~ a~) ) 0 where p(al ~ at) ~ 1. Hence, player 2 is almost. perfectly
informed about the commitment. The crucial observation, however, is that if player 1
commits to the pure action a~, the signal that player 2 receives is uninformative. Since
all information sets of player 2 are reached with positive probability, Bayes' rule dictates
that 2 believes that 1 played a~ no matter what signal he receives. In equilibriurn, player
2 best responds to ai for all possible messages, hence, if 2's best response to a~ in g is
unique (say it is a~), then 2 will respond with a; no matter what rnessage he receives.
Ilowever, then, in order to have an equilibrium in the seyuential move game, ai should
be a best response against a.z in g, hence, (a„ a2) must be an equilibrium of q.
As the above paragraph has shown, Bagwell's result is driven by the specific type
of imperfection in the communication technology that he assumes. It is not the case
that the commitment sometimes is not communicated, it is rather that the opponent
with a small probability receives the wrong message. To put it differently, Bagwell's
is a model of errors in perception, rather than errors in communication. His result
depends on the assumption that if, for example, a seller commits himself to "I do not
sell for a price less than g100", the buyer might interpret this as "I do not sell for less
than ~10,000" or as a commitment to "I give the object away for free". We do not
want. t.o enter into the debate about whether this is a sensible assumption, although
we believe that this specific assumption might explain why Bagwell's result appears
counterintuitive at first. It is, however, important to note that the assumption is crucial
for the result. If communication errors would take the form as suggested by Schelling
(i.e. commitments would not necessarily be communicated to the second mover, but if
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they would be communicated, they would be communicated without error), then there
would not be a lack of robustness of the type that Bagwell notes. The reader can
easily verify that in the latter case, as long as the probability that the commitment is
received is sufficiently high, a player will commit himself to his Stackelberg strategy.
(See Chakravorti and Spiegel (1993)).
As we do not wish to claim that Schelling's modeling of the errors is necessarily
better than Bagwell's, we take Bagwell's claim seriously. However, does the theorem that
Bagwell proves justify the claim that he makes? Does the result that the pure equilibrium
outcomes of the noisy sequential move game coincide with the pure equilibrium outcomes
of the simultaneous move game really allow us to conclude that "with even the slightest
degree of imperfection in the observability of the first mover's selection (...) the strategic
benefit of commitment is totally lost" (Bagwell (1992~)? In our opinion such a conclusion
would be premature as it would be based on the assumption that only pure strategy Nash
eyuilibria of a game should be taken into consideration. The restriction to pure equilibria,
however, is not compelling and the game theory literature has offered no justification
for this restriction so far. In fact, the concept of pure strategy Nash equilibrium suffers
from the important and well-known drawback of failing to generate a solution for some
games. (Existence might be considered the most fundamental property that a solution
concept should satisfy.)
In this chapter we take the position that there is no a priori reason to discriminate
against equilibria that are not in pure strategies. Consequently, we have to take mixed
strategy equilibria into account and this raises the question of which outcomes can be
obtained by mixed equilibria of the sequential move game with imperfectly observable
commitment. We show that Bagwell's noisy game has a"noisy Stackelberg equilibrium",
i.e. a mixed equilibrium that generates an outcome that is close to the Stackelberg
outcome and that converges to it as the noise vanishes. Furthermore, we show that there
may be other equilibria as well. Hence, Bagwell's game raises the issue of equilibrium
selection: If the leader's commitment can only be imperfectly observed, will players
coordinate on a pure equilibrium of the simultaneous move game (and, if they do, on
which one?) or will they coordinate on the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium? We address
this issue in Section 8.4. We argue that, starting from an original situation in which there
is uncertainty about which strategies will be played, players will reason themselves to the
noisy Stackelberg equilibrium. The argument in this section is motivated by elements
from the equilibrium selection theories of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and from Harsanyi
(1993), but the theory that we develop is different from each of these. As we show
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in Section 8.5, neither the theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), nor the theory from
Harsanyi (1993) selects the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium in general. The comparison
of these various theories gives interesting insights in each of them. Hence, although
the main message of this chapter is that there is no immediate need to reconsider the
literature that applies the idea of a"first-mover advantage"; the chapter may also be
read as an exercise in equilibrium selection.
8.2 The noisy commitment game
Notation in this chapter will sometimes differ from that introduced in Section 1.3. This
is done to avoid needlessly complicated formulas. For further convenience, this chapter
is self-contained.
Let g be a(finite) 2-person game in strategic form. Since below we will mainly be
interested in what happens when the players move sequentially rather than simulta,ne-
ously, we label the players as L(for leader) and F(for follower). Z(resp. ,7) denotes
the set of pure strategies of player L (resp. player F) in g and u;~ (resp. v;~) denotes
this player's payoff when the strategy pair (i,j) is played. We write Z-{1,...,I}
and ,7 -{1,...,J}. Throughout this chapter we assume that g satisfies the following
regularity conditionl
if (z,~) ~(k,l), then u;i ~ uk~ and v;i ~ vk~. ( 8.2.1)
This assumption implies that F has a unique best response against each pure strategy
i of L. This best response will be denoted by 6; and we write
u; - u;6,.
VVithout further loss of generalit.y we assume that
(8.2.2)
u, ) ~~x u;. (8.2.3)
1Bagwell (1992) restricts himself to the case where player F has a unique best response to any pure
action i of player L. He writes that the basic results are most easily reported in this case, from which
the reader might be tempted to conclude that his result ('Theorem 8.1 in this chapter) is also valid for
games that do not satisfy this condition. That conclusion, however, is unwarranted as was shown in
Van Damme and Hurkens (1999) (Endnote 1).
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Hence, in the sequential move game in which L moves before F and in which F is
perfectly informed about the pure action that L has chosen, the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium is (l,b) with outcome (l,b~). (We use 6 to denote the strategy of F in this
game that responds to i with b; (i E Z).)
We focus our attention on the noisy version of the sequential move game in which
F is only imperfectly informed about which action has been chosen by L. To that end,
let P be a stochastic matrix defined on the state space Z. Hence, P- (p;k);,kEZ with
p;k ) 0 and ~k p;k - 1 for all i. The interpretation is that F receives the signal "L
played k" with a probability p;k in case L actually plays i. Emphasis will be on the
situation where the noise, i.e. the probability of receiving the "wrong" signal is small
but positive. Writing Po for the identity matrix on Z(i.e. po - 1 for all i) we will
measure the absolute level of the noise by the distance between P and Po and we will
write
~P~ - max{~P;k - P;k~ : i,k E Z}. (8.2.4)
We will restrict ourselves to the case where any signal can result from any action, i.e.
p;k ~ 0 for all i, k E Z. (8.2.5)
Formally then, we consider the extensive forrn game gP given by the following rules:
1. player !, chooses an action i E Z.
2. chance chooses k E Z with probability p;k,
3. player F learns k and chooses j E,7,
4. player L receives the payoff u;~ and F receives v;~.
This game gP is referred to as the noisy commitment game. Note that the messages
(the signals that F receives) are payoff irrelevant. We will denote a(behavioral) strategy
of player G(resp. F) in yP by s(resp. f) and we write v- (s, f) for a strategy
combination. Hence, s is a probability distribution on Z, s E 0(Z), and f is a map that
assigns a probability distribution on ,7 to each element of Z, i.e. f E 0(,7)z. We let
s; denote the probability that L chooses i while fk~ is the probability that F chooses j
in response to the message k. ~1~e write fk - j if f~~ - 1 and use similar conventions
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throughout the text. The outcome of the strategy pair o- (s, f) in gP is the probability
distribution zP - zP(~) that o induces on I x J. Hence, we have that
i
zP(Q)ij - Si ~ i~ikfkj ( 8.2.6)
k-1
Note that zP may involve nontrivial correlation of the players' actions. Player L's
(expected) payoff in gP is written as uP(Q) and F's payoff is denoted by vP(Q), hence
~P(~) - ~(u I zP(~)), vP(~) - ~(v ~ zP(~)) (8-2.7)
A pair a - ( s, f) is a Nash equilibrium of gP if s is a best reply against f and f is
a best reply against s. Note that because of ( 8.2.5) there are no unreached information
sets in the ( extensive form of the) game gP, hence, any Nash equilibrium is a sequential
equilibrium, and in order for f to be a best response against s, it is necessary that fk
is a best response against the posterior beliefs at k induced by s for every message k.
By Bayes' rule, this posterior belief that F associates to i E I after having received the
message k is given by
so that, for all s with sk ~ 0
P,s
t'~ik - ~iksi, ~]~aksai





Hence, if the noise is small and F expects L to choose k with positive probability, then
he will attach high probability to the event that L actually played k when he receives
the message "k". Assumption (8.2.1) thus implies that F will respond to k with bk in
this case. Lemma 8.1 proves a slightly stronger statement.
Lemma 8.1 There exists e` ) 0 such that for all P with 0 G ~P~ G e`, all strategy
combinations r-(s, f) and all i E Z: If s; ) ~P~ and f is a best reply against s in
gP, then fi - bi.
Proof. The regularity assumption ( 8.2.1) implies that there exists ó C 1 such that for
all i E Z: If player F assigns at least probability ó to L playing i in g, then b; is the
unique best response of F in g. Let e" be such that (1 ~~)-1 ~ ó.
Now, let P be such that 0 G ~P~ - e G e' and let s E 0(Z) and i E Z be such that
s; 1,~. Then we obtain from (8.2.8)
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P,a Piis;
~i; ~
? (1 f f)-,
) (1 f ~)-'
- E(1 - Si) f Piisi
- [1 f E(1 - s;)~Pi;s;]-'
If f is a best reply against s, then f is necessarily a best reply against the posterior
beliefs P.; for all i. It, hence, follows from the above inequalities, and the choice of E`,
that f; - b;. o
8.3 Equilibria in the noisy commitment game
For the sake of completeness we start by stating (and proving) Bagwell's main result.
Theorem 8.1 (Bagwell ( 1992)) The set of pure strategy equilibrivm outcomes of g
and gP coincide.
Proof. Assume (i, j) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in g. Then j- b; and if f is
the strategy of F in gP defined by fk - 6;(k E Z), then (i, f) is an equilibrium of gP.
It obviously produces the same outcome as (i, j) does. Assume (i, f) is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium in gP. Since g k'' - 1 for all k, we must have fk - b; for all k. Hence,
i is a best reply against b; in g and (i, bi) is an equilibrium of g with the same outcome
as (z~f)~ O
Theorem 8.1 gives a sufficient condition for an outcome to be an equilibrium outcome
of the game gP. We now give a necessary condition for the case where the noise is small.
Write
~' - {(i,b,) : u; 1 mkxminuk~} (8.3.1)
for the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game in which player L's commitment
is perfectly observed by F. (Note that because of (8.2.1) any Nash outcorne has to be
pure.) We have that the Nash equilibrium outcome correspondence of gP is upper-hemi
continuous at P - p~.
Theorem 8.2 Let z~ 6e an equilibrium outcome of gP. If z- lim~P~-,o zP ezists, there
z E ~~~.
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Proof. The proof follows from regularity assumption (8.2.1) and Lemma 8.L Let ~' be
as in Lemma 8.1 and for P with 0 C ~P~ G e', let (sP, fP) be an equilibrium of gP with
outcome zP. Assume the limit outcome z to exist. If i~ k, sP ~ ~P~ and sk ) ~P~,
then fP - b; artd fk - bk, hence
lim uP(í, fP) - u;, lim uP(k, fP) - uk.
IPI-~o IPI~o
But (8.2.1) implies that u; ~ uk, hence that sPSk - 0 for ~P~ sufficiently smalL The
contradiction shows that, for ~P~ sufficiently small there is at most one i E Z with
sP 1 ~P~. Consequently, we have that z-(i,b;) for this particular value of i. It
is obvious that the inequalities in (8.3.1) must be satisfied. If there would exist k~ i
with u; G min~ uk~, then L would strictly prefer choosing k above choosing i in gP for
sufficiently small ~P~. ~
Theorem 8.2 implies that, when the noise is small, any equilibrium outcome of gP is
almost pure. This in turn implies that, if g has only mixed equilibria, the equilibrium
outcomes of g are disjoint from the limit equilibrium outcomes of the noisy commitment
game when the noise vanishes. This shows that a result similar to Theorem 8.1 cannot
be proved for a"satisfactory" solut,ion concept, i.e. there does not exist a refinement of
the Nash equilibrium concept that generates a nonempty set of solutions for every game
for which the equilibrium outcomes of the simultaneous move game coincide with those
~f rF,o :t,,, ..~ ,.t,,, tl,. ..1,~,. ., ..,, ~~ ........... ....... b:....... .. ..,.. .., ..v.~,.., .u...~ ..u.
It is not true that any Nash equilibrium outcome of the commitment game with
perfect observability can be approximated by Nash equilibrium outcomes of games with
slight noise: the Nash equilibrium correspondenc.e is not lower-hemi cont,imious. In the
game of Figure 8.1, (B, W) is a Nash outcome of the non-noisy game: It is optimal for
L to commit to B if F responds to T with E. However, noise forces F to choose W in
response to any signal since W is a dominant strategy. Consequently, only (T, W) can
be approximated by equilibrium outcomes of noisy games. (More generally, it follows







In this chapter we take the position that there is no a priori reason to discriminate
against equilibria that are not in pure strategies. Consequently, we have to take mixed
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strategy equilibria into account and Theorem 8.2 raises the question of which outcomes
of the base game g can be approximated by equilibrium outcomes of the game gP when
the noise vanishes. Theorem 8.3 gives part of the answer: If the noise P is small, there is
always an equilibrium that produces an outcome that is close to the Stackelberg outcome,
i.e. that is close to the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the sequential move game
without noise. We will refer to such an equilibrium as a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium.
Theorem 8.3 The game gP has an equilibrium oP -(sP, fY) with an outcome zP that
converges to (l,bl) as ~P~ -ti 0.
Proof. Consider the reduced strategic form gP that results from the strategic form of
gP by eliminating all pure strategies of F that do not prescribe to play bl after the
signal "1". In this reduced game, player L's expected payoff resulting from playing "1"
is approximately ul if the noise is small, no matter what F plays. Let ar -(sP, f P)
be an equilibrium of gP. If sP ~ ~P~ for some i~ 1, then Lemma 8.1 guarantees that
f;P - b; provided that ~P~ G e'. However, in this case L's payoff resulting from "i" is
approximately u;, hence, up(i, fP) G uP(1, fP), so that player L wants to choose i with
probability zero. The contradiction shows that, if ~P~ is sufficiently small
sPG ~P~ foralli~l. (8.3.2)
The inequalities (8.3.2) in turn imply that sP -ti 1 as ~P~ -~ 0, hence, (by Lemma 8.1)
that at the signal "1" only bl is a best response of player F. This shows that aP is an
equilibrium of gP if ~P~ is smalL Obviously, the outcome zP of aP converges to (1, bl ) as
~P~ -~ 0. o
We have seen two sufLicient conditions for limit equilibrium outcomes (Theorems 8.1
arld 8.3) and one necessary condition (Theorem 8.2). The necessary condition is not
sufficient (Figure 8.1) and the sufilcient conditions are not necessary: Also outcomes
that are not pure Nash equilibria, nor Stackelberg equilibria of g may be approximated.
Consider the game of Figure 8.2 in which L has M as a dominant strategy, so that (M, C)
is the unique Nash equilibrium. The Stackelberg equilibrium is (T, W'). Consider the
noisy commitment game with uniform noise, i.e. p;~ - e if i~ j and p;; - 1- 2e. It
is easily seen that the following strategy combination is an equilibrium of this game:
Player L commits to M with probability r}E and to B with the remaining probability
'-2`- player F responds to signals T and B with E, after signal M he plays C withlte '
probability 4~lE and E with probability 4-1~É. The corresponding limit outcome is
(B, E).













We will not attempt to describe exactly which outcomes can be obtained as limits of
equilibrium outcomes of the noisy game as the noise tends to zero. Rather we conclude
from the Theorems 8.1 and 8.3 that typically there exist multiple limits and, hence,
that there exists an equilibrium selection problem. We will attempt to address this
selection problem directly and we will propose an argument (an equilibrium selection
theory) that actually selects a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium. Our theory incorporates
elements from the theory proposed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) as well as elements
from the theory proposed in Harsanyi (1993), however, it differs from these and it may
select different outcomes. In particular, neither the theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988)
nor that of Harsanyi (1993) need to select a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium. The next
section describes our theory and proves the main result of this chapter, while Section 8.5
discusses the theories of Harsanyi~Selten and Harsanyi.
R.4 Fntiilihriiim cPlPrtinn
The strategy 6 of player F that prescribes to play the best response bk against action
k E Z for any signal k is a(weakly) dominant strategy in the (strategic form of) the
game where L's commitment is observed perfectly. If there is a slight amount of noise
(i.e. P~ Po), then b is no longer dominant, however, as long as the noise is small, it is
quite likely that b is a best response. Specifically, as Lemma 8.1 has shown, if ~P~ C e'
and sk ) ~P~ for all k, then b is the unique best response against s in gP. To put
it differently, b is a best response to a set of mixed strategies of player L in gP that
converges to the set of all strategies as ~P~ -~ 0. On the basis of these considerations it
would seem that L should assign a large (prior) probability to F playing b and, hence, he
will be tempted to play his Stackelberg leader strategy "1". However, if P~ Po and bl
is not a dominant strategy in g, then (1, b) is not an equilibrium of gP, so that a theory
that tells player L to play "1" and that tells F to play b is self-destroying. The simple
point we make in this section is that, if the players' reasoning process corresponds to
the tracing procedure (Harsanyi (1975), Harsanyi and Selten (1988)), then players will
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finally coordinate on a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium if they start from a prior that
assigns sufficient weight to F playing 6.
The tracing procedure is a process that gradually adjusts players' plans and expecta-
tions until they are in equilibrium. We only describe the mechanics of this procedure, for
the motivation and heuristic description of the process we refer to the original sources.
Let vo -( so, fo) be a mixed strategy combination2 in gP. We interpret vo as the players'
prior expectations, hence, a priori player F believes that L will play i with probability
so while L believes that F will play the pure strategy f with probability f o( f). For
t E [0, 1] consider the strategic form gP~`~oo defined by
u~'`'o~(i,f) - tuP(i,f) f (1 - t)uP(i,fo) (8.4.1)
vP'`'oo(z, f) - tvP(z, f) f( 1 - t)vP(so,Ï) (8.4.2)
Hence, for t- 1 this game coincides with gP, while for t - 0 we have a trivial game
in which each player's payoff depends only on his prior expectations. Write I'P(vo) for
the graph of the equilibrium correspondence, i.e.
I'P(ao) -{(t;s, f)~t E [0,1],(s, f) is equilibrium of gP'`'oo} (8.4.3)
It can be shown that in nondegenerate cases this graph FP(ao) contains a unique
distinguished curve that connects the unique equilibrium of gP~o~oo to an equilibrium
(sl, fl) of gP. (See Schanuel et al. (1991) for details.) The (linear) tracing procedure
consists of following this curve until its endpoint, and the endpoint TP(Qo) -(sl, fl) is
called the linear trace of ao in gP. The interpretation is that players eventually reason
themselves to the equilibrium TP(oo) if they start from the prior oo. Write zP(oo) for
the outcome of this linear trace TP(oo) in gP. We have that this outcome is close to the
Stackelberg outcome (1,61) of g if ~P~ is small. Formally
Lemma 8.2 If the prior vo - (so, fo) is such that fo(b) is su,fJ~iciently close to one, then
lim~P~-.ozP(aa) - ( l,bi).
Proof. Let fo(b) be large enough such that
uPo(i, fa) G uPo(1, fo), (8.4.4)
i.e. if player L's commitment is perfectly observed by F, then L strictly prefers to play
"1" when F responds with fo. Note that the regularity condition ( 8.2.1) implies that
ZWe could equivalently work with behavioral strategies, cf. also (8.5.9).
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(8.4.4) holds whenever fo(b) is sufficiently close to 1. Condition (8.4.4) in turn implies
that there exist e) 0 and t' ) 0 such that
"1" is strictly dominant for L in gP~`~oo if t C t' and ~P~ G e (8.4.5)
Furthermore, by choosing e sufl'iciently small we can guarantee that for all i~ 1:
if ~P~ G e, then uP(i, f) C uP(1, f) for all f with f; - b~ and fi - bi (8.4.6)
We will rest.rict ourselves to stochastic matrices P with
~P~ C t`~(2I). (8.4.7)
Finally, with e` as in Lemma 8.1, we assume that
~P~ c e'. ( 8.4.8)
Let P be such that (8.4.5) -(8.4.8) hold and denote by Q~~t - (sP~~, f P~i) an equilibrium
on the distinguished curve in I'P(vo) that connects the unique equilibrium of gP~o~oo with
TP(QO). We claim that
sP't C 1~(2I) for all i~ 1 and all t. (8.4.9)
Assume, to the contrary, that there exist some i~ 1 and t such that sP'` ~ 1~(2I)
and let r be the smallest t for which an equilibrium of this type can be found. Then
r) t` in view of (8.4.5). Hence, at t- r, the total probability that F assigns to G
playing i in gp~`~~o is at least t'~(2I), so that (8.4.7), (8.4.8) and Lemma 8.1 guarantee
that f,P'T - b;. At the same time we have that
sP,T - 1-~ sP.r ] 1- 1~(2I) - 1~2 ] ~P~
~~i
so that fP'' - bl by the same argument. But now ( 8.4.5) and (8.4.6) imply that
uP'T'~~(2 fP'r) C uP'r'o~(1 fP'T)~ ~ o
hence, sP'T - 0. The contradiction shows that ( 8.4.9) holds. In particular, we have that
sP'' ~ 1~2, hence fP'i - bi in view of Lemma 8.1. Applying Lemma 8.1 and (8.4.6) once
more we see that, therefore, sP'i C ~P~ for all i~ 1, hence, that
lim sP'1 - 1.
~P~~o
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This completes the proof. ~
To complete our argument that players will (or should) coordinate on a noisy Stack-
elberg equilibrium, we have to give an argument why player L should attach a high prior
probability to F playing 6. We will borrow such an idea from Harsanyi (1993). Harsanyi
proposes that the prior should be based on (should be proportional to) the structural
incentive that a player has to use this strategy and he suggests to measure this structural
incentive by the size of the stability set.
Formally, Harsanyi proceeds as follows. Let g- (A1i A2, ul, u2) be a 2-person game
and let S; - ~(A;) be player i's set of mixed strategies. The stability set of s; E S; is the
set St~(s;) of all mixed strategies of player j against which s; is a best response. At first it
seems natural to measure the structural incentives of a pure strategy a; by the Lebesgue
measure of St~(a;), but Harsanyi (1993) shows that this definition would violate certain
desirable properties. To circumvent these, Harsanyi first transforms the strategy simplex
S~ by the so-called inversion mapping w~ and he then takes the Lebesgue measure of the
transformed set. Formally, c~~ is the mapping from the interior of S~ to the interior of
S~ that maps s~ into s~ defined by
si(a~) - s~ i(ai)~ ~ si 1(a)' (8.4.10)
aEA~
Hence, Harsanyi measures the structural incentives of player i to use the pure strategy
a; E A; by number p(a;) -~(w~(St~(a;))) where ~ denotes Lebesgue measure. The prior
probability that player j then assigns to i playing a; is proportional to these incentives,
hence,
P~(at) - P(at)~ ~ P(a). (8.4.11)
aEA,
In the special case of our noisy commitment game, we have that the stability set of
the strategy b of player F converges to the entire strategy simplex of player L as ~P~ -~ 0
and, hence, that the stability set of any other pure strategy converges to a set of ineasure
zero. It follows that the prior of player L, as constructed by using (8.4.10) and (8.4.11)
puts almost all weight on the strategy b of player F when ~P~ is small. Hence, from
Lemma 8.2 we can conclude that players will end up in the Stackelberg equilibrium in
the limit. Formally, we have proved
Theorem 8.4 If players construct their prior beliefs by using Harsanyi's (1993) theory
of structural incentives and if they update their priors by using the tracing procedure of
Harsanyi (1975~ to obtain an equílibrium, then, in the limit when the noise vanishes,
they will play the Stackelberg equilibrium.
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8.5 Alternative methods of equilibrium selection
8.5.1 Evolutionary and eductive theories
In this section we show that the theories proposed in Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and in
Harsanyi (1993) do not necessarily select a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium as the solution
of the game with imperfectly observable commitment. The basic reason is that these
theories do not consider all equilibria of a game to be eligible as solution candidates.
Both theories start by eliminating certain Nash equilibria as candidates. Specifically,
equilibria that are considered to have poor stability properties are eliminated. Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) first eliminate all equilibria that do not belong to a primitive formation.
A formation is a set of strategy pairs that is closed with respect to taking best responses
and a formation is said to be primitive if it does not properly contain any other formation.
Harsanyi (1993) only considers equilibria that are both proper (Myerson (1978)) and
persistent (Kalai and Samet (1984)) as eligible. For generic 2-person games every Nash
equilibrium is proper and an equilibrium is persistent if and only if it belongs to a
primitive formation.3 Hence, for generic 2-person games, both theories start from the
same set of initial candidates.
W E
3.3 0,2
U I~},V I 1,1 I
Figure 8.3.
The game displayed in Figure 8.3 may show that the restriction to primitive (persis-
tent) equilibria may eliminate any noisy Stackelberg equilibrium. The game gP has three
equilibria: one corresponds to Theorem 8.1 (with outcome (1,1)), another corresponds
to Theorem 8.3 (with outcome close to (3,3)), and there is a third mixed strategy equi-
librium. Action B (i.e. the dominant strategy of L in g) is used with positive probability
in all three equilibria and the unique best response of player F against B in gP is to
always respond with E. Consequently, {(B,EE)} is the unique primitive formation in
gP, hence (B, EE) is the unique persistent equilibrium of this game. Therefore, the the-
ories of Harsanyi~Selten and Harsanyi select the pure equilibrium of g as the solution of
3For a proof of the first statement, see Van Damme (1987, Theorem 2.6.2). The second statement
follows from the observation that in generic games, a pure strategy that is a best response is a unique
best response against an open set of strategies in the neighborhood. See Chapter 2 for further details
about the proof.
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gP. These theories confirm Bagwell's claim that slight noise eliminates the commitment
power.
The argument used in the above example can be generalized. If one accepts persis-
tency as a selection criterion, one is led to the conclusion that in any game in which the
leader has a dominant strategy, slight noise eliminates the benefits of the leader being
able to commit himself:
Theorem 8.5 If player L has a dominant strategy in g, then gP has a unique primitive
formation (resp. persistent retract~, viz. the singleton set in which G plays this dominant
strategy i and in which F responds with b; to any signal k.
Proof. Let R- R~ x RF be a persistent retract (resp. primitive formation) and let j
be a pure strategy of player L in RL. Then F has a unique best response against j in
gP, viz. the strategy f with fk - b~ for all k. Hence, f E RF. The unique best response
of L against f is to play his dominant strategy i from g, hence i E RL. Let fk - b; for
all k. Then the strict equilibrium (i, f) belongs to R. Consequently, if R is primitive
(persistent), then R - {(i, f)}. O
The basic reason why Harsanyi and Selten eliminate equilibria that are not primitive
is that such equilibria may have very poor stability properties (cf. Harsanyi and Selten
(1988, p. 201) and Harsanyi (1993, footnote 12)). Requiring persistency favors the
selection of equilibria that have similar stability properties as strict equilibria, hence,
the solution theories of Harsanyi and Selten are biased in favor of the selection of pure
equilibria. However, one may very well wonder whether such a bias is justified: The
stability property captured by persistency may be relevant in an evolutionary context
- where the game is repeatedly played by a large population of players who receive
feedback about evolution of the play during the game (see, for example, Chapter 3)
but it is not clear that it has any relevance in the case where the game is played only once
and players rely exclusively on deductive personal reflection in order to figure out what
to play. At the same time, the theories of Harsanyi~Selten and Harsanyi rely strongly on
arguments (such as the tracing procedure) that seem to be particularly relevant in this
latter case and that seem irrelevant in the former. Hence, these theories may be criticized
for t.he fact that they mix arguments that are relevant in an evolutionary context with
arguments that are relevant in an eductive context. In the following subsections we
return to the purely deductive perspective.
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8.5.2 Harsanyi's (1993) theory
In this subsection we show that, even in the case where the Stackelberg equilíbrium is
a strict equilibrium of gP and, hence, satisfies all of Harsanyi's (1993) eligibility crite-
ria, Harsanyi's theory need not select this Stackelberg equilibrium. The reason is that
Harsanyi's theory does not invoke the tracing procedure. Rather, Harsanyi proposes to
select as the solution of the game that equilibrium that has the highest prior probability.
With the prior probability of a pure strategy as in (4.11), the prior probability of a pure
strategy pair a is simply given by
P(d) - PF(aL)PL(aF)
LY' W
and in the case where only pure equilibria are eligible, Harsanyi selects that equilibrium
a" for which p(a`) is largest. (At least this is the solution in case the argmax is unique.)
The game from Figure 8.4 (in which Ií is some real positive number) may show that














The game g from the left panel of Figure 8.4 is a unanimity game with Stackelberg
outcome (2,1). The panel on the right displays (a reduced form of) the game gP where P
involves uniform noise (P;~ - e if i~ j). We have eliminated the strategy EW for player
F in gP (i.e. the strategy in which F responds to T by E and to B by W) since this
is a dominated strategy. Harsanyi indeed suggests to eliminate all dominated strategies
before computing the players' structural incentives. The game gP has three equilibria
(T,WW), (B,EE) and a mixed equilibrium with outcome close to (B,E). Only the
former two satisfy Harsanyi's eligibility criteria, hence, to compute the Harsanyi solution
of the game, we have to compare the prior probabilities of these equilibria. Note that
although player L's prior assigns almost all weight to the strategy W F, of player F, this
prior probability plays no role in this comparison.
Note that the structural incentives for player L to use any of his pure strategies
are independent of Ií : These incentives only depend on player L's own payoff matrix.
Furthermore, note that both the prior of T and the prior ofB remain bounded away from
zero as e tends to zero. Turning now to the structural incentives of player F, we note
2(1 - e),1 - e
1-E,Íí(1-E)
0,0
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that the calculations are simple since, in the 1-dimensional case, the inversion mapping
is measure preserving. Hence, the prior probability of a strategy is just the Lebesgue
measure of the stability set of that strategy. Straightforward computations show that
P`~(WW) - e~(K - xe f e) (8.5.2)
and
p`L(EE) - Iíe~(Ke ~- 1- e), (8.5.3)
hence
liió p~~(EE)~p;(WW) - fí~. (8.5.4)
It follows that, if Ií is sufficiently large
lim p`(T, i~t-'6~V) c lim p`(B, EE) (8.5.5)
ej0 e10
and, hence, that Harsanyi's theory selects the equilibrium (B, F.F.) in that case. For
large values of lti , Harsanyi's theory does not select the Stackelberg equilibrium.
8.5.3 Risk dominance and the Harsanyi~Selten theory
An essential ingredient in the equilibrium selection theory from Harsanyi and Selten
(1988) is the notion of risk dominance. An equilibrium s is said to risk dominate an
equilibrium s' if the tracing procedure, when started at a certain (bicentric) prior p(s, s')
ends up at the equilibrium s. (Below we describe how this bicentric prior has to be
computed.) Starting from an initial candidate set, Harsanyi and Selten repeatedly elim-
inate equilibria that are either payoff dominated or risk dominated until finally only one
candidate - the solut.ion - remains. We have already seen that the Stackelberg equi-
librium need not belong to the initial candidate set, hence, the llarsanyi~Selten theory
need not select it. However, in Section 8.5.1 we argued that this elimination step is not
convincing. Hence, the question remains whether the Stackelberg equilibrium can be
eliminated by considerations of payoff dominance or risk dominance.
Theorem 8.2 implies that the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium cannot be payoff domi-
nated when the noise is small. Any Nash equilibrium outcome of the noisy game con-
verges to a Nash outcome of the game in which the commitment is observed perfectly
and among the latter the Stackelberg equilibrium is most preferred by player L. Conse-
quently, it remains to address the question of whether the Stackelberg eyuilibrium can
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be risk dominated. VVe have not been able to resolve the issue in its complete gener-
ality, however, for two important subclasses of games - 2 x 2 games and unanimity
games - we can show that the ( noisy) Stackelberg equilibrium risk dominates any other
equilibrium of gP when the noise P is small.
To formally define the risk dominance relation we have to describe how the bicentric
prior p(s, s') should be computed at which to start the tracing procedure. Harsanyi
and Selten have the situation in mind where it is common knowledge among t,he players
that either s or s' is the solution of the game. Each player i will initially assume that
his opponent j already knows which of the two is the solution. Player i will assign a
subjective probability z; to the solution being s ( and, hence, to j playing s~) and he
will assign the complementary probability z; - 1- z; to j playing s~. After having
constructed these beliefs, i will play a best response b;(z;) against z;s~ f z;s~. Player j
does not know i's beliefs z; and, according to the principle of insufficient reason, j will
assume that z; is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Hence, j will expect i to
play the strategy
Pi(s, s') - ~~ b;(z,)dz;. (8.5.6)
The mixed strategy of player i defined by ( 8.5.6) describes player j's a priori beliefs
which are used to determine the risk dominance relation between s and s'.
Before being able to state the main result of this section, one more definition is needed.
We sav that q-(Z..7, u, vl is a unanimit.v ea.mP if (a.l T -.7 (hl ~r,: - ,~.. - fl fnr ~11
i~ j, and (c) u;; 1 0 and v;; ~ 0 for all i. We simplify notation by writing u; - u;; and
v; - v;; and recall from ( 8.2.3) that ul ] u; for i~ 1. We also write "i" for the strategy
of player F in gP that prescribes to respond to any signal k E Z by playing i E Z.
Theorem 8.6 Let g be a unanimity game. Then the Stackelberg equilibrium (1,1~ risk
dominates any other equilibrium of gP when the noise P is small.
Proof. We first show that ( 1,1) risk dominates any other pure Nash equilibrium of gP
when ~P~ is small. It suffiices to show that ( 1,1) risk dominates (2,2). We first compute
the bicentric prior that is used in the risk dorninance comparison. Let us first compute
the prior pF of player F. If F plays z.l -F (1 - z).2 then the best response of L is
bL(z) - r 1 if z~ uz~(ui f uz)
Sl (8.5.7)
2 if z C uz~(u1 ~- uz)
hence, the prior of F is given by
P J ul~(ul f uz) if i- 1
( )pF(z) - l` 8.5.8
uz~(ul } uz) if i- 2
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Next we compute the prior of player L. If L plays z-1 f(1 - z) . 2, then the best response
of F depends on the message that F receives and on the size of the noise. However,
since the posterior of F puts positive weight only on the actions 1 and `2 of player L,
F will respond with either 1 or 2 at each possible message. Furthermore, if the noise is
small, then F will respond to the message i- 1(resp. i- 2) with the action 1(resp. 2)
for most values of z. Hence,without doing any computations, we may state that player
L's prior pL corresponds to a behavioral strategy f o of player F that is of the following
forrn:
.~1 if i-1 andk-l
o .~: 1 if i-2 andk-2fik -
0 if i~{1,2} and k~{1,2}
(8.5.9)
( f k is the probability that F responds to signal i with action k.) Now, let the prior
ao -(pF,pi) -(pF,fo) be as in (8.5.8), (8.5.9) and let the game gP~`~oo bc as in (8.4.1),
(8.4.2). If t is sufficiently small, then the unique equilibrium (sP~`, fP~`) of this game is
the best reply against the prior, hence
1 if i-1 andk-l
P,t -f;k 1 if i-2 andk-2
0 if i~{1,2} and k~{1,2}
and, provided that ~P~ is sufficiently small,
(8.5.10)
sP'`(i) - 1 if i - 1. (8.5.11)
Hence, in particular, player L chooses the Stackelberg strategy with probability 1 for
small t. We claim that, if we move along the distinguished curve in I'P(vo) by increasing
t, then player F has to switch his strategy before player L does. The argument is simply
that, if F does not switch from a strategy as in (8.5.10), then L is facing a convex
combination of strategies of type (8.5.9) and (8.5.10), hence, this is just a strategy of
type (8.5.9), against which the strategy from (8.5.11) is the unique best response. Hence,
as t increases, player F's posterior beliefs put more and more weight on L playing "1"
and gradually F switches to respond with "1" at more and more messages. Such changes
in behavior of F however, do not necessitate a change in behavior of L: The strategy
from (8.5.11) remains a best response. Consequently, if no equilibrium is reached yet,
F will have to change again. Eventually (when t gets close to 1), F's posterior after
the message "2" will put so much weight on L playing "1" that F will respond to that
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message by playing "1" as well. At that point in time we have obtained the equilibrium
(l,l) from gP and no further adjustments are necessary. Hence, starting at the prior
(8.5.8) -(8.5.9), the tracing procedure converges to (1, 1), so that ( 1,1) risk dominates
(2,2). Hence, the Stackelberg equilibrium risk dominates any pure equilibrium of gP.
Next, let s' be a mixed strategy equilibríum of gP. Theorem 8.2 implies that, if the
noise is small, there exists an action i E Z such that player L plays i with a probability
very close to one. If i - 1, then ( 1,1) is the unique equilibrium of gP~`~oo for all t. If
i~ 1, then the proof follows exactly the same line as above: Player L plays "1" for each
value of t and player F switches several times until he finally responds to all messages
by playing "1". p
Our final result is
Theorem 8.7 If g is 2 x 2 game and ~P~ is small, then gP has one equilibrium that risk
dominates all other equilibria and the outcome generated by this risk dominant equilib-
rium converges to the .Stackelberg outcome (l,bl) as ~P~ -~ 0.
Proof. The result follows from Theorem 8.3 in case player F has a dominant strategy
in g (gP has only one equilibrium in this case). Hence, assume that F does not have
a dominant strategy. Without. loss of generality assume bl - 1 and b2 - 2. In case g
does not have any pure equilibria, the result again follows from Theorem 8.3 since gP
has a unique equilibrium in this case. (The unique best response of F against strategy
i of player L is to respond with i to any message, but then L's best response is to play
j~ i.) There are three cases left to consider:
(i) (1,1) is the unique pure equilibrium of g.
(ii) (2,2) is the unique pure equilibrium of g.
(iii) both (1,1) and (2,2) are pure equilibria in g.
The first case is easy: It can be resolved by iterative elimination of strictly dominated
strategies. (It should be obvious from the description of risk dominance on the preceding
pages that strategies that are iteratively strictly dominated cannot influence the risk
dominance relationship.) The strategy "21" of player F(play k~ i in response to i for
i- 1, 2) is strictly dominated and once this strategy has been eliminated, the strategy
1 becomes strictly dominant for player L. (Note that action 1 is dominant for L in g
in case (i).) The third case is very much like the case considered in Theorem 8.6 and
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the proof proceeds along the same lines. We leave the details to the reader. In case (ii),
gP has three equilibria, viz. a mixed equilibrium with outcome close to (1,1), a mixed
equilibrium with outcome close to (2,2), and the pure equilibrium (2, 2). We have to
show that the first equilibrium risk dominates the latter two. The proof follows from
Lemma 8.2. Namely, consider the bicentric prior pL of player L in game gP relevant
for the comparison between the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium and the pure equilibrium
(2, 2). The reader easily verifies that
~Pi~map~(b) - 1, (8.5.12)
since the strategy b of player F(with b~ - i all i) is a best response to the noisy
Stackelberg equilibrium and is "almost" a best response to the pure equilibrium. Hence,
it follows from Lemma 8.2 that the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium risk dominates the pure
Nash equilibrium. To show that this equilibrium also risk dominates the third mixed
equilibrium, we note that the strategy b of player F is the unique best response against
a strict convex combination of the two mixed equilibrium strategies of player L in gP.
Hence, in this case the prior satisfies pL(12) - 1 and the conclusion again follows from
Lemma 8.2. ~
Although we conjecture that the result from the Theorems 8.6 and 8.7 can be gen-
eralized to other classes of games, we have to admit that we have not been able to find
a general proof. (We do not have a counterexample either.) However, we note that
applying the tracing procedure can be rather complex, so that a multilateral procedure
as that in Section 8.4 - in which the tracing procedure is applied only once - might be
preferable to a theory in which one is forced to make a rather large number of bilateral
comparisons. Furthermore, in order to apply the Harsanyi~Selten theory one has to
first compute all (primitive) equilibria of the game. We were able to prove Theorem 8.4
a-ithout knowing this set of all equilibria.
8.6 Conclusion
From the fact that any pure Nash equilibrium of a 2-person simultaneous move game
is also a pure Nash equilibrium outcome of the sequential move game in which the
follower can only observe imperfectly the action to which the leader committed himself
(Theorem 8.1 in this chapter), Kyle Bagwell concluded in his 1992 paper that slight noise
eliminates any first mover advantages. In the concluding section of his paper, Bagwell
writes
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"For applied theorists, the key message of the paper is that the many pre-
dictions derived from models with commitment may require reconsideration.
Apparently these predictions are valid only for settings in which the com-
mitted action is in fact perfectly observed by subsequent players. This re-
quirement is quite stringent, and it would seem to be violated in a number
of real-world settings to which popular commitment models are thought to
apply" (Bagwell (1992, p. 9), emphasis in original).
While we agree with the observation that the assumption of perfect observability is
stringent, we disagree with the statement that this assumption is cruciaL In fact, we
would claim that this chapter shows that the assumption is inessential. Not only have
we shown that the noisy game analyzed by Bagwell has always an equilibrium outcome
that is close to the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game in which the commitment
can be observed perfectly (Theorem 8.3), we have also given several arguments for why
players should coordinate on this particular equilibrium (Theorems 8.4, 8.6 and 8.7). In
addition, we have remarked that the structure of the noise as assumed by Bagwell is
somewhat peculiar and that other specifications, which are, perhaps, more natural and
which are closer to Schelling's original ideas (Schelling (1960, p. 149)) also allow the
conclusion that the assumption of perfect observability is inessential. Hence, we do not
see any need to reconsider the fundamental game theoretic insight that the power to
ir i i r
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Carrzes, Rules, and Solutions (Spelen, Regels en Oplossingen) is een proefschrift over
niet-codperatieve speltheorie. Het heeft tot doel de consequenties te onderzoeken van
het formeel opnemen van bepaalde strategische zett,en (zoals "commitments" en com-
nnmicatie) in de regels van het spel. Het onderzoekt tevens de werking van enkele
oplossingsconcepten die recentelijk geïntroduceerd werden.
Hoofdstuk 1 is inleidend.
Hoofdstuk 2 begint met een korte discussie van oplossingsconcepten die als oplossing
van een spel een (of ineerdere) verzamelingen van strategieën voorschrijven. Verschillende
van dergelijke oplossingsconcepten worden gedefinieerd. De nadruk zal liggen op verza-
melingen van strategieën die gesloten zijn onder de toevoeging van (een soort) beste
antwoorden. In het bijzonder zullen we curbl, curb~`, robuuste en persistente verza-
melingen definiëren, en ook zogenaamde primitieve, prirnitieve~`, robuuste en persistente
formaties. We le~iden enkele eigenschappen van deze concepten af waarvan we in latere
hoofdstukken gebruik zullen maken. We geven verscheidene voorbeelden waaruit het
subtiele onderscheid tussen de genoemde concepten zal blijken. Dit hoofdstuk wordt
besloten met een discussie van twee andere "verzamelings-oplossingsconcepten".
Het is belangrijk te weten of een oplossingsconcept relevant is in een eductieve of een
evolutionaire context. Hoofdstuk 3 toont aan dat curb en persistente verzamelingen rele-
vant zijn in een evolutionaire context. Er wordt een dynamisch leerproces gepresenteerd
dat alsvolgt getypeerd kan worden: Spelers hebben een beperkt geheugen en spelen beste
antwoorden tegen verwachtingen die gevormd zijn op basis van de strategieën die recen-
t,elijk gebruikt wercíen. We laten zien dat de spelers uiteindelijk strategieën zullen spelen
uit een minimale curb verzameling. Dit resultaat blijft, ook als sommige spelers geen
beste antwoorden spelen maar andere spelers nabootsen. Wanneer de spelers enigszins
onzeker zijn over de strategieën die door de andere spelers gebruikt worden, convergeert
het proces niet naar een curb verzameling, maar naar een curb', robuuste of persistente
1 De term curó is de atkorting van de Engelse vertaling van `gesloten onder rationeef gedrag'.
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verzameling, afhankelijk van hoe de onzekerheid gemodelleerd wordt.
In Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 wordt onderzocht wat de consequenties zijn als we toelaten
dat sommige spelers wat geld mogen verbranden voordat een spel gespeeld wordt. Op
het eerste gezicht lijkt deze mogelijkheid tot het verbranden van geld irrelevant. Het lijkt
onwaarschijnlijk dat iemand gebruik zal maken van de gelegenheid, en, dientengevolge,
zal de uitkomst van het spel waarschijnlijk niet beïnvloed worden. Het blijkt echter
dat de mogelijkheid van het verbranden van geld wiskundig gezien equivalent is met
het toelaten van kostbare communicatie, en dat het wel degelijk de uitkomst van het
spel kan beïnvloeden. In Hoofdstuk 4 bekijken we een spel met een willekeurig aantal
spelers onder wie sommigen de mogelijkheid hebben om eerst wat geld te verbranden.
We laten zien dat de spelers die geld kunnen verbranden hun geprefereerde uitkomst
krijgen in alle strategieën in de minimale curb (of curb~`) verzameling, zonder dat ze echt
geld hoeven t.e verbranden. Dit resultaat geldt ook voor de persistente verzamelingen,
maar alleen in het geval van een spel met twee spelers. In Hoofdstuk 5 bestuderen we
de mogelijkheid tot het verbranden van geld in een spel met asymmetrische informatie.
Er zijn twee spelers, een Zender en een Ontvanger. De Zender heeft privé informatie
over zijn type terwijl de Ontvanger een actie moet kiezen. De opbrengst voor de spelers
hangt zowel af van het type van de Zender als van de actie gekozen door de Ontvanger.
Voordat de Ontvanger een actie kiest, zendt de Zender een kostbare boodschap naar
de Ontvanger. We laten zien dat elk type Zender zijn geprefereerde actie krijgt in elke
~~~a~egieëucumuina~ie ui~ een minimaie curb (oT curb` oI persistente) verzamehng.
Het is al langer bekend dat de volgorde waarin spelers hun beslissingen nemen erg
belangrijk is. In de meeste modellen is deze volgorde vastgelegd door de regels van het
spel. Soms is het voordelig om als eerste een zet te kunnen doen. In dat geval zal iedere
speler zich willen verplichten om een bepaalde actie te kiezen zodat de andere spelers
zich voor een gedongen feit geplaatst zien en zich wel aan moeten passen.
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt welke evenwichten van een bi-matrix spel overblijven wan-
neer beide spelers de gelegenheid gegeven wordt om zich te binden aan een bepaalde
actie. We bestuderen daarvoor een model met een endogene tijdsbeslissingsstructuur.
In dit model moeten de spelers de afweging maken tussen enerzijds, zich binden aan
een actie (en daarmee de ander dwingen om een best antwoord te spelen) en anderzijds,
afwachten en daardoor in de gelegenheid zijn om optimaal te reageren indien de ander
zich gebonden heeft. We laten zien dat een gemengd evenwicht van het oorspronkelijke
spel alleen dan overblijft in het spel met een endogene tijdsbeslissingsstructuur als het
"commitment robust" is, dat wil zeggen, als niemand een prikkel heeft om de eerste zet
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te doen. We laten echter ook zien dat elk puur evenwicht van het oorspronkelijke spel
een perfecte evenwichtsuitkomst is van het uitgebreide spel. Als we echter alleen curb~` of
persistente evenwichten accepteren als de oplossing van het uitgebreide spel, dan kunnen
we concluderen dat alleen de evenwichten die "commitment robust" zijn overblijven.
Hoofdstuk 7 analyseert enkele economische spelen met een uniek evenwicht dat niet
"commitment robust" is. Het spel waarin de tijdsbeslissingsstructuur endogeen bepaald
wordt, heeft nu drie pure deelspel-perfecte evenwichten: Er wordt ofwel een Stackelberg
evenwicht gespeeld, waarin één speler zich bindt en de ander afwacht (twee mogelijkhe-
den), of er wordt een evenwicht gespeeld waarin beide spelers zich binden zich aan het
evenwicht van het oorspronkelijke spel. Om een unieke selectie te maken tussen deze
drie evenwichten passen we delen van de evenwichtsselectietheorie van Harsanyi en 5el-
ten (1988) toe. We laten zien dat de beide Stackelberg evenwichten het derde evenwicht
risico-domineren. Om tot een definitieve selectie uit de twee Stackelberg evenwichten te
komen, beperken we ons tot. dric economisch interessante spelen. lleze zijn (1) Cournot.
cornpetitie (in hoeveelheden), (2) Bertrand competitie (in prijzen) en (3) individuele bij-
dragert aan een publiek goed. We nemen aan dat de spelers verschillende kosten hebben.
In elk van de drie spelen onder beschouwing laten we zien dat het Stackelberg evenwicht,
waarin de speler met de laagste kosten zich bindt, risico dominant is.
In Hoofdstukken 6 en 7 namen we aan dat een speler zich kan binden tot een actie,
en dat de andere speler perfect geïnformeerd wordt over die actie. In Hoofdstuk 8
analyseren we de situatie waarin slechts één speler (de leider) zich kan binden. Maar
de actie van de leider wordt niet perfect geobserveerd door de andere speler (de volger).
Vlet een kleine kans observeert de volger een andere actie. Bagwell (1992) claimde
namelijk dat het voordeel van het zich kunnen binden, helemaal verdwijnt als er ook
rnaar de geringste imperfectie bestaat in de observatie van de volger. In dit hoofdstuk
laten we zien dat deze claim cruciaal afhangt van het feit dat Bagwell zich beperkt tot
pure evenwichten. Namelijk, het spel dat geanalyseerd werd door Bagwell heeft altijd
een evenwicht in gemengde strategieën waarvan de uitkomst dicht in de buurt ligt van
de uitkomst van het Stackelberg evenwicht van het spel waarin de actie van de leider
perfect wordt geobserveerd door de volger. We introduceren een nieuwe theorie van
evenwichtsselectie. Deze theorie combineert elementen van de theorie van Harsanyi en
Selten (I988) met. die van Harsanyi (1993). Als de kans dat een verkeerde actie wordt
geobserveerd niet te groot is, dan selecteert onze theorie het Stackelberg evenwicht.
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